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SECTION I 
/NTRODTJC TION 
BIOGRAPR/CAL TRODUCTIO1 1 
Life began for Louis de Donald in the manner 
in which it was to be immortalized - aristocratic, 
feudal and, above all, Catholic. Born at Milieu, 
Prance on October 2, 1754, the descendant of one of 
the old families of the Rouergue, Louis-Gabriel- 
Ambroise, Vicomte de Donald later took great pride in 
retracing his lineage to the time of the Reformation 
when one of his forebears, Etienne de Donald , (then a 
member of the Parlament of Toulouse), was largely 
responsible for the city's complete rejection of the 
new religious ideas. The title of Vicomte' did not, 
as is sometimes erroneously supposed, originate with 
Louis himself; but was acquired in the seventeenth 
century by the family of Bonald when the estate of 
la Rode came into their possession. It was as the 
Vicomte de la Rode that Louis de Donald took his seat 
in the 1789 Assembly of the Nobility of the Rouergue; 2 
1.This section is based upon the evidence of Henri 
Moulinies biography, De Donald (Paris 1915) . to 
date, the most comprehensive treatment, based on 
family papers and local archival records. 
2.Laroque et Barthelemy, Catalooue des Gentilshommes 
du Roaergue, (Paris 1863)p.31. Moulinie,p.4+ 
moreover, the title appears in his nominations for the 
Academie francaise and the Chamber of Deputies - both 
of which predate his personal entry to the peerage under 
Louis XVIII. 
As befitted such a tradition, Louis was sent for 
his education to the School of the Oratorians at %%illy 
where the medieval curriculum of philosophy, logic and 
mathematics was under the rigid guidance of the Catholic 
brotherhOod. The Superior of the college at the time 
was Father Mandar(d), whose friendship Bonald was to 
retain through many years of exile. Apropos the 
following sections of this thesis, it may not be without 
relevance to note that this same Father Mandar(d) of 
(Rainy was one of the friends of Rousseau, referred to 
in the Confessions4 Rousseau redalls the evening spent 
with his friend the day before the Parlement of Paris 
. declared its condemnation of Emile. In view of the fact 
that Donald himself spent most of his life denouncing 
the theories of Rousseau, it_is,worth remarking that 
the author of the Profession', de foi du vicaire savoyard 
and the staunch upholder of the Theorie du pouvoir both 
valued the friendship of this influential teacher. 
The imprint of his early schooling is everywhere 
apparent in Bonald's , works which grind heavily through 
the processes of deductive logic to their geometric 
3.J.J. Roussoau, Confe SS 1.0129 • (ed. PlamMarion, Paris, n• de ) 
Vol.IX,Part TI,Book XI,(1702),p.258. 
3• 
conclusions. Sainte.Beave, who had even less regard 
for the manner of Donald's arguments than he had for 
the matter, accused him of taking from his Catholic 
education only what was convenient and orthodox and 
never achieving what was philosophic and liberal. 4 
Of Donald's style, with its endless repetitions and 
impossibly contrived three-way divisions and sub. 
divisions, such criticism is justified; but of the man 
himself, as the events of 1789 oho this picture must 
needs be modified. 
Meanwhile, however, Donald completed his time at 
Juilly and returned to Mill= to consider his future 
career. Pinally t after much hesitation, in 1773 he 
joined the royal musketeers and went to live amid the 
dissolute society of Louis XV's court. Donald . his 
biographer reports 5  . resisted the general corruption 
of the century which, it might be added, in later life 
Donald was contrary enough to attribute to the deficient 
moral code of the democrats. However, Donald remained 
with the musketeers until they were disbanded in 1776, 
after which he returned to Milieu, where ten years later 
he was appointed mayor. And it was in this capacity 
that Donald greeted the early Revolutionary days with 
so much uncharacteristic enthusiasm; he did more than 
4•Sainte.Beuve, Constitutionnel (18 aoat 1851); Causeries 
du Lundi IV,OZITIWirrdrfra, (Paris o n.d.)p,428. 
5.Moulinie, p.8. 
pimply condone the Revolution - he actively supported 
6 it. . Regarding the development of the man retrospectively, 
the picture of Donald as a' militant revOlutionist . 
rallying his native town flaux armee for the principles 
of '89 appears incongruous, and yet it was so. The 
popular events of that crucial first year: the convocation 
of the States-General, their reunion at Versailles, the 
vote-byhead decision ofthe Third Estate against the 
wishes of the king and the other two orders, their triumph 
in the National Assembly empowered to give a constitution 
to France - Donald viewed from Millen with approval.. In 
fact, after the king had agreed to dismiss the troops 
surrounding Paris and Versailles and to recall Necker, 
the inhabitants of Millau - led by Donald,. now mayor by 
popular election - convoked an assembly to draw up 
petitions of approbation.. Donald's speech on this 
occasion declares his open and wholehearted adherence 
to the revolutionary. principles:- 
. ...You' could not have regarded 
with indifference the events which 
• 	 have afflidted, and have consoled, 
the nation. Your hopes and your 
thoughts have followed these generdue. 
citizens in the brilliant and dangerous 
course which they are pursuing; and, on 
the eve of receiving from them the 
happiness and liberty you have desired, 
by revealing that you. are imbued with 
6. 01. Peyrot litge_22111,12._Le_910A1A2s_cle la Glagno t to, 
- avec une etude our les debuts dia-la Revolution dans 
la Rouergue (1892); ikouliniO,P.10. 
• these sentiments, you show 
yourselves to be worthy of them; 
patriotism has brought you together, i 
it will inspire your resolutions... 
He sees this assembly as a_ symbol of the reunion of 
hearts and wills which the Revolution presages; he' 
predicts that this sacred title of citizen and the. 
prevailing spirit of concord and of fraternity will 
unify ranks and opinions. 8 After these - words the entire 
assembly proceeded to Notre Dame to _sing a Te DeuM to - 
express their gratitude for that Providence which had 
delivered the Revolution up unto France. The following 
day the three orders of Milieu voted unanimously to 
adhere to the decrees of the National Assembly, and 
Bonald himself drafted the following letters to the 
king: 
•Sire...the citizens of Milieu, 
crushed beneath the weight of 
taxes, in learning that the 
people are about to recover 
their rights and to be invested 
by your generosity with a share , 
in your power, look now upon the 
future with hope... 9 
and to the National Assembly: 
...Every Frenchman has become 
citizen. "All ranks, all 
distinctions have been swept 
aside, to be embodied in the 
7.j. Artieres t Annales de Milieu., p. 229 ;MouliniO, p.14. 
8. Mid. 
9.77itieres t op. oit.  -.PP. 33ff; tiounnie, p.16. 
5 . 
sacred title of Children 
of Prance... 10 
Some Months later, Bonald himself entered the 
records of the National Assembly as the initiator of 
thenconfederation d'honneurn a'project Which was 
adopted by all Prendh municipalities for the maintenance 
Of order and security in , the face of the dieorder and 
confusion which the Grande. Pear threatened. On the eve, 
of the first popular election, Bonald addressed the 
Citizen's of Millau: 
Although associated for three 
centuries with the destinies 
of this town, my family has 
known only its misfortunes. 
They have watched it time and 
time again torn by fanaticism, 
devastated by civil wars, bowed 
under the yoke of despotism. 
More fortunate than my fathers, 
/ have seen it reborn under the 
auspices of liberty; indeed, I 
was destined to proclaim it to 
you. My last function as. mayor 
must be to inform.you that we 
shall recover the rights of man 
and of the citizen, 11 
And so, Louis de Bonald, standing on the democratic 
platform of liberty, equality and fraternity which 
afterwards was anathema to him, was returned as mayor 
. by 293 of a possible 378 votes, 
6. 
11.77Etieree, oilfeit.,144241.2; 1oulinie,p,18. 
Prom the position of mayor, Bonald went on to 
become a member and then president of the departmental 
Assembly; until, in 1791 at the November session, his 
name does not appear in the register of deliberations. 
This is the beginning of Bonald's complete and bitter 
break with the Revolution and its principles. The 
rupture came, as for so many of the counter-revolutionaries, 
w-ith the implementation of the Civil Constitution of the 
Clergy. At Millau the treatment meted out to refractory 
priests aroused the wrath of the Catholic citizens and 
revived the old religious quarrels; houses were raided 
and pillaged and as the terror epread many of the citizens 
left the town - among them Bonald. 
Coblentz had become the centre of emigre resistance, 
and Bonald joined the forces gathering to support the 
prince de Conde; but after many months of fruitless 
campaigning in the Bourbon regiment, Bonald left for 
Heidelberg where he lived until 1795 under the assumed 
name of Saint-Severin. It was during his exile in 
Heidelberg that Bonald composed his first work, Theorie 
du pouvoir politique et religieux with no other references 
at hand, his son reportst 2than Bossuet's Histoire 
Universelle and several volumes of Tacitus: information 
which will surprise no-one who has read the Theorie du 
12.Henri de Bonaldr No tice  
. 1841); Mou1inie-, p;727 -ItUrAbWiii-TolTiiii-the 1845 
edition. See,however,L.de Bonald, Cauvres (Bruxelles, 
' 1845) VII1,pp.4461488. 
youvoir, In addition, the two works which seemed to 
Bonald to epitomize the political philosophy which' he 
proposeirto refute Montesquieu's Esprit des lois and 
Rousseau's Contrat social, must have been accessible to 
him for he quotes copiously and accurately from them, 
Many years later he explained that he believed that by 
this work he had fulfilled a duty: 
I took up my pen under the 
• influence of an irresistible 
impression, 
13 he wrote, and elucidated his impression by the inscription 
with which he chose to preface the first edition of the 
Thdorie du nouvoir published at Constance by emigre priests 
in 1796. It is a quotation from the Oontrat social: 
• If the legislator, mistaking 
his purpose. establishes a 
• principle contrary to that 
• which .arises from the nature 
of things, the State will not 
cease to be troubled until such 
• time as this principle is 
destroyed or changed and invincible 
• nature has asserted her dominion, 14 
In adopting his opponent's standard, Bonald was declaring 
war on first principles. 
Thus, when the work reached Paris, it was seized and 
confiscated by the Directory whose legitimacy it so 
'obviously attacked, and no Bonald's theories could have 
•13•Lettre a la Revue Europeenne, ao8t,1834; 
14,J,J,Rousseau,. Contrat social,Bk,2,Chap,XI (Vaughan ed, 
little or no effect in the political circles to which 
they were directed. The general public was entirely 
ignorant of the work and only a few of Bonald's friends 
and admirers retained copies of it - notably Chateaubriand, 
Bonaparte and, rather surprisingly, Sieyes15 The Theorie 
du pouvoir was not reprinted daring Bonald's lifetime; 
although Bonaparte, after his return from Egypt, offered 
to do so at the expense of the State, Bonald refused 
permission for what would have been a flagrant compromise 
of his monarchic and religious principles. 
Meanwhile, however, the growing royalist numbers in 
the two councils of the Directory had made it possible, 
even if not legal, for emigres to return to France and in 
1797 Bonald arrived in Paris where he remained in hiding 
until, after the peace of Amiens, he took the prescribed 
oath of allegiance to the government and the constitution, 
which enabled him to return once again to Millau, It was 
during these years in Paris that Bonald's friendship with 
Fontanee, Chateaubriand, La Harpe and other prominent 
literary figures with whom he collaborated on the Mercure 
de France and later the Journal dee Debate developed. 
But Bonaldie retreat from the life and affairs of 
Paris was short-lived* For many years Napoleon Bonaparte 0 e 
esteem for the political theorist had been apparent. In 
15 See Sainte-Beuve, op.citipm.430-31(note). 
10. 
1806, when Napoleon was attempting to capture the Spanish 
throne for his brother Joseph, a passage from the Theorie 
fiu pauvoirs 
Who would dare to seek revenge 
• once the king has pardoned? , 
16' was inserted in the newspapers at Napoleon's command. 
Bonaparte was obviously interested in Bonald because he 
was aware that, with significant modifications,' the 
latter's do •trines could be made to serve as ratifications 
of his own personal regime and imperial intentions; and 
he continually sought to employ Bonald's talents in the 
service of the government, He requested Bonald's 
assistance in his project against England, which he asked 
Bonald to treat in a dissertation upon the pliberte des 
mere". Napoleon himself outlined the argument whidh was 
submitted to Donald; the letter's reply has not been 
recorded, but the fact that the work never appeared is
sufficient evidence of Donald's defiance Bonald, in 
fact, never became reconciled to the imperial regime 
despite the overtures of Napoleon Oho, on OMB occasion, 
intervened to extricate Donald from Fouche's charges in 
relation to the publication of an artiole . on tolerance . 
in the Meraure de Orance 17and, on another, extended the 
bribe of a lucrative position as editor of the Journal 
16iHide Donald& op.cit.,(1845)N455(note). 
17.See P.Masson, Na oleon et M.de Bonald.Bcho de Paris, 
,(2 mai,1910); mou 	etP0 
11. 
de l'Empire in the vain hope of persuading Bonald to 
return to Paris 18 
But apparently the Emperor Napoleon could not always 
be refused, for in 1810 Bonald was persuaded to accept 
the position on the Council of the University which he 
had refUsed, two years earlier and which had since 
remained vacant . at the command of Napoleon, who is 
reported to have told Lucien Bonaparte that the position 
was not available because it had been reserved for M,de 
19 Bonald. Bat Napoleon's victory was a Pyrrhic one: actually, 
the University Council was not a policy-making body and 
was required only to deliberate upon questions relating 
to the reorganization of the education system which were 
submitted to it, This made it possible for Bonald to 
retain his position in Napoleon's government without 
actively contributing to it in any way. The imperial 
organization of education made no allowance for Bonald's 
Views,: that education should be completely subordinated 
to religion' and that teachers should be placed under the 
direction of the clergy or better still, replaced by 
members of religious orders, Naturally loath , to put 
into practice or even to condone principles not in accord 
with his own, Bonald adopted a policy of passive non-
cooperation and, in fact, spent only a few days each year 




in ParisPWhen, on behalf of the Emperor, Cardinal Maury 
approached him with the tentative offer of the position 
of tutor to the heir to the imperial throne (then "King 
of Rome"), Bonald made his attitude plain. "I should 
teach him to rule anywhere,", replied Donald, "save at 
Rome," 
• After four years spent thus, it was without regret 
that Donald watched Napoleon's departure for Elba and 
the reetoration of the legitimate king, although the 
•terms of the Charter which deprived the king of absolute 
power were a great disappointment to himP Nevertheless, 
once again, Louis de Donald found himself at the head of 
the deputation from Milieu deleted to convey congratulatory 
messages to the king. Donald terminated his speech by 
alluding to the independent stand he had attempted to 
maintain throughout the Napoleonic regime: 
Sire...(he said)...I have not 
ceased to respect power, but 
for a long time I have been 
unaccustomed to praise it. 	23 , 
The king's reply is indicative of the favour in which 
Donald was to be held throughout the reigns of Louis XVI/I 
and Charles X: 
...Milieu could not have chosen 
a more worthy voice to exprese 
Ito sentiments. 	24 
20.F.Masson, Echo de Paris (6 mai,1910)1 Moulinie0.39. 
21.B.de Bonald, o .cit.,p$463. , 
22•Victor de Donald, 	la Vie et des Carvres de M. le 
Vicomte de Bonald Avigncr ou.1 2. 
23.Journals des Debate,(3 juillet,1814)1 Moulinietp.42. 
13* 
Bonald retained his position as Councillor of the 
University and was recoimended by *the king for the: 
Academie francaise; but before the Academie had time to 
appoint new members, Bonaparte had returned triumphant 
to Paris* Bonald fled to' Aveyron for the duration of 
the Hundred Days, not to return to Paris until, under 
the Second Restoration, he was elected to represent his 
department in the Chamber of Deputies* The elections 
of 1815 were conducted at the height of the royalist 
reactions amid the fear of the White Terror, with Prance 
still occupied by the Allied armies; and the result was 
a monarchist government hostile to the Revolution. This 
was the famous "ChaMbre introuvable" at times more 
royalist than the king and more Catholic than the Pope . 
of which Bonald was a prominent member. 
Between 1815 and 1822 Bonald was regularly returned 
to parliament by the electors of Aveyron, a strongly 
Catholic and pro.royalist constituency* But it was 
during the first year of his parliamentary career that 
Donald experienced his most striking success: largely 
due to his initiative and intervention, the articles of 
the Civil Code relating to divorce were completely 
reversed and, in the name of religion and morality, the 
indissolubility of marriage was established for nearly 
seventy years. 251t was measures such as this that 
25 The bill drawn up by Bonald was promulgated =Nay 8, 
1816; it remained in force until 1884. 
14. 
incurred the wrath of the Liberals, who called the, 
Chambre introuvable "The Terror of 1815" and "The 
Delirium of , 93". Bonald, on the contrary, regarded 
as the moat honourable period of his life his association 
with this Chamber which, he claimed, 
...raised in Europe the flag 
of religion and monarchy, . 
wished to give to Prance the 
only government Which was suited 
to it and to Europe the only 
guarantees which would pacify it, 
(and which)...has always !sought 
justice before the law, moderation 
in matters of taxation, economy in. 
eipendtture, security of government. 26 
But despite his acclamation of the re-establiehment of 
the legitimate monarchy, Bonald could not condone the 
terms of the Charter which Louis XVIII had sanctioned; 27 
and the ultra.royalist found himaelf in the dichotomous 
position of repudiating the king's wlehee in order to 
serve the monarchy. In 1817 he wrote to Mme de Sezet 
Sometimes it is necessary to 
• serve the king, not only 
• without hope of recompense, 
but in the certainty of 
displeasing him, . 28 
And this theme appears again in an article in the 
Journal des Debate entitled "Can one contradict the• 
26.Conservateur (Juillet,1819); Moulinie e pp.83.84, 
27.At the commencement of the 1815 session, all deputies 
were required to swear allegiance to the Charter; 
Bonald avoided this by remaining absent. The stratagem 
did not go unnoticed. See Villelets letter to his 
father (8 octobre,1815); Mou1inie,N141. 
28.3 aoitt,1817; Moulinie,N89. 
15. 
monarch out of zeal for his cause?" 29Then, in 1822, 
Donald was admitted by edict to the king's Privy Cduncil 
. "the position is merely a sinecure," he wrote to a 
friend. 30  The followinglrear . 1823 - Louie XVIII called 
him to the Chamber of Peers, possibly in an attempt to 
mollify, Donald's rancour, but the latter never wavered 
In his attack upon the Charter. Discouraged by the fall 
of Villa°, even the return of the Ultras to power under 
Polignac failed to encourage Donald. No parliamentarian, 
least ()tall Polignac, he averred, was capable of saving 
a society which was constituted on false principles. 31 
The evil lies in 
the Charter 
he wrote to his friend Senftl 2when it became obvious that 
the days of the Bourbons were numbered. Finally, after 
his appointment to the presidency of the Censorship Board 
in 1827 and the unpopularity and rupture with Chateaubriand 
which resulted, Donald severed his connection with 
parliamentary affairs, although he himself had rendered 
this appointment a foregone conclusdon. Formally years 
he had made public his rigid views on the subject of 
censorship. In 1817 he had spoken in favour of it, 
likening the role of censor to that of author's friend, 
permitted to read, manuscripts before publication. In 
29.13 septembre,1819; Ibid. 
30.Lettre a Mme de Stair(7 mars,1822): 2oulinie.P.45. 
31.See Henri de Donald, op.oit..14480. 
32.8 aoat,18291 moulini fp. • 
this way, censorship became for Bonald a "truly liberal 
institutionn, far preferable to judicial repression. 33 
Even capital punishment Boneld defended on the grounds 
that it "merely sent 's criminal before his natural judge
Paul Courier voiced the hostility of his generation when 
he repliedt 
Go and teach all nations, 
-said the Master; but it is ' 
not written, Go with the 
police and teach. 	35 
Towards the end of 1829, therefore, Bonald 
to Monne, where he pat the finishing touches to 
Demonstration •hiloso 'his i. e du rinci e oonsti 
socifit6: a résumé of his previous publications, 
appeared early in 1830 on the eve of the second 
in defiance of his principles, 
retired 
the 
tif de 1 
The work 
revolution 
In spite of the active part which he had played in 
political affairs during the Bourbon restoration, Bo:wad's 
publications had continued to appear: in 1817 the Peneees t 
in 1818 Observations our l'omvre de Mme la baronne de 
Steel, and in 1819 the Melanpes •. a collection of articles 
which had appeared in the Iferoure and the Debate4 6and he 
Continued to contribute to the periodical prose which 
had eliveys been such a powerful weapon of the opposition. 
In 1816 the Correspondent.. a monthly review designed to 
33 See Boneld'e speeches in the Chamber of Deputiee,28 Jan, 
1817 and 19 deo,1817; ( ] xvres VI,p,363ff;cf VI/I,p.207ff. 
34 Quoted by Jules Simon, Philosophes et PUblitistes  
Contem °rains M de Bona d - Revue des Deux.4ondes(27) 
tpw 	ant. Sa n e-Beuve, op.cit.,p.436. 
35 Quoted in P, Be Arta, Reaction 814.18an 	2 
(New . York,1963)p.22cr  
36 The Mortara was suppressed in 1807 by Napoleon following 
a subversive article by Chateaubriand; and the Journal 
des Debate became, in 1806, Napoleon's mouthpidarq ---- 
1A 1 
17. 
bring about the fusion Of interests $ tastes$ and principles 
of Prance and Englend32 appeared for the first time in 
England._ Both Donald and ChateaUbriand were associated 
with it throughout its short existence, Two years later, 
after negotiations between ititrolles $ FrOnilly$ and the 
principal memberi of the group of Ultras, a new journal 
was started which for a brief period became the centre 
of royalist resistance. This was the Conservateurj but 
with the fall of the Demises ministry the Conservateuros 
purpose had been fulfilled and it ceased to appe 
whereupon Bonald directed his contributions to the 
arch—royalist Quotidienne. 
Daring these years Donald was also an habitue of 
many of the leading salons of the Restoration, lismartine 
records39that Bonald was often present at the salon of 
the princess de la TrOmouille, and it was at the ealon, 
of Mme Charles that Bonald and Lamartine became acquainted. 
Naturally Donald frequented the ultra- royalist gatherings 
of the Baron de Prenillyrand often accompanied 
Chateaubriand to the salons of Mme Becamier and e de 
Beaumontelfor these men . Donald, Prenilly and 
Chateaubriand . at this time shared identical religious 
and political views, collaborating first on the Mercure 
374A.Chnquet (ed), Bec011ectIme of Baron de Pr,enillx. 
(lsOndon$1909)P0U2*.' 
la.-Altheugh Bonald. .14amennais and FrOnilly continued, it 
for some time under' the tame of the. Defenseur,  
39.LaMartine4 Histoire Ao la Restauration (Paris)14p0 426$ 
40 A. Chuquet (edJ, .  
41 Chateadbriand$ 	o reer, gutg.i;mbe. (Paris)1949.  
PartII,PP#25-27. 
18,0 
de Prance and later on the Conservateur. The other 
partner associated with the Conservateur was Lamennais 
for many years a disciple of Bonald, although be, like 
Chateaubriend, suffered a change of heart, eventually 
rejecting Roman Catholicism. re Haller, whose 
Restauration de la science social° (published between 
1816 and 1820 in German) vas an apologia for Catholicism 
analogous to Bonaldss own, was a staunch supporter of 
the prinoiples of the Iheorie du pouvoir.1 2But the supreme 
expounder of Bonaldian traditionalism was the Savoyard 
counter..revolutionary, Joseph de Maistre, Their theories 
bore such a marked resemblance that de Maistre, towards 
the end of his life, wrote: 
' I have thought nothing that 
you have not written; I have 
written nothing that you 
have not thought, 	43 
and almost invariably, when the counter-revolution is 
discussed, the names Donald and de Maietre follow one 
another as the flji4  t the day, This is rendered the more 
remarkable by the fact that the two men never met: on the 
only occasion that de Maietre went to Paris, Bonald had 
been called away to Monna; so that it is doubtful if 
Bonald could be said to have exercised any influence 
upon de Maistre, Although de Maistress Considerations 
42. ,Both the work and de Haller were brought to Paris 'by 
, Bonald; de Haller was a Swiss Protestant converted to 
Roman Catholicism, Bonald was certainly influential in 
this conversion, which rendered de Haller ineligible . 
to represent his Protestant conatituency and forced 
,him to Paris, where Bonald was instrumental in placing 
• him on the editorial staff of the DebatelMoulinie,pp,60-2. 
43. see L, do Bonald, Principe constituTif.,.,chap.XVII, 
(Euvres VIII, p.10d(note). 
sur la Prance and the Theorie dm DouvRir were published 
coincidentally and postulate identical maxims, certainly 
they develop along very different lines# 44 
Nevertheless, it was outside Parliament, among these 
representatives of the Traditionalist boheol f that Bonaldfs 
influence me felt; his parliamentary Career, after the 
divoreellaw of 1816, Was ,a story of gogged opposition
• and failure, Even. cbarlea X did not admit . him to his 
Privy Council, AOting' always in accordance with his , 
intractable principles, Bonald regarded all compromise 
as defeat; to speak of the centre was to declare , 
revolution, for between monarchy and democracy was 
no...manta land. 
,Either society must be 
a monastery or.“ an 
evil place 
. he wrote f It is little wonder that Louis do Bond 
became, for his contemporaries and for posterityl 6the 
very incarnation of the ancien regime.kt 
44. See the comparative study by Emile Paguet, Politi UG 
,t Moralistes du dix.neuvieme siecle o (Paris, 
cr51710P170 b97cr.
, 
45.Lettre à Senft (16 , fevrier,1824); Moulinietp,140. 
46#Bona1d died at Monne on November 23,1840, aged 87 years, 
INTRODUCTION 
• (Chateaubriand) looks 
upon me as an aged man 
dreaming dreams of a 
by.gons century, 
wrote Bonald to de Maistre in 1821t7and posterity, on the 
whole, has agreed with Chateaubriand. Zees than one year 
after Donald's death. Simon wrote' (in reply to the 
official panegyric of the Academie francaies):. 
(Louis de Bonald) must be 
counted among the most 
irreconcilable enemies of 
our liberties...EV= now 
his political cease is lost 
for over and his philosophy 
dead . or dying. 48 
It has continued to be exhumed from time to time, 
however, as• the fortunes of the Action francaiso have 
waxed and waned, But apart from the Traditionalists 
470QUoted by 2aints-Beuve4,o 
48, Jules Simon. .014,0it. ,pp, 5 4. 
448# 
themselves (notably Barbey OAurevilly and Paul :Bourgot)1 9 
who naturally draw heavily upon Bonald's dogma in 
support of their' own, opinions have Changed little. Until 
the 1920s, in fact, critics had concurred with Professor 
Laski's evaluation of Louis de Donald: 
He was totally out of accord 
with the spirit of his time. 
All for which it came to stand 
he branded as the utmost sin; 
all for which he cared was lost 
at the barricades of 1830. The 
monarchy' for which he cherished 
so passionate an affection 
destroyed itself by acting on 
his principles. He urged nothing 
that history, if it did not falsify, 
at any rate failed to respect. He 
did not, like de Maistre, die before 
the course of events had proved the 
impossibility of his ideals. He did 
not, like Lamennais, find in the 
events of his age the basis of a 
better philosophy. Re belonged 
always to the eighteenth century, 
not indeed in the essentials of 
its intellectual attitude, but in 
its dogmatic and inflexible spirit. 50 
And these conclusions are easily reconciled with the 
facts. Essentially, Donald had become a political writer 
in response to a particular set of circumstances; and 
Donald however much be might argue to the contrary 
(nun/ye sal, absolute truth') . never lost sight of this 
50,R.J.Laski,' Authority in the Modern State  
9,128, 	, 
49. See Jules Barboy d' Aurevilly, Prohètes  (Paris,1851 and Bourget et Salomon, e 




fact, As One Who had survived the chaos and terror of 
the expulsion from the Garden of Eden, he felt himself 
aoipelled to lead the chosen people; not onward to the 
Promised Land, but back 4. for, to Bonald, it was trftlY 
to be Paradise Regained, To this end, he set himself 
to oppose the Pfalse" doctrines which had triumphed with 
the Revolution by expounding the ' ,true', principles of 
human society. 
The ofalse" dogma which her proposed to refute was 
that of the eighteenth-century philoeophee - in particular, 
of Rousseau and Monteequieu51 (ae well as, incidentally, 
Condoroot52and Voltaire"), Man, they had proclaimed, is 
naturally good and, by his nature, possesses certain 
sacred and imprescriptable rights; society is the work 
of man and rests upon a contract voluntarily undertaken 
between the members of the social group; all authority 
in the state originates in the people; the true saverei 
source of the constitution, the government, and the laws, 
which accepts no other direction than the general will, 
Such, in brief, is the creed which Bonald set out to 
refute. But, in doing so, he was to accept more of its 
tenets than he (or his critics) realized, 
On the contrary, Donald argued, man tends naturally 
51•Preface to Theoris 
52,e,g,Thciorie 
53.e.g, Dee 0 s e Vol 
pp,7-23,  
ouvoir 	uvrea III,pp,17 1 18, 
vres op,161.163, 
aver', Melanges..  (Biwa° VII, 
23. 
to be bad54  and needs to be guided and repressed by an 
authority outside himselfrman (he continues) .exists for 
society and not society for man; he has, not righte but 
duties, to fan).* 
00e The Declaration of Rights 
is only a partial truth... it 
is necessary to define for man 
rather less of his rights and 
rather more of his duties, 56 
Society is a necessary and primary condition the work 
of nature, not the conventional and arbitrary arrangement 
of man; all authority derives from a poser superior to 
that of man . from, in fact, Godrlawe therefore are the 
necessary rapport between natural phenomena, not the 
work of the legislator . man cannot give a constitution 
to society any more than he can give weight to matter, 
And in his mystical acoOunt of the origin of society, 
Ronald calls to task not only Rousseau but also Hobbes: 
. 	Was (the establishment of society) 
the outcome of force or the result 
of a contract? Definitely not. The 
institution of public power was 
neither voluntary nor forced; it 
was nocessaz, which moans that it 
•conforms , o the nature of social 	, 
beings; and its causes and its 
•origin were perfectly natural. 58 
This opposition stems from a fundamentally 
antithetical point of view, The philosophy of the 
54.e.g.Theorie du ouvoir Ceuvres 11100.32; Essai 
.analtiquo, Oivrea ,p. 3• 
55,Thborie.du ouvoir Wavree 1110.34, 
56. 	s a on pr 	OEUvres lop,224.5, 
570  orie du pouvoir, 	OTOS nit p. 38, 
58.1;pincipe constitutif, Wavres, 	p, 55, 
244, 
eighteenth century is based upon the . for Donald'. 
dangerous presupposition Of individualism: the initial 
error which breeds all other errors, In society it 
recognizes only the individual, reduces everything to 
the individual, and has for its end the full development 
of the individual through the realization of the rights 
of the individual. For Bonald this is :tantamount to - 
defining society as a rope of sand . social nihilism, 
anarchy, 40 lessPfor the individual exists only in and 
for societyPeociety makes man What he is and is 
responsible for what he becomes; apart from the familial, 
religious and professional groups which constitute society, 
Man has no identity. Except'.• and here is a problem 
except for the men of genius; men like Charlemagne, Who' 
gave to Christian Europe 
the impulsion which is 
still 	 61 
like Clovis: 
a man of great genius (d0) 
raised On indestructible 
foundations , the edifice 
of the Prench.Empire, 62 
and Oven Voltaire: 
who is responsible for the 
misforftnes of France. * ** 63 
59,e,g,"Du traite de Westphalieo, CRuvres 11,p,430, 
60,nu perfectionnement de lthommef', 
V110P,516.517„ 
61,Essai analytiaae, OSUNams 10,113, 
62,4hOorie du ouvoir Wavres 111074225, 
63, 0 Des 0 	o 	re iélanfes. Murree V110:234, 
The final seotion of this thesis will . be devoted to 
analyzing the adequacy of Donald's solution to the 
problems raised by Voltaire and the role of the individual 
as a causative factor in history; and has been prompted 
14 the suspicion that perhaps Donald's unchallenged 
flanti.individualista attitude might be in need of a 
reappraisal 64 
Of spume, (Donald continues) Rousseau, Montesquieu 
and the men of '89 and 0 93 are not innovators they 
have only drawn the conclusions of the sixteenths+centuri's 
promisees. And Donald retraces the origins of their 
erroneous do a to the Beformation, 65He sees in the 
spirit of free examination and individual reasoning the 
seeds of revolution not only in the Church but in the 
State; in the Church in the seventeenth century when 
the religion of authority was challenged by the theists 
and the atheists; in the State in the eighteenth century 
when the Revolution destroyed the power of the monarchy, 
Opposing thus the individual to the group, the reason 
of each to the reason of all, the authority of the 
evidence to the evidence of Authority, the work of man 
to that of nature, the arbitrary to the necessary, the 
artificial to the natural, he strives to show that, last 
as the strength of religious authority waned with the 
64. See infra, .Section V soVoltaire and History," 
65 0 Principe constitUtif, Chapitre XX, ODUVree VIII, 
15.124-130. 
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break from Rome, 'so the strength of domestic harmony was 
disrupted by the institution of divorce, and the Strength 
of political power with . the advent of democracy. The 
French Revolution has only consummated the trend initiated 
• by Calvin and Luther* 66  
• For the disintegration began by the Reformation, 
according to Bonald, there is but one remedy . complete 
and unequtuocal return to the state of authority . in 
religion, in the family and in the Stater Individual 
judgments can be nothing more than opinions which are 
particular and transitory; what man must know are the 
absolute, universal and eternal truths, found not in 
the reasoning of men, but in the reasoning of humanity 
• that is, in nature itself, which is God* And how 
can man come to understand this wisdom, which is not 
his to reason but to know? By studyinghistory and 
by analysing eociety and its traditions, particularly 
the vehicle of all tradition . language* And what be 
will find is ( a surprise for which Bonald did not 
prepare his readers because be did not perceive it 
himself) the divinely determined plan for the successive 
development of the human race: a doctrine of progress 
and perfectibility which might begin with Catholicism 
but which suggests marked affinities with the earthly 
66assai analyticUet Mrvres 1„pp,17-19, 
67 Essai analytiQue, *rims, 10P•18-214 
city of the eighteenth-century philosophers. The 
ensuing investigation"into the degree of Bonaldos 
commitment to the rational doctrine of the Ideologues 
whom he scorned has been instigated by this apparent 
convergence with the -Enlightenment. 
It is upon the "conclusive" evidence of history. 
and tradition, without which its principles would be 
mere abstract postulates, that the Theorie du'eouvoir 
is based. But, if this is really so, Bonald is 
sponsoring contradictory arguments, for what he is 
claiming as his own method is the very historical, 
empirical claim to fame of his adversaries. Either 
Bonald is working from the revealed word to absolute 
truth which is beyond proof or he is accepting the 
methodological innovations of Newtonian science If 
the former, he is guilty of the very crime with which 
he reproaches his unbeloved infidels: his 'men of 
imagination""who proceed from the principles to the 
facts instead of from the facts to the generalizations. 
In any case, even the presence of such an accusation 
suggests that there are anomalies in this aspect of 
Bonald#s thought which are in need of clarification. 70 
For, in all the works which follow (see particularly 
68• See infra, Section XV : "Condoroet and Enlightenment". 
69."Bayle, Voltaire, Jean-Jacques, Helvetius, Diderot, 
eto,n Escai analytique, Cauvres I0.14« 
70,See infra, Sections /YI and VI Montesquieu and 
Society"; "Voltaire and History". 
28. 
the gBislation primitive and the asbarshas.ghlleeephioues) 
this recourse to history and tradition is supplemented 
by the theory of language which, in its philosophical 
ramifications, becomes the pivot of Bonald's doctrina l 
Language Donald sees as the means by which are transmitted 
from generation to generation the traditiona which embody 
the social and moral truths. But language is nothing 
more than the expression of thought and the one only 
exists with - and because of - the other.- Thus the 
origins of tradition - that is, of society itself 
must be the source also of thought and of language* So 
that only, if man can be proved to have invented language 
can he be said to have found d society. If, on the other 
hand, language can be proved to have been a gift of (led, 
it follows that truth and wisdom are to be found there 
also; and God becomes the true founder of society* 
Against the arbitrary plan of the eighteenth-century 
rationalists, Bonald poses the divinely ordained; and 
Bonald bases his proof upon the aphorism: man thinks 
k his words before he ep aka his thoughts *7, ,Therefore, to 
have invented language man would first have required the 
conception of language; but to have conceived the idea 
since the idea implies the expression - he must already 
have possessed the spoken language: a contradiction. 
7l,L6j elation rimitive,Bk,I,Chap*I,Cauvres, 101).275-280; 
Req_ag_es,, 	Pe 	reel V,PP.72=1-39; see also 'Chrifitian MardchalqragEgriais in "La Philosophic, de 
Donald", •AnneIes de Philoso hie'Ohretienne,141910 * 
72*Essai amilytiaue, OEuvres 
29. 
which reveals, the absurdity of the atheists' attempt to 
 
spurn the evidence of revelation.73  Witness Rousseau, who 
gives evidence in-favour of Bonald's case, before 
dismissing it unresolved: 
• since the spoken word 
would appear to have been a 
necessary pre-.requisite to the 
establishment of the spoken word, 
• and convinced of the 
impossibility that language 
could have been a purely human 
invention, I leave to those 
who are prepared to undertake it 
the discussion of this difficult 
question... 	74 
' • It would appear, therefore, that students of Ronald, 
perhaps mistaking inflexibility for consonancy, have 
credited him with greater consistency than his work at 
times warrants. Perceiving that the logical outcome of 
a divinely ordained society constituted upon the revealed 
word is a constitution based upon the Decalogue (a 
commandment for all men at all times and in all placesT 5 
a yardstick for all legislators) most critics seem to 
have overlooked the discrepancies which the Theorie du 
rouvoir suggests. In fact, the appeal to revelation 
(which of course accentuates Bonald's absolutist 
tendencies) has been exaggerated by many of his 
73.16gielation primitive, Oeuvres II0p.72-75; 
Recherches phifosophicues t Oblxvres Vop.53,78-79. 
•,74."Discoure atm 	13.e Political Writings of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Vaughan ed.) Oxford, 1962, 
• Vol.I0p.155,15d. 
75.Legislation primitive, Oarvree I, p.335. 
interpreters at the expense of underrating Bonald's 
constant and Primary appeal to history (which is, 'just 
as naturally, conducive to relativism), Although, since 
the 1920s when Horatio Smith's article "Relativism in' 
76 Bonaldos Literary Doctrine" appeared, this facet of 
Bonald's thought has been recognized, it has been a 
limited recognition, restricted to particular aspects 
of his work, :Wary Quinlan . in 1953 . speaks of the 
tension between Bonald's historical and his political 
thought. T' Whereas in fact it would appear to be part 
of a fundamentally dichotomous approach which is at the 
very root'of his doctrine. This problem also . 
by implication, challenges the "extreme reactionary" 
interpretation of Bonald . has seemed to merit more 
attention than it has previously been given, 78' 
History, tradition and revelation then are the 
fixed points by which Bonald plots his neat trilogy , of 
principles, first formulated in the 2htorleas.pgana 
in the guise of the rapport between a will (volonte) 
which commands, a love (amour) which directs, and a 
force (force) which executes7 9 This axiom becomes 
Bonald's eternal triangle, which he sees perpetuated 
in all spheres of existence: in society, in God, in 
man himself. Later, it was expressed in terms of 'the 
76ijn the Journal of Modern Philoloxv (Chicago),24 
(1924)1214193-210*' 
77.M. Flail Quinlan, The Historical The t of the Vicomte 
Bonald (7aaIii.n, 9 3 pp, 
74.See infra: SectionyV, "Voltaire and History", 
794heorie du Eouvoir, Ceuvres III0435 4; ' 
31. 
"general will" or sovereignty (this is the will of 
society, nature or God), the "general power" which is 
the minister or agent of the general will (such as the 
head of domestic or political society), and the "general 
force" which is the instrument of general power (for 
example, the subject by which or for which the action 
is performed). From this trinity of elements, in 
which he discerns the image of the fundamental dogma 
of the Christian religion, Bonald deduces the law of 
the unity of power and the perpetuity of social 
distinctions: 
when (at the birth of 
society), in the midst of 
danger and uncertainty, there 
emerges a man strong in thought 
and deed who sways the multitude, 
voila le pouvoir; when the men who, 
after him, are the most capable 
and courageous join him as 
counsellors and agents, voila 
lea ministres du pouvoir; and 
when the others, under the 
protection of the intelligence 
and courage of these men, serve 
as the instruments of action... 
voila les suJets... 	80 
Their complement ? - Voila toute la constitution de 
la societe: "pouvoir", "ministre" and "sujet", which 
is, after all, only the microcosmic expression of the 
80 Princi e constitutif, CEuvres V111,pp.55-561 
LAislationprimitive, 0Euvres 1,9,342, 
32. 
vast universal trinity of cause, means and effect which 
Donald observes reflected in all forms of association: 
in the general relationship of man with God, it becomes 
God, Man-God, man; in religious society proper - God, 
priests, believers; in political society - king, nobility, 
subject-.peoples; in domestic society . father, mother, 
children; even the constitution of man he views as an 
hierarchy of elements - intelligence, organs and 'objects 
Why this uniformity ? . Because the constitution of a 
society is 
the necessary result of 
the nature of man and not 
the product of his genius 
or (of) the fortuity of 
events. 	82 
Always the constitution is the same: in man as in 
the universe; in the State as in the family and in the 
Church; man, family, State, religion and universe are 
represented as so many concentric circles devolving 
83 upon the unique centre of the universe: God. In a 
plethora of mathematical formulas, Donald describes the 
relationship of each circumference to the centre:- the 
cause is to the means as the means is to the effect; 
so that the sovereign is to the minister as the minister 
is to the subject; the father is to the mother as the 
81.Essai analytioue, OEUvres I t pp.5-9,84-89; 
rimiiNg7TEuvres 1,pp.386-387: 
82.Théorie du Douvoir, Oeuvre° 111,p.68; see also 
Easel analytigni. Oftvres 1,1).79. 
83.Priagipe constitutif, Oftvres VIII,p.102. 
33, 
84 latter is to the child; and so on, worlds without end. 
It was this obsession for "unite", "uniformite", "union" 
which led Emile Paguet to write his satirical epitaph 
for Bonalds 
I have had only one idea 
in my life - And therefore 
I have had all possible ideas 
And I have proved that all 
these ideas were none other 
than the first. 	85 
Time determined, all the elements of society fit 
neatly into their allotted places to fulfil their 
determined roles: like but never equal, in the social 
hierarchy at whose pinnacle, necessarily in solitary 
confinement, omnipotence resides. However, Sainte...Heave, 
after reading Bonald (whom he dubbed "the modern 
86 Pythagoras"), complained that, once begun 
one could no longer 
see the light of day, 
much less the Heavens 
which he expressly wished 
to show one. 	87 
The constitution, then, is society's 9maniere d'être", 
whence it follows that the administration fulfils the 
function of its role as the "maniere d'agir". And in 
84.14gislation primitive, ODuvres 
85. Paguet, OP. Olt. P.73 • 
86.Zainte-Heuve, 	 
889a750.ation Erimitiv(2, OEuvres 
his various treatises upon the many facets of 
administration - the communes, the Church, the 
provinces, the war, finance; judiciary Bonald claims 
to recreate the natural order revealed by history and 
tradition, and pronounces, as the consequence, his 
89 renowned eulogy of feudalism . 	even in this, Louis 
de Bonald bears the marks of the "interregnum" he seeks 
to efface; as enthusiastically as Condorget or the 
Encyclopedists he (who expects everything of nature 
and nothing of man 4) extols the value of education 
which is the incumbent duty of every administration. 90 
Bonald by now has established the natural and 
necessary conditions of social existence: the 
sovereignty of the general will and the subordination 
of the particular wills (which ensures the unity, 
permanence and independence of the sovereign); and 
the perpetuity of the ministry which acts on the 
authority of the sovereign solely for the good of the 
89.The Legislation primitive is the most comprehensive 
statement of Bonald's political philosophy, since 
it contains the all-important theory of language 
which does not appear in the work which pre-dates 
it, the Theorie du pouvoir: However, Bonald's 
writings, taken together, do not form a whole; all 
of the major works tend to be repetitive so that the 
final piece, Principe constitutif, is really a 
succinct resume of the previous arguments. For this 
reason, it has not seemed worthwhile to indicate 
more than one source,,except where another has 
added materially to the significance. 
90,Legislation primitive, Oftvres I,p.154; see also 
"Be leeducation et de l'instruction", Mélanges, 
CEuvres VII,pp.459 ff. 
34. 
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subject; as well as the obedience of the subject which 
is the object of the solicitude of the sovereign and ' 
the ministry. And, it follows, this constitution is 
of universal applicability because the political society 
is but the prototype of all other societies; so that 
the same logical deductions which lead Bonald to conclude 
that the only truly constituted political society is 
the absolute monarchy, lead him also to declare the 
indissolubility of marriage in the domestic societ*, 
amd the perfection of Christianity or more precisely, 
of Catholicism, in the religious society. Civil (moiety, 
being for Bonald the union of political and religious 
societies21thus incorporates the constitutions of both: 
in their perfected form . absolute monarchy and 
Catholicism. For Bonald 
The religion of the unity 
of God and the constitution 
of the unity of power converged 
(finally) in Europe. 	92 
According to whether or not societies put-into 
effect these principles of natural law, so are' they 
nconstituted n or Pnon.constitutedq3 For Donald, the 
claseification is categoric; there can be no compromises, 
for constitutions are designed, not by legislators, but 
by God: 
91.Theorie .du pouvoir, :(Euvres 
92. Ibid pi 68. 
p. 42. 
360 
The admirers of Aristotle 
speak to us of the one hundred 
and fifty-eight constitutions 
which he studied; as if there 
were more than two, one good 
and one bad.., that of the 
unity of power and that of the 
plurality of powerel 94 
From the constitution, Bonald distinguishes the 
government; from the fundamental laws which shape 
society, he perceixes the political laws which distribute 
the power. In constituted societies, the government 
arises out of the constitution and consequently is in 
harmony with it; the political laws are the natural 
and necessary concomitant of the fundamental laws. 
Other societies, however, which really are not societies 
at all but merely superficial associations, lacking a 
constitution, possess only a government imposed 
artificially from above which is neither natural nor 
necessary.95  In the latter, the general will is identified 
with the sum of the particular wills . the mistake, 
according to Bonald, of all democrats, particularly 
the arch-democrat, Rousseau: 
The will of the entire 
populatioN, even if it 
were unanimous, is only 
• the sum of the particular 
wills, and Cannot be the 
general will... 96 
•• the principal political 
error of J.J.Rausseau (and the 
94 Pens6es, Murree VI,p.42. 
950,Ibid o pp. 47TE- 
96.1bi4,p.35. 
authors of that memorable - 
,declaration) was. to confound. 
the ugenera1 11 will with the 
"collective"! 	an error 
perpetrated. by Condillac who, 
by mistaking "general ,' ideas 
for "collective" ideas, invoked • 
• atheism, lust as Jean-dacqUes 
invited anarchy, 	97 
• In fact, monarchy and democracy embody, in their 
extreme forms, all the perfections and all the vices 
of governments and 'societies. At one extreme Bonald 
idealizea the French monarchy at the height of its , 
security and power; at the other, he denounces the 
republic of '93 4* the Terror of democracy. On the.  
one hand, unit*, continuity, tradition and peace on 
the other, plurality, anarchy, ambition and war?° 
This, in the final analysis, is the original 
opposition of society to the individual, of the 
general to the particular' of nature to man, of the 
necessary to the arbitrary. And so BonaldArrives at 
his paradoxical conclusion: that true liberty and 
equality exist only in a monarchic regimerttile the 
claims of democracy, subject to the arbitrary and 
particular whims of individuals, are illusory and 
false: the philosophes have mistaken the shad= for 
97,Essai ansaytigue, ceavres I l p.75,note 1. 
98.7;:g7TRorie du pod;3177-7Euvres 111,pp.108-112,278; 
"Discaurs politiques ear l'Otat actuel de l'EuropeN, 
CEuvres II,p.300. 
99.-agmenTes Simonon.cit.,p# 514, 	. 
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the substance, the ashes for the phoenix. But how 
many of their fires were to burn again before 
Donald's own sacred cows? Natural law borrowed 
perhaps from the Contrat-social? Political science . 
Montesquieu-inspired? Humanity's progress towards 
an earthly Utopia . Condorcet'a influence? Voltaire's 
philosophy of history . refuted or appropriated? 
Barbey d'Aurevilly, only a decade after Donald's 
death, committed him to his literary asylum for 
prophets of the past where, half a century later, 
Emile Paguet found him and (intuitively, rather than 
rationally) wrote of himo 
This man of the past 
had much of the future 
in him," 	100 
Another half century has passed and still the question 
is begging; How much of the future had Louis de Donald 
in him? 
38. 
100.B.Faguet, pn.cit.,p0 98. 
SECTION II 
ROUSSEAU and NATURE 
Royalists, Maurras pointed out, may be Christians 
"first of all", that lei they may invoke the design 
of God (divine right) in justification of monarchy: 
or they may be positivists, and appeal to natural law 
and history. 1 Louis de Bonald, without a doubt, 
qualified for the former category - first and foremost 
he was a Christian. He even introduced the Theorie du 
rmuvoir with the remark that 
Ckul is a fundamental truth 
and will be taken for granted 
in this book. 	2 
But Bonald did not perceive, or at least did not 
consider, that the two categories were mutually 
exclusive, and, relegating Christian revelation to 
parentheses, set out to validate his Catholic 
conclusions by appealing to natural law and history. 
The circumstances and motives which gave impetus 
to Donald's writings dictated also his methods. To 
1. Charles Maurras, "Le Dilemma de Marc Sangnier", 
La Democratic religieuse (Paris,1921)pp.34-36; 
Charlotte Murat, French Ho alist Doctrines since 
the Revolution (New York01933)226.  
2.Theorie du nouvoir,, Oftvres 111,1424 0 
39. 
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refute the philosophes 7 to refute Rousseau, Montesquieu, 
Condoroet and Voltaire 7 was the task Donald set .himself, 
and it followed that to be conclusive, his refutations 
must be on their terms, and these terms included "history", 
"progress", "reason" and, before all else, "nature" 
I have quoted Montesquieu 
and J.J.Rousseau a great 
deal, 
wrote Donald, in the preface to the Theorie du pouvoir.; 
In fact, how could one 
write on political theory 
without citing the Esprit 
des lois and the Contrat 
social? 	3 
Certainly Donald could not afford to do so, as he 
readily professed: 
I gladly acknowledge them 
both in my work, when they 
accord with my principles, 
because, if these illustrious 
writers had not sustained a 
fundamental fallacy, they 
Would have perceived great 
truths and expressed them 
forcefully, 	4 
Time and time again Donald has recourse to the testimony 
of his adversaries to express his own ideas, not so 
much to emphasize their occasional similarities as to 
3 ibid,p.17. 
4.1-sra,p.16. 
underline their fundamental divergence. For, to 
Bonald, the Théorte du poixvoir and. the Enlightenment 
were diametrically opposed, they were antithetical and 
they were incompatible? • To Bonald, from the vantage.. 
point of exile, the disorder and anarchy of the 
Revolution appeared to be the inevitable outcome of. 
6 the applic tion of Rousseau's principles, The Terror . 
which represented all that Bonald most hated . could 
be traced to the Contrat social, The Revolution itself 
should be sufficient proof of the error of Rousseau's 
ways, but to ensure that the culprit was recognized, 
Bonald determined to expose the fallacies of the 
philosopher from Geneva, and incidentally provided 
the Counter.Revolution with its rationale, 
Man, claimed Rousseau, is naturally good, and it 
is society which corrupts him, No, Bonald replied, 
man is naturally bad and it is society which perfects 
him; by nature, he is weak and governed by his passions; 
and in order to offset his weakness and to suppress his 
passions, he needs an authority outside himself: this 
is precisely the role that society fulfils,7  Before 
arguing that man is naturally good or naturally bad, 
however, Bonald found it necessary to clarify the- 
%Legislation primitive, ciuvres la:T.257-258. 
6,Theorie du pouvoir, Oftvres I 10,19, 
7 •Aid p- 10 , • 	• 
meaning of nnatureo because this belief in a natural 
order and in natural law is just as basic to his own 
ideology as to the thought of Rousseau. As soon as he 
does, Bonald,discovers in,Boubseau'a definition the 
fundamental error of the itilosophe - for the author 
of the Contrat social., in Bonald's view, mistakenly, 
identifies unatarela with "natifo i And this is a 
distinction which Bonald regards as crucial: the 
"natifu or original state is the primitive state 
for man, represented by childhood, for humanity, by 
barbarity and ignorance; in fact, a state of weaknees 
and imperfection. On the other hand l the 'tnatureln 
state is the state of fulfilment, of perfection: and 
this is the goal towards which development naturally 
tends. Thus Bonald rejects Rousseau's ideal, which - 
he claiMe
8 
 is an appeal to primitivism which fails to 
differentiate between the gnatif" and the unaturelo- 
conditions of society, which are really antithetical:.-  
The native state is the 
savage state, and therefore 
it is piny and imperfect; 
either it will be destroyed 
or civilised. The civilized 
state is the mature, completed 
perfect state, and this is the 
9 natural state - secure and strong. 
8 Beeai ana3ytiQue. 0Davres I,pp.691.70; 
is at on primitive, Tuvres /10.200-01. 
944c1slation orimitive, Oftvres II,p.86. 
42. 
43. 
The concept of the "noble savage" is, therefore, absurd 
and impossible; it is a contradiction in terms, concludes 
10 Bonald, since the state of nature is the most civilized 
state of all. And as it is only within society that 
man can fulfil himself, society is the natural state 
of man: . 
In effect, man belongs to 
society by natural necessity; 
and the great mistake that 
the philosophee of the 
eighteenth century made was 
to consider man as an 
isolated entity, belonging 
only fortuitously to society. 11 
Contrary to Rousseau's belief that the native and 
natural states are identical, Bonald argues they are 
antagonistic and are in constant opposition. Rousseau 
who commenced by appreciating the truth: that the nature 
of a being is its perfection . has ended in a fallacy 
because he mistook the natural state for the native 
state. In fact, Bonald argues, all Rousseau's errors 
stem from this original misconception, which enables 
him to contemplate a state of nature for man which is 
completely exterior to society and to argue that the 
latter depraves those who enter into it, . which is 
false. It also enables him to speak of the family as 
10.Ibid, CEuvres /ip,291. 
li;Frgg amagw, des lettres et des arts", MelanAes, 
Oeuvres 
the only truly natural society when,, in reality, it is 
merely a primary state in which 
society can no more remain 
stationary thanHman'can 
halt in infancy. 12 
From Rousseau's original mistaken premise, tooi emerges 
the notion of a natural religion which is, in fact, 
only the primary form of Christianity, which discloses 
its true nature in , revealed religion. But Rouseeau, 
by confusing the natural state with the primitive state, 
would have revealed religion return to natural religion, 
political society to domestic society, and civilized 
man to a state of barbarism, Rousseau has inverted the 
natural order and Donald denounces hims 
Novelist of nature, 
derogator of civilization. 13 
• Society, claimed Rousseau, is the work of men; it 
is the product of a contract voluntarily undertaken. 
Never, never, never, replied Bonald. Society is the 
work neither of men, nor even of one man, but of nature 
itself; it is not arbitrary, but necessary; 
Was (the establishment of 
society) the outcome of 
force or the result of a 
• contract? Definitely not. 
The institution of public 
power was neither voluntary 




nor forced; it was necessar7, 
which means that it - odinformed 
to the nature of social beings, 
and its causes and origin 
were perfectly natural. 14 
Society, then, is not the outcome of a contract. In 
fact, Donald continues, there is no such thing as a' 
social pact or contract in any society — not in 
political .society any more than in religious or 
domestic society. In the family, no covenant exists 
between a father and his children 
who are not born of their 
own volition to a particular 
man rather than to another. 	15 
And in religious society there is no voluntary compact 
between God end man. It follows that in political 
society also, no contract exists between authority and 
subjects; neither preceding nor following the institution 
of power. Not prior to the establishment of the latter, 
since society is not called upon to choose between 
admitting or rejecting power 
because society cannot 
exist without power, 	16 
. power is not arbitrary, it in necessary, which Means 
It is natural, Even Rousseau's argument for a social 
contract implies this, according to Donald, for in 
14. Principe constitutif, Oftvree VIII p.55. 
15,1seai •anaiytique, amiliSMT7f;g.51, 
'submitting theme lven . to the decision of the man Who 
proposed the contract, the people are acknowledging. 
an authority, , 4n ,effect, 
they have conceded their 
obedi nce before they . 
possess their master. 	17 
Nor is a pact entered into after the establiehMent of 
:authority, because a centract, to be valid is a 
commitment between equals; While between power and 
subject the natural:relationship:is one of dependence. 
Rousseau's concept of the social contract Bonald 
rejects on the grounds that it provides neither basis 
for power nor incentive for ,duties: 
It destroys society, by 
making of power Only a 
contract revocable at will; 
it degrades, men by making, 
of his duties only a 
reckoning between his 
personal interests. 	18 
History substantiates what reason has proved: 
that society does not emerge from a social contradt. 
Wo matter how far into the past one looks, history 
reveals men in society, acquiescent of authority: and 
this authority, by virtue of the physical and moral 
superiority which is responsible for its ascendancy, 
naturally asserts'it elf over the individuals Who, by 
17.1bid. 
18.9)es sciences, des lettree et des arts",  elanges,  
.CEuvres V11,14365. 
46. 
their spontaneous obedience, have rendered themselves 
subjects * If anyone can be said to have "formed 
0 society 19  therefore ' , it is the man wham nature has : 
endowed with the qualities of leadership. Were it 
not so, society would remain for ever merely an 
agglomeration of individuals - a supposition which 
Bonald detects with alacrity in every aspect of 
eighteenth-century thought*. Of Adam Smith he writes: 
Adam Smith has dwelt at 
length upon the nature and 
causes of the ',wealth of 
nations"... but what he has 




etc* , and not of the wealth 
of nations, which is quite 
a different thing* ** A nation 
is like a society, and that 
is something other than an 
aggregation of individuals* 	V) 
Bonald does not deny that the people may at times 
believe that they have chosen their leader, but points 
out that, in fact, this does not mean that their 
decision is either arbitrary or Independent:-
People never make a choice 
without a reason, which is 
in itself a law . often the 
19* Principe constitutif, Ceuvres, VI/10:456 4 
20."De 1a Richesse des Nations'yEelanges, Oeuvres VII, 
P.584. 
47 * 
most imperative of all 
the law of circumstances * 	21, 
As it is not the product of a contract effected 
by man,, society (whose pre.requisite is authority) 
wouid thus appear to be both necessary and natural, 
since it is derived froM the very nature of the beings 
among whom it is established* 
There are (wrote Bonald) 
laws which govern colonies 
• of ants-and of bees; so why 
should one suppose that there 
are not similar laws for human 
society and that the latter is 
left to the fortuity of man's 
• inventiveness? 	22 
The duty of the philosopher is to discover and to 
expound these laws which derive from nature. This is 
the fundamental truth that Bonald discovered in the 
writings of Rousseau; that there is a truly natural 
order determined by natural law. All that was 
necessary for happiness (or so it seemed to Rousseau 
and his disciples) was to discover and to propagate 
the laws laid down by a benevolent deity, and to obey 
them. This was the Enlightenment's substitute for 
Christianity. But it was precisely this "rationale 
creed with which Louis de Bonald, the sworn opponent 
of the Enlightenment, hoped to persuade all men back 
21•Essai anal ti ue, COuvres 101452-53. 
22.Pens es, CEuvres V10.55. 
48. 
to the untrodden ways of Christianity. 
To Bonald, with his obsession for symmetry and 
unity, it appeared that Rousseau, while recognizing the 
perfection of natural law, was violating its authority, 
which must necessarily be absolute. For one consequence 
of the theory of a social contract is that the members 
of the social group may modify at will the laws which 
govern them - even improve upon them, , according to 
Rousseau. Rousseau, applying this principle 
unreservedly, even attempted to draw up constitutions, 
first for Poland and, , ,later, Corsica. But this is 
treachery to the concept of innate ideas, declared 
23 Bonald, who quoted as his watch-word the lines: 
A people which has lost 
its mores, by seeking to 
give itself written laws, 
is imposing upon itself the 
onerous necessity of writing 
everything, even its mores. 	24 
The laws which are of nature cannot be modified without 
damaging the natural order of society. The anarchy and 
chaos of Revolutionary France stem from man's attempt 
to usurp the role of the only legitimate legislator . 
• nature 25  . thus substituting for the general will their 
personal will. Society is the work of nature, not of 
human legislation: to fabricate it is futile, if not 
23 Theorie du pouvoir, Bk•VI, Chap o III, eCuvres III, 
13.314 ff. 
24iCEuvres I, frontispiece. 
250halsorie du nouvoir, ODuvres III074317i 
49. 
26.Ibid,p,114. 
27„Mirg. analv  
28Rousseau, o 
Ronald, . 
ti us, Catvree I,p.19, 
_Ris__„(VairgaiT Vol.II,pp.62-631 
Wiiff.165 III, frontispiece,, 
actually dangerous: 
One cannot write nature 
into existence; to mite 
the constitution is to 
-reverse it; just as to 
decree the existence of 
God is to destroy faith. 	26 
But nature will have her revenge, predicts Bonald f .and 
from the evil excesses the fallacy which provoked this 
state of imperfection will be expelled and society will 
revert to its natural constitution, Thus revolutions' 
(and the French Revolution is proof of this) are really 
natural and salutary crises by which nature 
repudiates the dangerous 
principles which a debilitated 
authority has permitted to 
encroach, and restores society 
to its original health and 
vigour. 	27 
Did not Rousseau himself recognize this important truth 
when he wrote: 
If the legislator, mistaking 
his purpose, establishes a 
principle contrary to that 
which arises from the nature 
of things, the State will not 
cease to be troubled until 
such time as this principle 
is destroyed or changed and 
invincible nature has asserted 
her dominion 	28 
. which Bonald later had inscribed in the Theorie du 
pouvoir? , 
Another' conclusion which, for Bonald, emerged from 
the theory of the social contract was, of course, the • 
sovereignty of the people: what is established in the 
interests of all must necessarily be established by 
all, wrote Rousseau. All authority therefore emanates 
from the people who are the sovereign will. Not at all, 
argued BOnald. Sovereignty lies with God and is the 
expression of his will . or (what amounts to the same 
thing) the will of nature, which is eynonymous with 
the general will of society. The conceit of the 
general will is also one which Bonald has borrowed 
from his arch-adversary Rousseau, only to invert it to 
29 the detriment of the other's argument., Bonald contends 
that the general will must not in any circumstances be 
mistaken for the particular will of one man, which must 
necessarily be subject to self-interest and passion. 
Nor, however, should, it be equated with the sum of the 
particular wills, because 
The will of the entire 
population, even if it were 
unanimous, is only the sum 
of the particular wills, and 
cannot be the general will. 30 
Wills are essentially conflicting and destructive and 
can never be united in harmony for the purpose of 




the principal political 
error of J.J.Rousseau... was 
to confound the "general" will 
with the "collective" 
an error perpetrated by Condillac 
who, by mistaking "general" ideas 
for "collective" ideas invoked 
• atheism, just as Jean-Jacques 
• invited anarchy. 	31 
What, then, is the general will to which Bonald refers? 
It is the nature or the 
• natural tendency of a'being 	• 
to fulfil its purpose. 32 
This purpose, for society, is the preservation of 
social beings, which is at the same time superior to 
each individual and to the aggregation of individuals: 
it is the will of the social "corps" - the will of 
nature itself - that is, the will of God. 
It is true, admits,Bonald, that Rousseau, even 
though he raised 
the edifice of the social 
'contract on this hopeless 
ambiguity between the popular 
will and the general will, 	33 
actually did distinguish between the .general will and 
the particular will. In fact, the -author of the Contrat 
social recognized, before Bonald himself, that the 
31•Essai anal ti ue, Oeuvres I,P.75,nota. 
32,Th orie du ouvoii77171711es III,p.36. 
33 e Ib d. 
52. 
general will is not simply the will of all: 
There is often considerable 
difference between the will 
Of all and the general will. 
The latter is concerned only 
with the common interest, the 
former with interests that are 
partial, being itself but the 
am of individual wills. 34 
But Rousseau aroused the wrath of Donald by appearing 
to abandon this truth by placing the general will with 
the popular will. 
That Will be general, it is 
not always necessary that it 
be unanimous, though it is 
necessary that every vote cast 
should be counted. Any 
deliberate exclusion breaks 
the general nature of the 
decision. 	35 
And what, objects Donald, will happen if the voices 
are numerically equally opposed - where does the 
general will lie then? 36Voted out of existence; and 
not only that, Donald continues, but auppose all 
opposing voices, save one, mutually cancel each other, 
is the general will then really the will of the only 
outstanding individual? If so, it is a particular will. 
And Rousseau's contradiction abnegates itself, 
If, then, the general will is quits distinct from 
34 Rousseau, 	cit..V01,11.3442. 
35•Ibid,1440(no 
36.532.122.2pristitutif, CEuvres n1101484-85, 
53. 
the will of each and.from_the will of all * .it is not in 
this consUltatien of the people that it is necessary to 
look, wrOte'Bonald; 
Where all the particular 
wills * loves and forces 
necessarily wish to dominate * 
it is imperative that a 
general mill * a genera/ love* 
and a general force dominate... 37 
and for this it la necessary to seek higher * beyond the 
transient caprice of individuals to the steadfastness 
and immutability of God. To vest sovereignty in the 
people . in the particular . is to free individuals 
from all restraint,. from all 'sense of obligation * and 
to legitimize their every decision. Jurieut Who was 
one of the precursors of the doctrine of the social 
contract and of popular sovereignty* once wrote that 
the people is the only 
authority Which has no need 
of reason to validate its acts; 	38 
which means* says Bonaldt that if the people wish to 
destroy themselve00 there will be no sanctions to 
control or prevent them. This can only be avoided b y  
Committing sovereignty to a will and a force which is 
stronger than man's. And this which the philosophes 
rightly term 'nature is none other than God." 
37 Theorie du ouvoir, Ileuvres 111,1434. 
38.Essa ana Ttique, ODwres i0.81, 
3900u Divorce* (Evros IV0.450. 
54. 
55. 
So that, having borrowed from his antagonist the 
concept of natural law, Bonald renounces its every 
tenet; the nature of man himself, the nature of society, 
the nature of the laws, the role of the legislator, and 
the depository of authority in the State, even the nature 
of nature, Rousseau has misconstraed, claimed Bonald• 
That which he deemed to be natural was, in effeot, 
unnatural; for that which is truly natural is supernatural. 
To Rousseau . traitor to Locke's refutation of 
innate ideas . what was natural was inherent: but the 
eighteenth.century book of nature was open for all to 
read, Christians and atheists alike; and Bonald found 
nothing in its pages to contradict such a definition. 
He agreed that what was natural was inherent, but he 
imposed the added condition that what MS natural was 
also divine: 
•4,. natural, perfect, divine . 
they are synonymous terms. 40 
Rousseau's error does not lie in the notion of innate 
ideas itself which, wrote Bonald, has had a long 
existence: 
Plato, the fathers of the 
Church, and the medieval 
schoolmasters have sustained 
Vb.,. Rousseau returned to it 
when he said: What God wanted 
man to do, he did not make known 
40.Legielation primitive, CEuvres 1,14358, 
• to Mm through another tan, 
but told 'him himself, and 
• wrote it at the bottom of 
his heart.' 	41 
But Rousseau was mistaken in believing that innate 
ideas are the property of the individual; rather, said 
Ronald, they are social and absolute, because 
The Scriptures established ' 
the word of God for all men . 
absent or present, for all 
• times and in all places; 	42 
so that when Ronald, at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, wrote 
The time has come to offer 
• to mankind the map of the 
moral universe, and the 
theory of society, 	43 
he was envisaging a map of Christendom only, a map, 	_ 
which would not accommodate the Brave New World of the 
Enlightenment. For Bonales map of the moral universe 
was to be traced, not in the secret recesses of the 
human heart (for who could count the thoughts which 
arise in the heart of man?) 41 but in the Scriptures. 
Tainess criticism of the Traditionalist sohool of 
Bonald was that its work was to refute rather than to 
41.1bid,p41169# 




inquireP Almost a truism4 the foregoing would suggest, 
and yet, in feet, it is only a partial truth. Certainly 
Bonald's work began in denial but, as it was elaborated, 
it developed into a political theory no less reasoned 
and comprehensive than the theses it set out to refute, 
So it wat•e with Bonald's confrontation with Rousseau, 
Bonald proposed that the Contrat social be retitled: 
Handbook for the use of 
societies to dislodge them 	46 from their natural inclinations 
. an appellation which, in its mordant irony, epitomizes 
all Bonald's animosity towards Rousseau and, just as 
clearly, the degree of his commitment, Bonald was 
acknowledging, as Rousseau before him, a universal 
natural order against which to measure the contemporary 
Aorder of things. 
We should distinguish 
between the variety in 
human nature and that 
which ie essential to it, 47 
wrote Rousseau, and Bonald, taking this advice, began:- 
There exists one constitution, 
and one only, for political 
society, one and only one for 
religious society; the conjunction 
of these two constitutions and of 
these two societies constitutes 
,civil society; both constitutions 
45 Talus, Les .hiloso hes fran ais du dix-neuvieme 
-s-.114alv. Pa e l - z.0 ,p,3 
46.Theorie du Pouvoir, aftvres 1110.53, 
47.117511767181151-777 
Carl Becker, The Heaven1 Cit.' of the Bit teenth Centu 
Philosophers kiss" 	p 
result from the nature of the 
members of each society, as 
• necessarily as weight arises 
from the 	of matter, 
These two constitutions are 
necessary metaphysically speaking . 
that is, they could not be other 
• than they are without conflicting 
with the nature-of the members of 
each society, 	48 
- the opening articles of Bonald's first work, which 
pose immediately the natural and necessary character of 
the social complex, for Bonald, as much religious as 
political. . 
- Prom this principle, which be maintains is 
indisputable, Bonald reasons that it is not possible 
to treat society without speaking of man, nor to speak 
of man without going beyond him to God. It is thus 
from God himself thot society emanates; and, by a 
series of propositions which he deduces consecutively, 
Bonald posits in turn that God surpasees all 
understanding and must, therefore, represent infinite 
wisdom; that God recogtizes himself with infinite 
knowledge; ,that God loves himself with infinite love; 
that God wills his own preservation or happiness with 
an infinite will; that God is able to preserve himself 
by an infinite and omnipotent force; that God , ..is 
therefore infinite will, infinite love and infinite 
56. 
. , 48.Thborie 421.220m1E„ COuvres 
49 force. In love of self lies the instinct or the 
reproduction of the species; in love of these creatures 
— or created ones . lies the instinct for their 
preservation. Now, all beings must be cast in the 
image of their creator: so this is man, similar to 
God (similar, but not equal . cardinal distinction), 
Man is therefore, like God, intelligence, will, love 
and force. Intelligence, since he recognizes God, 
"or projects him in his thoughtnrlove, because he 
loves God and wishes to preserve the knowledge of God; 
and force, since he is able to retain God (be preserves 
God inasmuch as he makes of God the subject of his 
thoughts and the object of his lave). God and man are 
thus linked by these relationships of will, love and 
force, which means that man's nature derives both from 
the nature of the finite (as the created being) and from 
the nature of the infinite (the creator). ,These 
relationships are therefore necessary, which means 
°such that they could not be otherwise without 
conflicting with the nature of their being"._ Thus, and 
according even to Rousseau's frame of reference * 
Natural (being synonymous 
with necessary) relationships 
must coincide with political 
laws 






mam4 laws (or necessary relationships) derived from the 
nature of God and man. pnis, finally, there is between 
God and man a society 'which is the natural, religious 
society called natural religion. 
Being, like God, will, love and force, man, 'like 
God, wishes to reproduce and to preserve others moulded 
in the image of himself; just as with God, in whom the 
love of self is the drive which produces similar beings, 
and the love of these beings the instinct to preserve 
them, so Bonald defines the natural desire for 
reproduction and preservation in the human context. 
Laws also exist therefore, he continuesPbotween man and 
man, derived from their physical and moral nature: 
relationships of shared will and of reciprocal love 
directed towards the common goal — reproduction and 
preservation. This society based upon man's necessary 
relationships with his own is the natural, physical 
society — the family. 
Whether physical or religious, however, society may 
be either natural or public. Natural, it features the 
family and private worship; public, it is the State and 
revealed religion, Always it may be defined as a union 
of similar identities for their mutual aims of 
reproduction and preservation. But of these two goals, 
5 Ibidt p629. 
it is especially the first reproduction . which is 
realized in natural societies (physical or religious), 
Too often, in practice, love of self supersedes love 
of others . both God and men. However, man should love 
God more than all other beings, and he should love his 
neighbour as himself, ince all men, made in God's 
image, are equally good and, therefore, equally lovable. 
On the other hand, the mutual preservation of beings 
is assured only in the public or general phase of 
society: in revealed religion, where natural religion, 
accomplished or generalized, will be the element, and 
in political society, in which the family will be the 
unit. It is only then that the "general love" of others 
overrides the "particular love" of self. In fact, as 
Rousseau's manifeeto states: 
If the establishment of 
societies has been made 
necessary by the antagonism 
that exists between particular 
interests, it has been made 
possible by the conformity 
that exists between these 
same interests. 	53 
Thus general will, general love and general force 
form the constitution of political society. But if it 
is to be general it must be dommon to all = which 





As long as several men 
regard themselves as 
comprising only one group, 
they can have only one will, 
which is related to their 
mutual preservation... , 
General will cannot be based 
upon a particular aim. 	54 
Will is manifested externally, for Bonald, in the laws, 
. which are the expression of the general will; love, in 
the sovereign-power, who pereonifies society or the 
fellow-creature in general in the eyes of each man in 
particular; force, in the "corps" or the men Who labour, 
on whose behalf the action of power is exercised. 
General will, or the will of society (that is, the will 
of God himself, which is nature), general power, which 
is the agent of this will, and general force, which is 
the action of the general power, together form the 
Constitution of Bonaldfs society in abstract. This 
55 'society, concludes Bonald, was born as the universe: 
of a will directing a love acting by a force. In this 
trinity of elements, in this rapport between a will 
which commands, a love which guides and a force which 
executes, Bonald perceiites as in a mirror the reflection 
of the fundamental dogma of the Christian religion. 




Prom these principles emerges the first natural 
law of society: namely, the unity of power. Society ,  
claims Donald, will very quickly destroy itself if 
authority is shared among many; although, in fact, even 
when it appears to be in the hands of many, it is really 
the property of one, of the strOngest, the most able, 
the most scheming, or the misguided. It is a formula 
dear to Bonald, and he proffers it as an axiom: 
Where all men wish to 
dominate with equal will 
but unequal force, it is 
necessary that one alone 
should dominate lest all 
be destroyed. 	56 
From the unity of power Bonald deduces his second 
natural law: the perpetuity of power. The "hamme-
pouvoirn, the monarch, must be either immortal or 
perpetual; for, if he were to languish, the exercise 
of the general authority of society would cease: which 
means, Bonald elaborates, the general will, preserver 
of society, would be left without the complement of 
authority, and the general force without power of 
direction. Now, will without authority is not free 
will, and force without power is not directed force. 
Therefore, Bonald cautionersociety bereft of will 
and devoid of authority leaves itself susceptible to 
57.1b1dtp.75. 
64. 
blind, unbridled force. The concept of the general 
will demands that the succession of power must not be 
interrupted, even temporarily; power must be perpetual, 
And power can be secured in perpetuity only through the 
hereditary transmission of authority vested in one 
family. 
No lees fundamental than the perpetuity of 
authority is the continuity of the agents of public 
force: another natural law which Bonald regards as 
sequential. Prom the moment, in effect, that the 
general will (which is the innate desire to achieve 
perfection) becomes perpetual, and consequently its 
power of attaining it, perpetual, its force must be 
likewise; for authority can no more exist without force 
than a being can exist devoid of the will to realize 
Its purpose. 
Poroe is action; action 
presupposes agents or 
ministers. Therefore the 
agents or ministers of the 
public, general or social 
(synonymous terms) force 
must be perpetual. 58 
;Twat as, in the case of power, permanence is guaranteed 
by succession within the family, so for the agents of 
public force it is ensured by the hereditary transmission 
of public functions and social professions, 
58.Ibid t pp,78.79. 
65. 
Fundamental constitutional law expreased by the 
relationship of general will, general power and general 
force; fundamental political law of the unity and 
perpetuity of power and the permanence of social 	. 
distinctions, — such are, in brief, the natural laws 
which Bonald formulates in the early chapters of the 
Thecrie du nouvoir. More presentation, however, was 
not enough; the pragmatic approach to nature which he 
had learnt from Rousseau determined that his principles 
must be both reasoned and applied, and his tone didactic. 
So that, having introduced his theory of natural law, 
Bonald does not hesitate to repeat it and, in fact, the 
balance of the Thborie,du pouvoir and, indeed, his 
entire writings, are really variations upon this theme, 
frequently in identical terms. To demonstrate that 
these principles do represent the natural order, to 
illustrate them and to justify them by the example of 
• ancient and modern societies, to follow their influence 
with regard to duration, prosperity, perfection, 
national character and government involves the rest 
of his early work. 
The principles postulated in the ThOorieliz 
are both repeated and developed in the works which 
follow; in condensed form (Bonald says so himself) 59 
and denuded of all historical application, in the 
59•Principa amstituti Ceavres VIII,p.35. 
66s. 
Bassi analytioue and Divorce, systematized almost to 
the point of a mathematical treatise (historical 
documents by way of alleviation and support) in the 
I RIslation 	and Ina new and final 
abridgement in the ;Principe constitatife There is 
repetition in so far as the expressions general will, 
general love or power, and general force recur 	. 
continually; but there is also development, or at 
least discontinuity, as these terms, in his later works, 
give place to those of power, minister and subject; in 
their former connotation the sovereign was the will of 
God; the minister, the monarch or agent of this will; 
and the subject, the monarch's instrument or agent of 
action. But in the later works there is no longer the 
concept of the sovereign in the capacity of general 
will; instead, as though he wishes to consider only 
the visible elements of society (the "personnes 
socialee", as he refers to them), Donald treats the 
power as the perspnification of society, the minister 
as the agent of the king's will, and the eubject as 
the object of the will of the latter and the action of 
the former, Prom society in abstract, from the soul, 
emerge the corporeal and sensible manifestations, 
It is in the LOgislation primitive60that the 
concept of this "trinity of social persons" is presented 
61:4LOgislation primitivs, CE‘avres Iop.342 ff. 
with the greatest detail and rigour. Here it is deduced 
from a trinity more vast which embraces the entire 
universe, the trinity of cause, means and effect. Bonald 
discerns everywhere the image of these elements and 
patterns: in God and his relations with the world, in 
religion and its fundamental dogma, in the family, in 
the State, and in the constitution of man. 
Prom his theory of language, which he integrates . 
at this point with his theory of society, Donald deduces 
that man, having necessarily received speech from a 
superior being, and consequently aware of him and of 
himself, is cognizant, therefore, of the mostuniversal 
cause s) , God, and the most universal effect, man. But 
the knowledge of these two extremes does not afford 
total insight into the nature of man's relationship 
with God. A mean, an intermediary, is necessary who, 
proportioned by the perfection of the one and the 
infirmity of the other, establishes a connection between 
thaw And the nature of this connection may be expressed 
as a proportion: namely, the cause is to the mean as 
the mean is to the effeot; which, translated, signifies 
that the.,cause operates upon the mean in order to 
determine it as the mean operates upon the effect to 
produce it. The terms, cause, mean and effect, 
comprehend all beings; the proportion which they form 
embraces all relationships. There is no order apart 
. from these terms and this proportion. 
68, 
Prom the universal natural order, it is possible 
to proceed to particular applications where the terms, 
cause, mean and effect assume particular connotations; 
and the general formula represents particular 
relationships* Now the general world order may be 
subdivided into the physical world and the moral, or 
social, world* In the first, the cause is the primary 
source, the mean - movement, the effect . matter. 
In the social-cum...moral world of will and action, cause, 
mean and effect adopt the general titles of power, 
minister and subject, and the appropriate cognomens of 
particular soCieties; in political society, king, . 
nobility and subject;•in domestic society, father, 
mother and children, and so on. In every society, in 
conjunction with the social persons so adeptly 
classified, are the natural and necessary relationships 
of their association; so that the king is to the nobility 
as the latter are to the subjects, the father to the 
'mother likewise, the Middle-man always partaking of 
the character of the two extremes, 
For :Ronald these natural phenomena and natural 
laws are demonstrated in the family, the State, the 
universe, religion, and even man; but to avoid , 
unnecessary repetition and to determine the points of 
convergence and divergence with the nature of which 
Rousseau wrote, one society only will be analyzed . 
tho State* 
The State is descended from, and is the natural , 
projection of, the primary society . the family* One 
is a society for the production and preservation, of 
indiViduals; the other, a society for the production 
and preservation of families, wrote Bonald7ltaking his 
cue from the "partial truths" of the Contrat social, 
which states: 
The oldest form of society - 
and the only natural one . 
is the family 	We may 
therefore, if we wish, 
regard the family as the 
basic model of all political 
associations. The ruler is 
the father writ large: the 
people are, by analogy, his 
children... , 62 
The family - (it is always the landed family which 
Bonald has in mind, because it alone is independent) - 
the family forms of itself a society naturally independent 
of all other families in its persons and its properties. 
But Such are the passions of men and the force of 
circumstances that this natural independence is often 
challenged by another family. Whence arise differences, 
dividons, struggles, finally a state of war. This 
state of affairs would inevitably lead to the destruction 
A 





• if there were not raised 
above them, by virtue of 
• the general and necessary 
• lams for the preservation of 
the human race, one man who 
• has the power of submitting 
to a general order of duties, 
• that is, to the laws of a 
single constitution and to 
• the action'of a single 
administration, these partial 
and divided societies * 	63 
Thus emerges the general and public state of society, 
which is composed of many particular or domestic societies. 
This passage from the domestic state to the public 
state is effected quite naturally* It may indeed seem 
surprising that between families until then independent, 
that between men, formerly total strangers, a public 
power could establish itself and gain acceptance* It 
may even appear to be the outcome of force or the 
result of a contract: 
Since no man has natural 
• authority over his fellows, 
and since might can produce 
no righti the only foundation 
left for legitimate authority 
• in human society is agreement, 64 
wrote Rousseau* But Bonald deniee such possibilities 
vehemently* The idea of the voluntary formation of a 
• society without social distinctions Is anathema to him 
. 634Agislation nrimitive,Ceuvres II0p * 5 6* 
64,Jtouseeau,on.cit*,II,p107*-- 
Voila le pouvoir - 
Voila lea ministres - 
Voila lea eujets 	65 
. natural and necessary, they emerge in all societies, 
where they comprise the natural, necessary, hence 
unique, constitution: ' 
si* in every sodiety, even 
those in decline, there are 
no other ranks, no other 
relationships, no other 
functions* 	66 
The monarch, who wills. and who acts for the 
preservation of society, represents power * His will 
is law and his action government* Be himself wills; 
but acts through his ministers * The latter serve to 
inform his will and to put into execution his action 
on behalf of the subjects for their mutual interest. 67 
There can be little doubt that Bonald borrowed this 
owill-force.action" theme from Rousseau, who defines. 
the relationship of the ministry to the sovereign 
(albeit, in his scheme, the people) in identical terms: 
The force, therefore, of 
the body politic Cannot be 
exerted save through an 
appropriate agent who 
translates it into action 
in accordance with instructions 
• issued by the general will, 
acts as a channel of communication 
65* Principe constitutif, .CEuvres V1110,56 * 
66,Ibid* 
67,YZETslation primitive, Wuvres 106 205 * 
710 
between the State and the 
sovereign, and performs for 
public ends the same function 
as that fulfilled in the 
individual man by the union 
of mind and body. .. this is 
the ministry. 	68 
And, he continues, 
Those who maintain that the 
act by which a people submit, 
to their rulers is not a contract 
have much right on their side. 
It is, strictly speaking, nothing 
but 'a "commission046.0 the alienation 
of which, being incompatible with 
the body social, is contrary to 
the whole object for which it has 
been established. , 69 
The ministry is the agent of the general will and 
represents the action 'of the general will, which is, 
government, writes RousseauPand it may be likened to 
the link which unites the extremes of a continuous 
proportion of which the mean proportional is the 
ministry or government., The latter receives from the 
sovereign the orders which it passes on to the people. 
The theorem is a familiar one to students of Bonald; 
and would suggest that the source of Bonald's algebraic 
formulas should be sought not in the pettifogging 
scholasticism of the Middle Agee, but in the very 
century to which he chronologically belongs. 
681 1ousseau, 	 
69 0 1bid, 
70.7sra.. 
72. 
Just as domestic power acts for the benefit of the 
children, so public power is directed towards the good 
of the subjects, which is its raison d'être: it is a 
service - just that, and nothing more. Power is love, 
claimed Donald, but Rousseau thought otherwise; whereas 
in the family, he wrote, 
the father's love for his 
children is sufficient reward 
for the care he has lavished 
upon them; in the State, the . 
pleasure of commanding others 
takes its place' 	the 
ruler is not in a relation 
of love to his people. 	71 
But power complexes have no place in Bonald's natural 
order. Does not Holy Writ say that the Son of God came 
not to command, but to serve? Indeed, claims Donald, 
The ministers are more subject 
than the subjects themselves, 72 
since they are first and foremost subjects themselves 
and, as such, subject to all the common laws of society, 
as well as being subject to the special services which ' 
are incumbent upon their rank: and these become more' 
arduous the higher the position in the social hierarchy. 
The term "serving" or "service" . does it not designate, 
"in all Christian languages", the highest political, 
judicial and military functions? demands Donald. It is 
therefore most aptly applied to the most elevated rank 
71«Ibid,p.24. 'Oargi analvticuel CEUvres I,pp.8849. 
73. 
of all . power. 
Where does power originate? In God, replies 
Bonald: omnis potestas ex BeoPsovereignty is in God 
alone, and power is only the delegate of this 
sovereignty* All power comes from God, echoes Rousseau, 
Certainly, but so do all 
ailments. Are we to conclude 
from such an argument that 
we are never to call in the 
doctor? 	74 
Donald is by no means oblivious to the problem posed 
by Rousseau but considers that,' by equating "divine 
right" and "divine power" with "natural right" and 
"natural power", the matter ip resolved* By what means, 
Bonald asks, is it possible to distinguish the power 
which emanates from the sovereignty of God, and an 
assumed power which is only deputed by the sovereignty 
of man? And replies: 
I mean by power which 
•emanates from the sovereignty 
of God and conforms to his 
will, the power constituted 
on and by political laws... 
•laws which are the result 
of the natural relationships 
between man and society, 
consequently the expression 
of the Supreme Being, creator 
of men, and author of the 
natural relationships which 
73.11A9211/19102.11N Ceuvres III,p.41 * 
740161-ibildidi76P.4-dit-4/175:N7 
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76. 
But Bonald, secure in the knowledge that, when Cicero 
appealed to authority, he proclaimed, net "it is just", 
nor "it is natural", but "it is writtenfircontinuee 
his self-interrogation, Power - speaking in the abstract . 
is it held by divine right? "Oui, sans doutee . he 
replies, 
because domestic authority 
is held by natural right, and 
public power ITETicessary right, 
and because the author a nature 
is the author of all the niTeWary 
conditions of existence, and 
because he could not destroy the 
conditions necessary for the 
survival of beings without 
destroying the beings themselves. 79 
Moreover, Bonald, moving from the sphere of theory to 
that of application, reproaches Mme de Sta.:a for 
speaking of the doctrine of divine right, 
as if those who profess it 
believe that the divinity had, 
by special revelation, appointed 
a particular family to govern 
a State, or that the State belongs 
to him in the same way as a flock 
belongs to its master, 	80 
Unquestionably, the theory of divine right, in Bonald's 
hands, loses its mystical character and assumes a very 
definite naturalistic bias, 
7846Rielation,rimitive, 0ftvresI0.335., 
79,Pensees, Ovavres VI,pp,Idd-ldl, 
80. "Observations sur:1 0 ouvrage de Mme la baronne de 
Stable, Melanges:, CEuvres V11,14657. 
77, 
Political authority necessarily has the same 
characteristics as its theoretical counterpart. Pirirt 
of all, it le one; and it is preoisely because it can 
not be a "matter for divipion" that it is such a matter 
of division among men, contends Bonald: 
It is the seamless coat 
which cannot be divided 
but instead is drawn by lots, 
and always among the soldiers," 81 
The functions of power may be multiple, according as 
its action is applied to a diversity of objects; but 
its essence is one. If there were two monarchs, there 
would be in reality two societies: wherever power is 
divided, factions develop, which are miniature societies 
in the heart of the true society - the State, luring 
the latter to its destruction. The Master himself 
warned that "power divided against itself cannot stand"; 
•although his meaning may easily be misinterpreted, 
• 82 cautions Donald. Even civil war, he writes, does not 
constitute power divided against itself, since each 
party claims power, and claime it in its entirety. The 
division of power to which Bonald objects is the legal 
division of the unity of power - the actual contemporaneous 
working of two or more powers; it is this simultaneous 
dAvieion of power which is contrary to the nature of 
81, Principe constitutif, Ceuvres VIII, pp. 6263; 
John 19 - 23,24« 
82. "Meditations politiques tireee de 1 , Evangile 0,• 
CEuvres VIII,p,164. 
78. 
society and which must result in its destruction. 
Voreover, and in spite of appearances to the contrary, 
unity of power , exists'even in those States where it would 
appear to be most absent - in democracies where the law 
of number reigns. Indeed, Bonald was forced to admit 
that, in his battle against the advocates of the 
division of power, he found in his habitual democratic 
adversary staunch support. Jean-Jacques Roupseau, in 
no uncertain terms, maintained that sovereignty is - 
and must be - indivisible: 
For the same reason that 
sovereignty is inalienable, 
so, too, it is indivisible. 
For either the will is 
general or it is not, 	83 
wrote Rousseau; - Bonaldos contention also, and he, in 
fact, cites the Contrat social in confirmation: 
It is said that Japanese 
conjurors will out a child 
in pieces in full view of the 
audience, and then, casting the 
fragments into the air, bring 
them to earth again all duly 
assembled into a living infant. 
Such, or almost such, are the 
tricks performed by our modern 
men of politics. The social 
Corps is first dismembered with 
an adroitness which would do 
credit to a country fair, and 
then reassembled, no one knows haw. 84 
83. Roue seau,  
84.1bid,p,41; 
ToTtald, Oeuvres III0.314. 
79. 
Even in democratic States; Bonald elaboratesrpower 
lies with the most unified group who have in their 
midst 'the unseen voter: the power of circumstance.
Also; most popular States elect a chief magistrate, 
who is not, to be sure, a permanent power, but who 
- nevertheless remains an image and fiction of the unity 
of power. Is this not sufficient proof that the unity 
of power is in the nature of man and the needs of 
society . that it is natural and necessary? 
, Subject to God alone, power must be independent 
of man; for once power becomes dependent it is no longer 
power. Power and dependence, wrote Bonald, on one 
86 occasion, are as mutually exclusive as round and square. 
But independence presupposee wealth which, for Bonald, 
means property. The Monarch must be a proprietor, which 
means, on Bonald's terms, that the monarch must be a 
landowner; without landed property ownership there is 
no political independence, since all other wealth, 
mobile or commercial, is dependent upon men and 
circumstances. 
Again, the monarch's power must be definitive and 
absolute; if he cannot exact obedience, he will na't be 
independent, and he will not be monarch, since any 
violation in itself indicates the presence of a power 
85:Principe constitutif, CEuvres VIII,p.85. 
86. "Observations Bur l'ouvrage de Mme la baronne de 
Staeln, Melanges, CEuvres V110.654. 
mightier than the monarch himself. But there must on 
no account be any confusion between absolute power 
("a mUch-maligned term") and arbitrary powerrAbsolute 
and arbitrary - like natural and native - are, for 
Bonald, antonyms: while the former indicates the absence 
of all factors extraneous to the state of nature, the 
latter implies total emancipation from restraint, where 
man is entirely dependent upon the will or caprice of 
man. Absolute power is independent of the men over whom 
it is exercised: thus, a father's authority exists quite 
independently of his children, the authority of a master 
is independent of his servants, and the authority of 
the king is independent of his subjects. But arbitrary 
power is independent of the laws by virtue of whioh it 
governs: a case in point is the despot who rules 
tyrannically; another, for Bonald, is the sovereign 
people, since, following the definition so often cited 
by Rousseau, it always has the right to change the laws, 
even to improve upon them. If, argues Rousseau, 
in each State there is only 
Cue good method of regulating 
it, the people who have 
discovered that method ought 
to keep to it. But if the 
established order is bad, 
why should we regard as basic 
those very laws which themselves 
constitute the obstacle to its 
being good? Besides, in any case, 
87.Frincine constitutif, ilexvres VIIIip.64. 
81, 
it is always open to a people 
to change their laws; even when 
they are good. For if they like 
to injure themselves, by what 
right can they be prevented 
from doing so? , 	88 
By the right of absolute authority, retorts Donald., • 
whose natural duty it is to prevent such unnatural, 
arbitrary acts. Absolute power secures obedience by 
the natural order of things; arbitrary power by . 
compulsion. One is synonymoue with liberty, and the 
other With tyranny. Rousseau, however, realized, the 
difficulty Of sustaining such subtle distinctions in 
reality, where 
bad men do mount the throne, 89' 
.and anticipating Donald's reply, wrote: 
The remedy,(sote) say, is 
to give unmurmuring obedience. 
God, in his anger, sends bad 
kings to a country, and they 
must be. endured as the scourge 
of Heaven, Such sentiments are, 
no doubt, edifying, but 1 have 
a feeling that they are better 
suited to the pulpit than to 
books on politics. 	90 
Doubtless, Donald admits from his pulpit, it is possible 
that absolute power may. deteriorate into arbitrary power 
and govern in violation of tpe laws which nature traces 




for those over whom authority is exercised. This is 
why the first law of monarchy must be to defend the 
subjects against oppression, even if this entails: 
violating the political and social laws. But, continues 
Bonald,it does not follow, that if the king does 
violate these laws, he should then, as the philosophes 
claim, be deferred to the jud ent of his subjects. 
This would be to reduce his power to the dependence of 
men, and'therefore,to deny it. He may be judged only 	, 
by God, supreme judge of kings, who punishes them 
through their own shortcomings. This will be, for the 
subjects - as even Donald acknowledges . a slim guarantee. 
And so Bonald is forced to admit the right of popular 
action, which he calls passive resistance, as opposed 
91 to active resistance. 
The latter is revolt: it is peculiar to despotic 
and popular governments; it is only to be expected where 
wills are opposed to wills and powers to powers. Passive 
resistance, on the Other hand, resembles the force of 
inertia which the subjects may oppose to the monarch. 
It is difficult indeed to perceive the difference 
between Bonald's "force of inertia" and Rousseau's 
"unmurmuring obedience" but Donald hastens to clarify. 
Passive resistance has nothing in common with passive 
obedience to which the enemies of absolute power have 
_ 
91.'"Observations sur l'ouvrage de dime la baronne de 
'Steel", Melangee, Oeuvres VII,p.657. 
83. 
attempted to liken it, he continues; in fact, it is just 
the opposite. Passive obedience means absolute and 
unreserved submission; it is based upon fear and, as 
often as not, hatred; it is imposed by violence; it is 
the natural outcome of tyranny (tyranny either of one 
or of many). Active obedience is enlightened; it Is 
attendant upon advice or even remonstrances; it is based 
upon affection and respect; it belongs properly to the 
monarchy. Active obedience and passive resistance are 
always found together, as inversely passive obedience 
breeds active resistance. They both represent the limits 
of power, on the one hand - of absolute power; on the 
other - of arbitrary power* Port arbitrary or absolute, 
power.is always limited: there is no such thing as 
unlimited power in Donald's scheme of things, not even 
in God, whose action upon the universe is limited by 
the nature of his own creations. 
Singular, independent, definitive, and absolute . 
power must also be perpetual2 2 The death or suspension 
of power will herald the end of society, since a society 
without power is no longer a society * To be perpetual, 
power must be, in practice, continually and physically 
present in society, in order to rule its movements and 
to direct its action; if not, for want of a legislating 
and regulating power, society will be given over to 
92.Principe constitutif, CEuvres VIII,p 65. 
disorder, and from disorder it will not be slow to 
decline into despotism, hioh is the return of power 
1 	 3 
but in negative form - no longer ministers, subjects 
and legitimate authority, but instead a despot,' , 
Sycophants and slaves. An unnatural and unhealthy' 
state of affairs, which Bonald, no lead than Pousseau, 
regards as a prelude to revolution. Once the natural 
Order has been disrupted, wrote Rousseau, a state of 
imbalance is created, and 
then disorder will be 
substituted for the rule 
of law, power and will 
will cease to act in 
concert, and the State, 
entering Upon a phase of 
dissolution:, will fall 
either into despotism ' 
or into anarchy. 	93 
But, both would add - their aspirations fixed upon 
.antipodean Utopias it in only 
until such time as 
invincible nature has 
asserted her dominion. 
Nexander Pope expressed, perhaps better than any 
other, the confident optimism of these philosophers 
(Who looked) thros . Nature up to Nature's God, 
(Where) God and Nature link'd the gentral frame, 
And bade Self-love and Social be the same. 
Theirs was a Christian creed of natural law:- of God's 
in his Heaven, all's right with the world - but in the 
Enlightenment's terms. 
84. 
93. Rousseau, ma. cit. , II, pp. 65-66. 
-6— SECTION III au., 
MONTESQUIEU and SOCIETY 
85. 
The illustrious Kontesquieu, wrote Rousseau 
has not really treated 
the principles of political 
law; he has been content to 
treat the positive law of 
established governments; and 
nothing in the world is more 
different than these two studies 
... it is necessary to know 
what ought to be in order to 
judge fairly what is 0IP 1 
an appraisal with which Bonald concurs wholeheartedly. 
"A celebrated author", he wrote, referring to Montesquieu, 
has treated the "spirit 
of the laws"; the time has 
come to treat or to recall 
'the reason fox' the laws", 
and to look less for the 
spirit of what is, than the 
reason for what ought to be. 2 
Before all else, it is Montesquieuss empirical approach 
to social studies which antagonises his critics - among 
them Bonald and Rousseau who, while agreeing with his 
1.Rouseeau,The Political Writine if Joan-Jacques Rousseau 
(Vaughan ed.) 110.147 
2. Legislation primitive, Oeuvres 1,14 249. . 
86. 
cultural criticism, could not accept defeat. No radical 
solution, no panacea, no Utopia, The Esnrit des lots  
does not contain one specific recommendation for the 
ultimate political society. Instead, it suggests a 
range of possibilities dependent upon specific 
circumstances, none promising the millenium. Montesquieu 
deals in terms of the comparative; Bonald in terms of 
the superlative. And yet it was Louis de Bonald who 
claimed to share Montesquieu's predilection for the 
facts, for experience, for the lessons which both thought 
could be drawn from history. Donald reproaches Montesquieu3 
for devoting himself to the "is" rather than to the 
"ought"; thus remaining disinterested and quite satisfied 
so long as for every society, for every law, for every 
constitution, he has an explanation. To Bonald, 
Montesquieu seems impervious to the distinction between 
what is good and what is bad, between what should be 
maintained and what rejected. The absurd and the 
unreasonable - are they to be justified simply on the 
grounds that they exist and have been explained? 
Relentlessly pursuing 
the spirit of what is, 
and never the reason 
for what should be, 
Montesquieu, claimed Bonald, 
3 Theorie du pouvoir, Oftvres 
87, 
found the reason for 
the most contradictory 
laws, even those which 
defy all reason. 4 
Merited or not, the criticism throws light upon Bonald'a 
attitude towards political science . on the confUsion 
in hie mind between the empirical and didactic approadh 
to his sdbject, between the description of forms' and 
social institutions and the search for the means of 
amending and correcting them. 
What is no less abhorrent to Bonald is the fact 
that anyone should espouse, as Montesquieu did, the 
very idea of a diversity' of laws apPertaining to the 
human race. This misconception overlooks the all-
important truth, for Bonald that human nature is always 
and everywhere invariable 
in the tropics as 
in the frigid zones 
and that therefore the same lams and the same 
constitution are appropriate to all, Man, Donald claimed, 
has everywhere the same needs and having the sem needs, 
stands in the same 
• relationship to his 
fellows and to his 
environment. 	6 
Thus, everywhere 
4.L4 elation orimitive,CEuvrea 4142014, 
50 T (aria du jouvoir, CEuvreaMI,p 0 166. 
6, 
• 88, 
men, formed among. 
themselves like: 
societies, 	7 
Man everywhere has• the same passion to dominate; therefore 
what is everywhere required Is the same curb on his 
passions; therefore, Donald concludes, society everywhere 
must have the same rules, the same laws, the acme 
constitution, Moubtless, there is within the human 
race variety; but variety only according to how far, by 
its corruption, a particular group is removed from the 
natural archetype, }Weever, in reality, there are 
•neither laws nor constitutions for degenerate and corrupt 
peoples. A conetitution worthy of the name exists only 
for true human nature, And it is to rediscover this 
constitution, eternal and universal, to rediscover the 
legislation for all times and all places, the 
"legislation primitive”, that the philosopher must cot 
him-elf, rather than to describe the diversity of customs 
and then seek explanations for them, Donald cannot 
condone in Montesquiou this unmethodical attitude 
which must cbncede, with diverse laws, diverse 
legislators. The very definition of the lees, Which 
Montesquieu coined and Donald appropriated: 
necessary relationships 
which derive from the 
nature of things 	8 
7,Ibid, 
8,VEnrie du nouvoir,CEuvres 11102.315 
89 . 
•should have prevented him from falling into this error. 
To sayo 'in off eat, that the laws are natural relationships, 
is to admit that nature alone established these 
relationships and, consequently, that nature alone can 
make the laws . which means that to nature alone belongs 
the legislative power. Par from being able to establish 
the necessary relationships, the human legislator who 
interferes 
only retards the work of 
nature and prevents it from 
establishing the necessary 
relationships, by himself 
introducing what is not 
• natural and necessary. 9 
But, in MontesqUieuts book, there is divine la 
and there is human law - civil law, political law, 
domestic law and canon law . and they are different in 
their origins, in their objects and in their nature 
Such relativist analysis was bound to arouse absolutist 
criticism, as Montesquieu was 'ware when, for those of 
Bonaldian temperament, he wrote: 
In the laws there are certain 
ideas of uniformity, which 
sometimes strike great geniuses 
(for they oven affected Charlemagne), 
but infallibly make an impression 
on little souls. They discover 
therein a kind of perfection, 
9.Ibid,p 316. 
which they recognize becaus 
they cannot help but see it; 
the same authorized weights, 
the same measures in trade, 
the same laws in the state, 
the same religion in all its 
parts. But is this always and 
without exception right? Is 
the evil of changing constantly 
lees than that of suffering? 
And does not greatness of genius 
consist rather in distinguishing 
between those cases in which 
uniformity is requisite and 
those it which there is a 
necessity for differences?... 
If the people observe the laws, 
what does it matter whether these 
laws are the same? 	10 
Clearly, from Donald's point of view, it is precisely 
this which does matter; and, if Montosquieu's 
contemporaries have regarded him as a man of genius, 
posterity . 
which judges works by their 
effects and opinions by events . 11 
will pronounce him only a "man of great intellect", for 
one errs with intellect 
but not with genius. 	12 
Montesquieu * °founder of political science", writes 
Bonald, is doomed to ignominy: 
10.Montesquieu, Espxi.t des lois,Bk.XXIX,18.0EUvres completes, 
(ed.Masson) Paris,1950. VoLI,p.?90. • 




since schools always retain • 
something of the turn of mind 
and character of their founders, 
;..'the disciples of Montesquieu • 
will defend his brinciples only 
with the weakness and irresolution 
that an equivocal doctrine and a 
timid and indecisive master 
bequeaths. 	13 
Montesquieuss very explanation of the spirit of the 
laws . one of his most original bequests - is, for 
a . cause'for alarm, To attribute to the physical 
factors of climate, soil and organic structure the 
reason for the character and the customs of a people, 
their laws and their institutions; to make thus of man 
a vegetable, product 
submitted to the properties 
of the earth and.to the 
action of the air, 	14 
is to degrade, his dignity, justify his vices, ignore 
his duties, and nullify government. To admit the notion 
that latitude dictates" 
religion and government, '15 
is truly to produce a work which is irreligious, 
anti-social and tuiscientific. What forms the character, 
taste and =stoma of a people are the political and 
religious institutions, the inherited traditions p •as 
well as education and imitation; but not the climate. 
13.1bid o pp,201-202 0 
14,Th6orie du pouvoir  Ceuyres.III,p,360. 
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.hae confused two elements which are quite distinct: 
power and its functions: the latter emerge from the 
former, The power is singular, but the functions are 
multiple. Certainly the functions may be delegated 
to ancillary bodies or functionaries, provided that 
the authority which delegates remains always the will 
which commands. If not - if authority itself is 
divided, if there are manifold authorities within the 
came State . then the functions which emanate from 
them will be in a perpetual state of uncertainty and 
insurrection, This, for Bonald, is tantamount to a 
permanent state of revolution. 
, 	The theory of the separation of powers is moreover 
stamped, for Donald, with a characteristic which, quite 
apart from any other, suffices to render it repugnant: 
and that is its 	•ish origin. Just as (Bonald 
believes) Rousseau sees only Geneva and measures all 
his hypothetical states against it, so Montesquieu, 
after one brief sojourn in Bngland, sees all institutions 
and governments in relation to their English counterparts. 
Bonald deplores this loyalty to the other side of the 
8 Channel1- a desire for imitation which he condemns, 
Donald's hostility towards the English constitution is 
augmented by its mixed and ununiform composition; for 
18.110gislation primitive,Cuvres I,p.201; and 
.1.1140:2LAS-RaWIE,Bkal,Chap.VII,04vres III,p.351ff, 
94. 
it unites two forms of government which are, in Donald's 
view, antithetical . monarchy and democracy; by this 
con; unction England, Donald considers, has written her 
own obituary. 
Thus, with regard to the separation of powers, the 
'diversity of laws and constitutions and the reasons for 
this diversity, and the influence of the climate on the 
customs and legislation of nations, Donald stands opposed 
to the position adopted by Montesquieu, and in the final 
reckoning, despite his acknowledged debt, judges him 
Not as severely as ho did the author of the Contrat 
soci410 
1. i,.....y .t.„,...r _SociettCenettionGovernalent 
and Administration. 
The mathematical principles which, in Donald, 
pass for natural laws - whose application is visible 
in the family, in the State, and in the Church 
in each case, the constitution. The constitution, then, 
represents their °maniere d'atre", which perforce results 
naturally and necessarily from the members of the society 
and from the relationships between them, Without doubt, 
among social members, many relationships may exist, 
Donald allows, but not more than one of necessity; which 
means that for each type of society there is - and there 
can be . only one Constitution, one "maniere d'atren, 
95• 
19 which conforms to nature. There is one constitution 
for domestic society, one constitution for political 
society, one constitution for religious society, and 
one constitution for civil society: it is that which 
is characterized by unity of authority, social 
distinctions, hereditary and fixed functions, and a 
ministry dependent upon authority but independent of 
the subjects, And this constitution is and must be 
everywhere the same, because man is everywhere the 
SEIM, because he has everyWhere the same needs, which 
are not subject to latitude at all. The work of nature, 
not the fabrication of man, the conetitution is 
immutable,. 
Prom the constitution it is possible to derive 
the government; from the natural laws, the political 
lawelF° While the constitution is the very mode of 
--social existence and is symbolized by the organization 
of power, the government is the form assumed, in each 
eociety, by ,the representation of power. 
In constituted societies, the distinction is 
difficult to perceive and, strictly, does not exist; 
the external aspect of the government is at one with 
the constitution: the political laws are the necessary 
consequence of the constituted laws and are therefore 
• i9.Lé jolation 	Ouvres iirN375. 
20• 	t134 
96, 
fundamental. This is to say that there is or each 
type of society ,- domestic, political and religious . 
only one form of government which is natural and 
necessary, in the same way as there is for each may 
• one natural and necessary constitution. This perfect 
form is, from Donald's prinCiples, for the family:' 
monogamy; for the State: monarchy; for religion: 
Catholicism, As for the constitution, and for the 
same reason (since it is the work Of nature), 
government 'has no need of human legislation,. 
It is otherwise with societies which have either 
no constitution or an anomalous constitution the 
non-constituted or badly constituted societies (it 
is all one, to Bonald). In these cases, the distinction 
between the government and the constitution is actual. 
These societies, which have neither general will, nor 
general authority, nor distinctions, nor hereditary, 
professions: societies in which all is particular, . 
confused and temporary, do not have, strictly speaking, 
a'constitution4 They possess Only the Outer trappings 
of society; they have a government without a constitution. 
This is the case, for example, in the family where, 
instead of one wife, the husband finds (in the event 
of polygamy or divorce . which is only a variation of 
polygamy) the possibility of having an "infinite" 
number of wives; in the State where authority is vested 
in an "indefinite number" of people; in those religions 
which have neither a unique God nor a single authority: 
these are simply governments, not constitutions. On 
any particular topic, according to Bonald, there can 
be only One necessary, conclusion, although there may 
be any number of unnecessary points of view. rt in 
these unnecessary points of view which are artificially 
imPosed upon nons-constituted societies which form the 
government (whereas a constitution is comprised of the 
necessary conclusions) P' And precisely because the basis 
Of government in not necessary, it is not for nature to 
reveal it instead, it nunt be written: 
The laws express no more 
than opinions, proprieties, 
and particular wills, It 
is necessary to be able to 
• 	 recall these opinions, etc, 
by committing them to paper, 22 
In non onstituted societies, where nature 4s not taken 
as the legislator, it is necessary to create a legislato r:  
There have never been 
legislators except in those 
societies which have rejected 
the legislation of nature* 	23 
Below the constitution and the government (which 
are in any cane the same in constituted societies), 
Bonald places the administration, that is, the cello t on 
214heorie du pouoi , Ouvree 1110,2610 
22.1 	,p 
23 .TErd, p.329. 
get 
of regulations which determine the way of life of the 
members of the society* The constitution, says Bonald„ 
establishes society's *maniere d'OtreP; the administration 
its omaniere d'agirq4 The constitution fixes the extent 
of authority; the adminietration provides the rule of 
duties: in domestic society, the respect due to the 
parents and the obedience owed by the children for the 
direction of their persons and the administration of 
their common possessions; in religious society, religious 
observance and ecclesiastical discipline; in the State, 
the military, tadioial, otvil, rural-and municipal lzws; 
these. are the rules of administration, which are 
distinct from the constitutional laws. 
The constitution could be described as the intrinsic 
order, the spirit of the society; While the a ttintstration 
is the extrinsic order, the physical form; or, better 
still, the constitution is the temperament of the State 
and the administration is the regime* Mat applies to 
man applies also to the State, !rites BonaldPjust as 
the former may have a good temperament despite a bad 
regime or a weak temperament under a wise regime, so a ' 
State may be strongly constituted but have a deleterious 
administration, or be badly constituted while possessing 
a wise administration* For example, Prance, which was 
24..6j4slationyrimitiveICEavres I t p.375. 
25.PArIncio constitalirl (nuvres 
the most securely organized of European societieS, has 
often been negligently and inadequately administered, 
On the other hand, Switzerland, Germany, Holland, "and 
Oven England", with weak constitutions, have almost 
always been fortunate in their judicious administrations. 
It is the quality of her constitution which has enabled 
France to emerge victorious from OW of the most 
violent crises which could beset a State; but all 
their administrative sagacity will not prevent the 
other nations from foundering, The constituted states 
are like healthy men able to weather excesses and to 
resist fatigue and sickness; the non-constituted states 
are like weak men who know only how to avoid maladies 
without overcoming them, And in the same way as for 
the individual, the discipline must be more severe in 
proportion as the temperament is weaker, so, for society, 
the administration met be more vigilant and more 
stringent where the constitution is defective* A good 
constitution is thus a guarantee of liberty: it allows 
some freedom to the individuals and reduces regimentation 
te/a minimum; a bad constitution, by cotparison, insists 
1Wan scrupulous attention to regulations and thus , 
necessitates a tyrannical and harassing administration. 
It is Bonaldts contention that every society must possess 
a certain amount of monarchism and that, if it is not 
in the constitution . where it Ought to be - then it 
t. be sought in the administration; if authority is 
not concentrated, at the head of affairs it must he 
distributed ameng the membere,. and this dispersion, 
which has been appropriated by democratic States, 
results. in the most persecuting tyranny for the 
subjects* 
Society thus attains perfection when to a strong 
constitution, it unites a wise administration, lust as 
man can achieve fulfilment Only if he unites with a 
sane and strong temperament a. judiciously adapted 
routine* Harmony then reigns between the administration 
and the government, se between the ideal government 
and the natural constitution. InstitUtiOns are then 
the necessary consequence of the political laws and 
the constitutional laws are fundamental. Pounded 00 
the nature Of man and Of things*. expression of the 
relationships established by nature itself, they do 
net require human ordination* 
II. So Acorn 
 
ive Stud 
    
Prom the moment that, for Honald, the form of the 
government is identified with the very constitution of 
tho society, distinguiehing the forme of government is 
equivalent to defining the types of society: an exercise 
instigated by the gsprit des lois, which Bonald quotes 
at lengths 
101, 
assume three definitions, 
or rather three facts: that 
a republican government is 
that in which the entire 
people, or only s part of 
the people, possesses supreme 
power; monarchical government, 
that in which a single person 
governs by fixed and established 
laws; despotic government, that 
In which a single person directs 
everything by his own will and 
caprice, 	26 
Bonald seizes upon Biontesquieuts triple social 
classification, in which he believes he has found 
support for his own* In Monteequieuis definition of 
monarchy as opposed to despotism and republicanism, 
Donald believes he has detected his own distinction 
between constituted and non-constituted clocietiee. 
The monarchy alone, for Bonald, is modelled upon the 
nature of its constitution; and he turns to Montesquieu 
for substanttation: 
Only one governs, but by 
fixed and established laws, 
by fundamental law% 	27 
But republican and despotic governments are definable 
only in terms of their externals: republican government 
by reference to its machinery of government 
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government, and that his method is comparative. But 
Bonald overestimates his debt to the illustrious 
Montesquieu. Viewing monarchy with the myopic vision 
of a monarchist, Donald is dominated by . the consideration 
of absolute principles. He seeks the perfect form of 
government, that which is forever in harmony with human 
nature, and he admits of no compromise. Montesquieu, 
despite the preface in which he confesses that the facts 
themselves meant nothing to him until he discovered the 
principles they were to illustratel lis really interested 
in diecoverIng how far particular forma of government 
are associated w(ith , determined'states of oociety, and 
instead of pronouncing absolute condemnation or 
commendation, he is propared to accept the relative 
merits of various governments, always seeking and 
advising improvements within particular frames of 
reference. Some consider, he wrote, illustrating ,his 
originality, 
that nature having established 
paternal authority, the most 
natural government is that of 
a single person, But the e2ample 
of paternal authority proves 
nothing... Better it is to say 
that the government, moat 
conformable to nature is that 
which best agrees with the 
humour and disposition of the 
people in whose favour it is 
established. 	32 
31, rit deeollamtlg: Oeuvres camoletesiVol• 
32.
I 1 0 
104. 
However, Bonald has not remained indifferent to, 
nor untouched by, ontesquieuts social analysis* And 
in his final work his last attempt at a comparative 
study of societies is clearly influenced by the 
In the some way, according to Bonald in the 
1110.4pe constitut413that the family may be either 
monogamous or polygamous, so political society may be 
either " onocratic" or "polycratic" . in other words, 
monarchic or popular. Hli or, each of these general 
types admits of further subdivision: and within the 
monocratic category Borald distinguishes royal monarchy 
(which is true monarchy), despotic monarchy and elective 
monarchy; while he divides polycratic societies into 
democracy, aristocracy, and representattve government * 
Now royal monarchy is the only , form of government 
in which the three social persons are completely 
distinct and homogeneous. This ie the way it was, in 
Bonales view, under the ancien regime: poWer wae 
hereditary, the ministry - under the name of the nobility 
was hereditary, and the subjects also, through 
profeseion and property, participated in this inheritance 
of traditions and continuity; power was independent, 
the ministry dependent upon the power under whose 
33fFrit12142.2.2nataaLl, CEuvres VIII, p.74, 
105. 
direction it acted, and the subjects, on whose behalf 
the ministry exercised its authority, had no other 
function than to obey. 
This perfect distinction and homogeneity of social 
ranks is found neither in despotic nor in elective 
monarchies. In the former . and Bonald cites the 
example of Turkey • power is hereditary, but the 
ministers may be dismissed or reappointed, and then 
only in a private capacity, at the pleasure of the 
sultan. In the latter (elective monarchy) . Poland, 
for instance the nobility is hereditary, but the 
throne is only for life, and in reality is dependent 
upon the conditions imposed by those who have instituted 
it. In Poland, the ministers have too much control; 
in Turkey, the monarch has excessive power. The first 
la therefore prone to anarchy, the other to despotism. 
In either case, the State is weak and troubled, and the 
subjects oppressed. 
Diametrically opposed to monarchy (government by 
one) to democracy (government by all). Instead of 
being dietinet, fixed and homogeneous, the social persona 
merge, in democracy, into one: the people . who are 
power and ministers and subjects. This cauees utter 
confusion and is, strictly speaking, unattainable, 
106, 
Aristocracies (such as Venice or Geneva) are 
characterized by the presence of two social elements: 
the ministers and the subjects - the nobility and the 
people. Aristocracie6 are easily recognizable, continues 
Bonald, because the class of citizens who collectively 
exercise power and call themselves the Senate or its 
equivalent, lose the title of nobility in order to 
assume the title of patriciate. And this is not simply 
a difference of terminology; for while the nobility 
serves power, the patriciate exercises it: the nobility 
is minister to the power, the patriciate is the power. 
In the hereditary nature of their power, in the 
resultant stability, arietocracies approach the 
advantages of monarchy; but in the collective form of 
their power, they share also the vices of democracy: 
aristocracies harness the advantages of one to the 
inconveniences of the other. 
As for representative government - the three social 
persons can be disCerned, but only nominally. The 
monarch represents power; the nobility or patriciate 
(Chamber of Peers in Prance, Lords in England) represent 
power; and the subjects themselves, by representation, 
claim power. Shared power is an inevitable onsequence 
of mixed governments; which meane that in representative 
government, unity of power is only a fiction* 
107. 
Bonald himself, in his social analysis, confesses 
his debt to the author of the Esprit des lois; but it 
is clear that he pays greater tribute than their 
affinity warrants, Montesquieu - and herein lies his 
originality - ontesquieu classifies the various 
societies not in terms of the number of persons bolding 
power, but in terms of the structural differences 
between societies: territorial magnitude, population 
figures, size, disposition, and cohesion of parties, 
customs, religion, crime-rate, and so on, Bonald 
certainly has been impressed by this method and 
proceeds in an analogous fashion by identifying (at 
least in constituted societies) the government with 
the constitution, and by distinguishing the diverse 
forms of government according to the nature and the 
relationship of the essential elements of the society, 
But while Montesquieu.° distinctions are modelled 
always upon the comparative, relative character and 
evolution of societies, Donald's, despite his constant 
appeal to history, preserve always his absolutist 
approach. 
This become more and more evident in the major . 
works, where Bonales social analysis breaks down into 
a simplified opposition of monarchy to democracy, 
108., 
II • Monarchs v Democracy 
In monarchy (writes Bonald) 
everything is social: 
religion, power, and 
distinctions; in a popular 
State, everything is 
individual: each has his 
own religion, each his power,' 
each wishes to be distinguished 
or to dominate either by 
talent or force. In monarchy, 
because power is social, it 
is limited by the social 
institutions; In democracy, 
because power is individual, 
it is limited by man. Monarchy 
considers man 14 society.., 
rpublicani considere man 
apart from sosietY... And 
since society is made for man, 
and man for society, monarchy, 
which coneiders man in his 
relations with society, is 
suited to man and to society. 
And republicanism, which 
considers man without relation 
to society, is unsuited both 
to society and to man. 	34 
The opposition of the two forms of government is 
thus epitomized', for Bonald, by the opposition of the 
general to the particular, the individual to the social, 
the natural to the artificial., 
34.Th6orie du nouvoir, Oftvres 
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The liberty of any 
being is synonymous 
with its perfectibility. 	36 
But man is, by nature, a social animal; therefore his 
will must be the will of society, which is the general 
will. an is thus free only if be can conform to this 
general will, and this is possible only in that society 
in which the general will is attained and expressed by 
the general power; which means, only in monarchy can 
m n be free. To accomplish his will thrum*: society 
and to depend upon the monarch who represents the 
general will - this, for man, is liberty. While to 
accomplish a particular will, to depend upon power 
which expresses only particular wills - this is slavery; 
hence slavery is the natural concomitant of democracy 
where all is particular. Here, in effect, man is 
dependent upon man, upon the power of man, upon the 
laws of man: what the• democrats call liberty is, in 
Bonald'e view, the subjection of the particular wills 
of others to the particular will of self. a subversion 
of man's natural end, which is the general will for 
the preservation of society. But, in monarchy, man 
is entirely independent of men and dependent only upon 
the general will. The king, independent in his person, 
is subject only to the laws: to the natural laws of 
36 Legislation nrimitive,CEuvree 110.88, 
society to which he ()zee his :existence to the political 
laze which determine the manner Of his political 
exietence t to the religious laws common to all men, 
and to the civil laws of proprietorship. The ministers, 
subject equally to the laze, the same lame as the 
monarch, and in addition to the special laze of their 
station, are independent of the subjects, and even 
independent of the will of the monarch, at least of 
his particular will, since they are obliged to obey, 
in Bonaldes scheme of things, only the general will 
manifested and transmitted by the general power 
(without having, it is true, he admits., what renders 
this independence quite illusory, to distinguish in 
the transmitted orders between the general Will of the 
sovereign and the particular will of the king). As for 
the other citizens » the Subjects1.*. they are also 
subjected to the natural, political, religious and 
civil laws as well as to the particular laws of their 
respective professions; but they are not dependent 
upon the particular will of others, nor even upon the 
particular will of the monarch , 
since they should recognize 
only the general will 
manifested in the prescribed 
forms, 	37 
This independence of all members of society withregard 
37.Theorie dm vouvoir,CEUvres III,p.93. 
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to men and to particulars and thie dependence only in 
relation to the general will and laws are, then, the 
attributes of monarchy and the assurance of genuine 
liberty, which can never be attained in democracy* Thie 
concept of liberty-through-dependence recalls 
Montesquieuss admonition: 
It is true that in 
democracies the people 
seem to act as they please; 
but political liberty does 
not consist of unlimited 
freedom* In governments - 
that is, in societies 
directed by laws - liberty 
can consist only in the 
power of doing what we 
ought to want, and in not 
being constrained to do 
what we ought not to want. 
We must have continually 
• present in our minds the 
difference between 
• independence and liberty* 
E2pressing the general will of society or nature, 
monarchy, Bonald continues, really has no need of 
legislators; quite simply ', there are no new laws to 
be created * Nature itself makes the laws - and amends 
them: quite imperceptibly customs develop, seaming 
eventually the foie() of law where their authority is 
38 
38*Bwit des lois,Bk*II$3*Ceuv es complates,I0.205-6,  
uncircumscribed by time or place; while the disturbances 
which trouble society are nature's indication of a • 
defective or incomplete law. The monarch has only to 
write at the dictate of nature: 
The monarch is, as it 
were, only the secretary 
of nature. 	39 
On the other hand, in democracy, laws are not the work 
of nature, but of man; they are arbitrary, not necessary, 
and express, not the will of nature, but often just the 
whim of the legislator. And precisely because they do 
not conform to nature, because they are even contrary 
to nature, it becomes necessary for the legislator , to 
intervene continually, not only in the general 
organization of society, but in the most trifling 
details of a inietration; he must determine everything 
and regulate everything, because he cannot count on 
nature itself. Monarchyt by virtue of the strength of 
Its constitution, does not need to descend to such 
trivial prescriptions: it does not fall into that 
tyrannical administration Which, in democracy, is the 
penalty to be paid for the weakness of the constitution. 
The excessive regimentation of democracy - 
democracy, which is based upon the supposition that 
the liberty of the citizens is sacred and inviolable . 
39.ThOorie du pouvoir,CBuvres III p.329. 
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actually resulte in the abuse of this liberty* This, 
to Bonald's way of thinking, is the logical consequence 
of the democratic view of society and man. Regarding 
society as the result of a contract and believing man 
to be naturally good, the democrats must perforce 
allow free play to every whim. But before long it 
becomes necessary to face the consequences of this 
blunder, and around these unrestrained wills it becomes 
necessary to impose all manner of "trivial laws and 
trivial precautions" until, finally, they are held in 
bondage* But in monarchy, where man is seen in his true 
lights with a will very often depraved, with instincts 
to be curbed and passions to be subdued, he is denied 
"the exercise of his will", but at the same time left 
with "every natural liberty in his actions". If he 
misappropriates this liberty, he renders account of 
himself only to religion, whose action begins where 
that of government ads. 40 
In monarchy, the nobility intervenes (in a manner 
both spontanr.ouo and necessary) between sovereign and  
subject - a body which, ministry of the first for the 
service of the second, represents for both the surest 
safeguard of independence and liberty. Its aim is the 
actual preservation of society* As the public force, 
40.Ibid,pp*116-117. 
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under the direction of the sovereign from whom it must 
always remain distinct, the nobility has the double 
functions of combat and of counsel, It combats, not 
by taking the offensive (which is contrary to the 
constitution) but by remaining on the defensive. It 
counsels, that is, it acts in an advisory capacity to 
the king,,gradually establishing itself as a 
depository of the laws. 
In democracy, the subjects, being also sovereign, 
are placed in the vulnerable position of having to 
rely entirely upon their own strength of resistance, 
which is puny and easily broken; sooner or later, 
despotism encroaches. Montesquieuss influence is 
quite apparent in this interpretation of the intermediary 
and hereditary nature of the nobility. In monarchy, 
wrote Montesquieu, 
the most natural, intermediate, 
and subordinate power is that 
of the nobility... Abolish the 
privileges of the nobility... 
in a monarchy and you will 
soon have either a popular 
state, or else a despotic one. 	41 
No monarch, no nobility; no nobility, no monarch - 
42 instead, a despot, Montesquieu contended, and Bonald 
agrees. That the nobility, he addsPis indeed a 
41. Esprit des lois,Bk II,4.CEuvres completes,I,pp.20-21.  
42•Ibid,p.21. 
43.117Orie du pouvoir,CEUvres  
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protection for the subjects is demonstrated by the 
fact that the first precaution taken by despots is 
the destruction of the nobility's independence. 
Doubtless the nobility may, by the privileges 
which are attached to its position, provoke envy. But 
these privileges are merely the provision and' 
compensation for the duties which are incumbent upon 
it. And it is the duties'. not the privileges 
which should be considered, ,Viewing it in this light, 
the subjects, instead of envying the nobility, should 
stand in awe of the onerous honour of being admitted 
into its ranks. Por,its ranks are open to all — all 
those who, by labour or fortune, have accrued sufficient 
wealth to gain independence. Wealth'is the open sesame 
to the ministry: Bonald's reply , to those Who would 
espouse equality of opportunity. The nobility is not 
a decoration, nor a prejudice, nor a usurpation • but 
a dut04 And, again, the Esprit des lois e7presses 
succinctly the same sentiments: 
(The nobility) should not 
be a boundary between the 
power of the prince and the 
weakness of the people, but 
the link which joins them, 45 
Bonald's conception of the role and status of the . 
44.14 ielation rimittve,CEuvres 1,p 211. - • 45•Bk049.CEuvres comp tes,I,p,73,-- 
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nobility is, quite clearly, Montesquieu-inspired. 
By misconstruing the role of the nobility, Bonald 
proceeds, by suppressing this necessary intermediary 
between the sovereign and the subjects, by denying the 
latter the natural defenders of their interests and 
their liberty, by imposing upon them a master with 
unlimited freedom, democracy offers no alternative 
to direct subjection except the recourse to revolt * 
which thus becomes a permanent condition of society. 
In monarchy, on the other hand, the appeal to violence 
is never necessary, since oppression will be deflected * 
by the nobility in the first instance or, if a second 
should arise, by the passive resistance of the subjects. 
The institution of the nobility provides a clear 
contrast between the social character of monarchy, as 
opposed to democracy, where everything is individual. 
The nobility is a profession, attached not to individuals 
but to families in whom, by property inheritance, it 
becomes fixed and perpetual. And what is ti'uo of the 
nobility is true of all monarchic institutions. Monarchy 
recognizes the individual only in the family and the 
family only by profeesioni 6it is a family organization, 
At the top of the social professional ladder is the 
46.Theorie du nouvoir,Ceuvres III,p,313. 
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royal family, which exercises , power; beneath them, the 
noble families devoted to advising and serving the king; 
finally, the subject families occupied in work and 
industry. And the families, in their turn, form social 
groups ("corps"). The individual by himself is of no 
consequence; he acquires significance only through the 
family or group to which he belongs, which, either by 
inheritance, education or environment, has prepared 
him to fulfil his role adequately, Monarchy, Donald 
likes to emphasize, has no need of great kings, nor 
of great men in any profession; it is sufficient that 
there be mod kings, good ministers and good subjects. 
Monardhy is based upon the belief that, if exceptional 
events demanding exceptional kings and men arise, the 
events themselves will produce them. 
If monarchy is the organization of families, 
democracy, on the contrary, is the organization man; 
,where individuals (without the support of either social 
group or tradition) are called upon to fulfil all 
professions. 
Sometimes with a hundred 
thousand arms (the people) 
destroy everything; and 
sometimes with a hundred 
thousand feet, they creep 
like an insect. 	47 
47•Esnrit des lois Bk.II 2. Essai anal ticue,Ceuvres  
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wrote Bonald, quoting Montesquieu« And this is only 
to be expedted, for the individual has only his own 
resources: upon his qualities or faults depends, at 
every moment, the functioning of the democratic social 
organism; mediocre or bad, he is useless or dangerous; 
and so it becomes essential for him to be superior, 
which is both contrary to nature and a threat to 
society. Contrary to nature, since nature is replete 
with mediocrity, but meagre in excellence. A threat 
to society, because exceptional men, dissociated from 
the exceptional circumstances appropriate to them, 
' refuse to be integrated; and then, tormented by a 
desire to create great events, they create only 
unnatural ones, The benefit of monarchy is precisely 
that it spares societz from great men 'who wish to 
become even greatern°to the detriment of the strength 
and unity of the state. The disadvantage of democracy 
is that it encourages this plague of great men, who 
are a scourge on society and a permanent danger to the 
liberty of the citizens. 
The preponderant role of the individual in 
democracy; the constant need for superior men at all 
levels of the social hierarchy; the abrupt admission 
to the professions without preliminary family or 
48.,Essai analytique,CEuvres I l p.102« 
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social education; the temporary 'and. precarious nature 
of these positions which are always entrusted to 
individuals from whom they can, just as arbitrarily, 
be withdrawn in favour of others; the absence of a 
guarantee for the liberty which is no longer to be 
found; . these suffice to explain, for Bonald, why 
Montesquieu should have made virtue the principle of 
demooracy1 49 
There is not much probity 
required to support a 
monarchical or despotic 
government. The force of 
law in one, and the prince's 
arm in the other, are 
sufficient to direct and 
maintain the whole. But in 
a popular state, one spring 
more is necessary, namely: 
virtue. 	50 
wrote Montesquieu. Certainly, avers Bonal41 
eXtraordinary qualities must be demanded of the 
citizens, where the government itself is deficient. 
• But, he continues, in democracy virtue cannot afford 
to be limited, as Montesquieu restricted it, to 
political virtue, but must be extended to moral and 
religious virtue. Prom all of which it should be 
obvious that such a government is, in fact, unattainable 
49,Th4orie du pouvoir,I,BkaYI,Chap,II,OEuvres III,pp.305ff. 
50.Esprit des lois,Bk.III 0.CEuvres coliggra. 10.26. 
51.Theorie du pouvoir,Cituvres III,p.305. 
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and unnatural. It demands of the individual a perfection 
which is not by nature his - a perfection which, if it 
did exist, would render all government and law redundant. 
Beusseau had good reason for saying that democracy is 
a government suited only to gods. Much wiser and lose 
exacting, monarchy takes account of the weaknesses of 
human, nature and places greater store upon the social 
group or the profession than upon the individual, 
addressing itself less to virtue in general. than to 
one particular virtue: honour. The notion of honour 
as the pivot of monarchy is unquestionably drawn from 
the Esprit des lois although, as usual, identical 
conclusions are not reached by amenable methods* For 
Montesquieu, honour is monarchy's substitution for the 
virtue upon which democracy depends; in monarchy, he 
writes, in his dispassionate manner, 
it is extremely difficult 
for the people to be 
virtuous... (But) if 
monarchy wants one spring 
it is provided with another. 
Honour, that is, the 
prejudice of every person 
and rank, supplies the place 
of the political virtue of 
which I have been speaking 	52 
In Lontesquien's view, a monarchical government supposes 
52.Enprit des 1oi9,Bk•III,5..6.CEuvres completes,I,pp.32-33. 
122. 
pre-eminences and ranks, and since it is the nature of 
honour to aspire to preferments and titles, honour is 
properly suited to this government. It is a stimulus 
on which it is easier to rely, for the general good 
Of' society, than the virtue of the citizens; by acting 
for himself and for his class, each is acting for the 
entire society. For Bonald, honour is rather the 
virtue appropriate to each social group or profession; 
and it assumes particular forms in particular professions. 
Thus, claims BonaldPfor the warrior honouris br very, 
for the magistrate equity, for the priest propriety 
and gravity, for the gentry loyalty, for the scholar 
truth; French honour is fidelity to the king, which is 
patriotism; honour for a woman is irreproachable conduct* 
So many virtues - all of which are the mainstay of the 
monarchy; all of which comprehend the common denominator: 
they are social, which means they are exhibited in and 
for society. In democraoy, by comparison, virtue is 
always individual - private, rather than public; where 
inappropriate virtues may even run contrary to the 
interests of society. 
By its unique virtues, by its hierarchical 
organization, by its natural constitution, monarchy, 
for Bonald, assumes not only the true liberty which 
53.  Theorie du pouvoir$ Mivres 111 $ p. 310, 
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consists of the ability of each to attain his perfection, 
but also the true equality for which, erroneously, 
54 democracy claims the privilege. Bonald is clearly 
not concerned with physical and moral equality (nature, 
he says, did not wish it, and man cannot redress nature), 
but with social and political equality. The democrats 
believe it consists of the equal right of each to 
exprees his will and to exercise his power; but as, 
in practice, this right is real only for some and 
remains purely illusory for others, such equality is 
a chimera. In monarchy, however, equality is a reality — 
familial rather than individual . consisting of the 
capacity of each to graduate, by labour and thrift, 
from the domestic to the public estate, to join the 
nobility in order to serve the State. 
Donald does not regard the nobility — and he takes 
as his prototype the French nobility . as a closed clams 
or caste. He considers it, on the contrary, open to 
all who, by their efforts, show themselves to be capable 
and worthy of the rank. Nothing could be more natural 
or more legitimate than ambition: not in the language 
of passion where it signifies the lust for wealth and 
the means of dominating others; but in the language of 
morality and political theory where it indicates the 
• 	•• 
' 54.Essai analytiOue,CRaVres 1,14101. 
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altruistic desire: • 
to serve the public 
in the public professions. 	55 
This ambition, claims Bonald, was in the heart of every 
family under the ancien r6gime, and it was for all a 
principle worthy of emulation* To them, the constitution 
seemed to say: 
When you have fulfilled 
your goal in domestic 
society, which is to 
acquire independence and 
property by legitimate 
endeavour, order and 
economy; when you have 
attained self-sufficiency 
and are financially in a 
position to serve the State, 
the greatest honour to which 
•you could aspire would be to 
•enter the order which is 
specially dedicated to 
serving the State and, once 
there, you will became 
eligible for all public 
positions* 	56 
True political equality, like true liberty, is 
found then, by Bonald, only in monarchy. The nobility, 
which acts as a seminary for public positions, is open 
to all* And this prospect suffices to maintain hope 
in each heart, hope which keeps men happy and sustains 




them in their efforts. This resignation and happiness 
is absent in democracies: where every individual 
immediately aspires to all positions, discontent is 
the natural result of their disappointed ambitions. 
An Montesquieu, with greater moderation, expressed it: 
Ambition is pernicious in 
a republic. But in a 
monarchy it has some good 
effects; it gives life to 
the government, and is 
attended With this 
advantage, that it is in 
no way dangerous, because 
It may be continually 
checked. 	57 
However, equality, in thin sense, does not appear 
to be in the forefront of Borod's preoccupations. It 
seems to have been invoked merely to oppose democracy 
on its own territory. Actually, for Bonald, what 
constitutes equality in society is less the admission 
or admissability to all positions than 
equal submission on the 
part of all, to the 
general laws which are 
common to all, and to the 
particular laws which 
relate to specific 
professions, 	58 
in the same way that political liberty is submission 




, to the only general will of society and independence 
with regard to all other wills. There is liberty and 
equality in monarchy, and only in monarchy, because 
there, and there alone, power, minister and subject 
are subjected at the came time to the laws of their 
station, and to the laws common to the State; and 
because they obey only the general will and not the 
partiOular wills which are not laws. In the final 
analysis, what Bonald understands by political equality 
is the equal resignation of all to the inequality of 
circumstances: the gradation of professions, the 
hierarchy of social positions;, this inequality, these 
distinctions, this hierarchy, which is the very essence 
of monarchy, are no much more readily acceptable where 
• they are considered beneficial and necessary, and where 
• it is clearly not impossible to breach the degrees. 
Equality as the democrats interpret it runs contrary 
• to the very nature of society, They wish all men to 
be politically equal. But, replies Bonald, theimust, 
then, wish to make all professions equal — which is to 
argue that the professions which feed, lodge and clothe 
• man are as important and as honourable as those which 
teach him his duties, or fight his battles, or punish 
his infract1ons.59 
59. "Observations sur l'ouvrage de Mme /a baronne de 
Stae1 4,01angps,gEuvres Vii, pp 
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For want of liberty and equality, democratic 
societies live in a perpetual , state.of agitation and. 
turbulence. Uncommitted appetites, ambitions and 
paasions must induce a bitter struggle for power, In 
, which the passions of each encounter no other barrier 
than the passions of others. The monarchic state, on 
the other hand, because it guarantees true liberty and 
equality, experiences only tranquillity and stability. 
The advantages of monarchy which Montesquieu discerned: 
its ranks, its permanence, its constancy and security, 
are even more apparent to Bonald, In .a regime in 
which each has and accepts his station, filed and 
distinct, whence would disorder derive? 
Monarchy alsoi- by virtue of its constitution, 
shuns external disturbances. Conquest * declares Bonaldf° 
Is incompatible with monarchy. Based upon the principle 
or preservation, and not aggrandizeMent, wars are 
limited to those which are strictly necessary for the 
preservation of society. As for Louis xwe ware of 
Conquest - to Bonald, these are evidence of Francois 
weakened constitution - the result, Bonald considers, 
.of the gradual alienation of a largo part of the royal 
domain and the schism between Church and State . which 
had destroyed that fiXity whith is the true limitation 
60,Th6orie  du nauvoirI CEuvres III,pp.217-218. 
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of polar and the necessary result of the constitution. 
•"Republican Prance", after all, has not hesitated to 
wage war beyond all frontiers :Pyrenees, Alps, Rhine, 
and even the Atlantic, and this in because her 
constitution has been, not merely altered, but destroyed: 
public religion, throne, and social distinctions. 
One final difference (which is a consequence 
rather than a cause of his preceding comparisons) 
•Bonald discerns: this is the presence, in monarchy, 
and the absence, in democracy, of a national character, 
More readily felt 0 defined, writes BonaldPthe 
national character of a people would appear to be the 
attachment of that people to perceptible objects of 
their affection . attachment to worship, to the royal 
family, to the families in distinguished positions, 
to the °social proprieties. It is formed of a mixture 
•of habits, customs, and way of life. AlthoUgh, 
obviously, this line of inquiry has been prompted by 
the Esprit doe lois, for Donald the national 
characteristics are not moulded by the climatic 
•conditions in which Montesquieu seeks their explanation, 
but by the political and religious institutions: by 
education, by imitation, environment, and tradition. 62 
A' people who have most attachment . most constant, 
61, 1b18, p. 390. 
62;Ibid, pp. 361.2. 
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invariable attachment - will (in Bonald , s opinion)• have 
most customs and, therefore, most character; and this 
character will be more or: less strongly pronounced in 
relation to the unity of the nation, and to the 
continuity of its traditions: its religion, its 
government, its royal family, its frontiers. Only 
monarchy realizes this continuity of conditions; a 
monarchic nation must therefore have more character 
since it has inherited 
all the social customs, 
since the citizens have 
• before their eyes the 
objects of all their 
affections. 6$ 
In democracy, on the other hand, there can be no 
national character. Mere would be the objects of 
affection and the respect for customs? Not in religion, 
which is neither public nor common to all, and inspires 
neither veneration nor dependence. Not in authority, 
which is always particular, individual and transient, 
having no attachment to property or family. In
•democracy, in place of cuetome, there are opinions; 
in place of memories, reasoning; in place of feelings, 
thoughts. Thus, novelty is accepted without murmur; 
the virtues of other nations are extolled and emulated; 




new coil; and, as a consequence, the national 
character disintegrates, In monarchy, on the contrary, 
religion, language, institutions, education, 
administration, even literature and art, are jealously 
preserved; and innovations, particularly foreign 
imitations, are not regarded, for that fact alone, as 
superior. The people thus come to hold a high opinion 
of themselves and the national character is maintained 
in its purity. 
Thus Bonald arrives at his conclusion, which wes t 
of ()aurae, his starting-point: in monarchy - fixity, 
continuity, tradition; in democracy - instability and 
discontinuity. Order and peace in the hierarchy; 
trouble and anarchy in the uniformity which is really 
despotism. Liberty and equality are the attributes 
of feudalism, The feudal laws, wrote Ronald quoting 
Montesquieu, 
form a very beautiful 
prospect. A venerable 
old oak raises its lofty 
head to the skies, the 
eye sees from afar its 
spreading leaves; upon 
drawing nearer, it 
perceives the -trunk but 
does not discern the root; 
the ground must be dug up 
to discover it. 	64 
64,Bs rit des lois,Bk4XXX1 1,Thigorie du pouvoir,,COuvres III, 
p.176. 
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And when the ground is due - Por Montesquieu, the 
seeds of an entire forest in which all grandeur, 
strength and might are relative. For Bonald, one 
solitary venerable old oak - monarchy: to monarchy 
le the kingdom, the power and the glory. 
SECTION IV 
CONDORCBT and ENLIGHTENMENT 
132« 
While Rousseau and Uontesquieu take the principal 
supporting roles in Bonald's dramatis personae, 
Condorcet, by comparison, makes only rare appearances. 
Nevertheless, Donald did not underestimate Condorcet's 
role in either the preparation or the realization of 
the Revolution. He wasanare of the active part which 
Condoroet bad played in the work of the Legislative 
Assembly and the Convention, in the compilation of 
the Declaration of the Ri ts of Man in 1793, his 
collaboration in the Constitution of the Year One, and 
the organization of the Republic. He was aware also 
of Condorsrat's radical Jacobin sympathies in the trial 
of Louis XVI, and he was not oblivious to Condorget'd 
vituperative attacks against religion and those 
associated with it. These were grounds for antipathy 
and denunciation no less fundamental than those _ 
furnished by the pontrat social and the Esprit des  
Iota; but-Donald appears to have become aware of them 
only after the ,Theorie du pouvoir was completed. 
Condor9et's ESQUiSee d'un Tableau reached him when 
he arrived at Constance in 1796. Immediately he 
despatched for publication a supplement expressing 
133. 
the reflections inepired by Condoroet's doctrine of 
human progress. An analysis of these reflections 
exposes Donald's comprehension of, and attitude towards, 
Gondorcet and, consequently, Donald's own doctrine of 
progress and enlightenment. 
Donald regards the Esquisse (Condonet's "prophetic 
trumpet") as the apocalypse of the new Gospel: the 
Declaration of the Rights of an symbolizes the Decalogue 
and the French Republic the Exodus achieved. Donald 
holds this work (which, he claims„ expresses nothing 
but contempt for all religion, derision for the Christian 
religion, hatred for monarchy and disdain for all 
government which is not popular) to be the last word 
of philosophy, in the contest to which it has challenged 
1 eociety,-- And Donald, taking up the challenge, sounds 
his own prophetic note: 
For myself.., I would 
dare to predict quite the 
opposite and announce the 
triumph of the Christian 
religion and the destruction 
of republican government.,. 
Prance never has been and 
never will be, a republic, 
(Prance) is a monarchy 
in revolution, 2 




From beginning to end, writes Bonald, 
the Essulese is just a 
disguised sophism, 
presented with a display 
of erudition and scientific 
apparatus capable of 
impressing the uninitiated 
or unsuspecting reader, 3 
The thane which Condorpot develops is that the 
progress of knowledge renders men better and societies 
perfect, For, allied to Condorpet's distrust of faiths 
supernatural was his belief in the value of the 
knowledge which the physical sciences would impart. To 
the philosophes . and Condorget in particular - science 
had rendered obsolete the whole basis upon which the 
ecclesiastical edifice rested. Christian revelation 
was rejected as mere hypothesis, and miracles as 
undanonstrated, unscientific, and therefore untrue. 
This supposes first of all that 
man makes and 
perfects society - 4 
which is, in Bonald's eyes, the fundamental heresy of 
the eighteenth-century philosophes. Secondly, it 
assumes that knowledge (that is, scientific knowledge) 
necessarily improves the man - and this, too, is false, 
claims Bonald, 5 The philosopher cannot resist the desire 
3•Ibid,p.165.• 
4.15374 
5 11717 pp 165-166 • 	, 	• 	• 
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to dominate by imposing his opinions or his wit, any 
more than the military dictator can resist using 
physical force* The natural sciences add nothing to 
the virtue of the man; and they contribute but little 
to his happiness * Moreover, instead of fostering the 
preservation of society, they actually hasten it 
destruction by their encouragement of commerce and 
luxury, which are corruptive influences on men and 
corrosive elements in society. 6 
Condorcet's confidence in establishing, on the 
rigorous certainty of mathematics - in particalar * 
upon the calculation of probabilities the duties of 
man and the laws of society, morality and politics, 
encounters in Bonald only a scepticism full of disdain 
and indignation. The time, then, will come, he writes 
with heavy sarcasm, when everything which relates to 
the faculties . even the intellect - of man, to the 
rules of manners and duties, to the principles of the 
social order, will be "weighed, measured and calculated", 
truth °like matter", virtue "like length", happiness 
"like quantity", Conscience will be merely an equation, 
morality only a problemg Condorcet conceals the 
concepts in the verbiage. 
All Condorpet's reasoning leads logically, in 
6. 'bid, p. 167.. 
7 enras, p.170. 
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Bonaldts,mind, to this conolusion: that, if the 
sciences Perfect society, the prize of government 
naturally falls to the scientists. Such a concept, 
8 writes Bonald disparagingly, was assured of making a 
great impact among the crowd of those semi—savants 
whose numbers had been greatly increased by the 
Dictionaries, Encyclopaedias and Journals, and who 
all believed themselves called to instruct man and 
to direct society* The art with which it was presented 
could not but be conducive to its success. The method, 
claims Bonald, is "simple and exact": it consists of 
proceeding from the known to the unknown, from the true 
to the probable. But readers should be on their guard 
for, says Bonald, 9the object is continually changing, 
so that Condorpet draws his moral conclusions from 
physical promisees. From the progress realized in 
the natural sciences and the arty, he passes adroitly 
to conjectures on the progress that man will make in 
the science of manners, duties, and the perfection of 
the social order. ,Oondorcet continually confuses 
• 	 The certainty of what 
Is with the hope of 
what should be, 10 
And what a contrast there is between these hopes and 
the realities:, That cruel disillusion comes with the 
8 0 mid, p 174. 
   p.175. 
10. Ibid. 
137 : 
facts Philosophy promised society virtue, happiness, 
immortality; it has yielded only corruption, misery 
and death. The debate between . philosophy and society 
is reduced by Donald to very simple alternatives: 
either society (by Its constitution) moulds man, or 
man (by his inventions and discoveries) shapes society; 
to reduce it still Further, either society shapes 
itself and man, or man moulds himself and society?? 
Experience is there to adjudicate, 
Condorslet, just as intensely as Montesqaieu and 
Rousseau, believed in the absolute value of the 
individual, in his natural and imprescriptable rights, 
in the fundamental liberty and equality of all men: 
there, for him, , was an inviolable force before which 
the power of the State must yield. Donald, on the 
contrary, acknowledges the individual only in society; 
he accords him duties rather than rights; and he 
denounces equality as being contrary to nature. For 
Condorcet, although he admita the necessary, natural 
and spontaneous nature of social existence, although 
he speaks neither of natural law nor of a social 
contract, for him, as for Montesquieu and Rousseau, 
society appears always as an artificial creation: 
human reason Can fashion it to its own liking. The 
insistence upon artificiality is, of course, particularly 
11.1bidopp,180,183. 
138, 
repugnant to Bonald* Society is the work of nature; 
nature is the only legislator. The idea of human 
intervention in the formation or development of the 
social group is completely foreign to him, "Social 
art" says Bonald, borrowing Condorgetts own terminology, 
is an apt expression to describe the application to 
society of the principles established by the social 
acientiste. It is a fact worth remarking, be writes: 
philosophy makes of 
society an art, nature 
makes of it a living 
realityl 	12 
And nature, in Bonaldse scheme, is synonymous with 
religion. All the attitudes of the author of the 
Esquiese which Bonald sets out to refute: the artificial 
character of societies, the right of the individual to 
be appointed judge of institutions and legislator of 
peoples, the substitution of arbitrary theories and 
systems for the constitutions of nature, and the 
sovereignty of human reason . are merely pawns in the 
great contest between religion and philosophy, The 
champions of Reason and the champions of Religion were, 
to quote Pierre Bayle, fighting desperately for the 
possession of men's souls, 13Pew of the protagonists 
would admit to compromises; either the laws of 
12,/bid,p.169. 
134a3Ted by Paul Hazard, The European Mind 1680-1715,  
(Pelican Books,1964)p•17— 
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authority, order and progress were divine and immutable, 
or they were human and histOridal. Condorcet, Of Course, 
adopted the latter alternative; but Bonald, influenced 
by his adversaries more than he realized, (perhaps :in 
an attempt to be more persuasive), those the somewhat 
paradoxical argument for laws which were at the some 
time divine and immutable— and historical. 
In spite of the 
differences between 
my principles of society 
and those of Condercet, 	14 
acknowledges Bonald,. we Are in accord on one important 
point: the indefinite perfectibility of man* 
COndoicet, in the Bsouisse d'un Tableau, olzdined 
that 
• The progress (of humanity) 
is subject to the same 
• general laws that can be 
observed in the development 
of the individual... 15 
Bonald may well have had Oondorcet's analogy in mind 
when he wrote 
Society then, like man, 
passes through several 
different stages and the 
two advances may be compared 
with one another; society has, 
like the individual, its childhood, 
its- adolescence and its manhood. 16 
14 Suppl6mentn,CEuvres IV,p,179. 
15.Esquissol (London,1955),13.4. 
16.1304slation nrimitive,CEUvres Ipp 3 3. 
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In childhood, society is in an imperfect state of 
ignorance, of undirected parts! adolescence (which 
Donald likens to Hobbes's "robust child") brings with 
it corruption, passion and error . a stage . beyond Which 
pagan peoples have never advanced; but in maturity 
society achieves its perfect natural end, characterized 
by reason, truth and virtue. 17 
Por Bonald then, as for Condorcet, 
Society moves slowly 
(towards the achievement 
of its natural end)... 
it never stops, 18 
As Bonald recognizes, as the final historical explanation 
the doctrine of progress must be an all-embracing one, 
and to the impulse for perfection he attributes even 
those things that he most abhors: 
,., all the innovations 
attempted by governments, 
all the revolutions effected 
by the people, all the schemes 
for amelioration devised by 
philosophers, 	19 
even though he is forced to retrace his steps by assuring 
his readers that these acts, springing (as they must) 
from divine sources, nevertheless had not received 
divine sanction and would have no permanence, 
17,Ibid, 
18. 11Va-trait4 de Westphalie",CgUvres II,p.430. 
19."Du perfectionnement de l'homme",pelanges,CBmvres VII, 
p.518, 
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since the laws of 
God can redress the 
mores of man, 	20 
To Donald, the difference between mores and laws is a 
fundamental one. Mores are man-made; laws are divinely 
ordained - and in proportion as the sooial mores can 
be made to conform to the revealed commandments (which 
represent truth), in such degree can society be said 
to be perfect. And, Bonald would have us believe, it 
is the omnipresence of th Prime Mover Which prevents 
society from continuing in the state of perpetual 
depravation to which individualist doctrines would 
hare it succumb; while progress, although Bonald always 
equates it with conservatiamPtecomes, just as Condorcet 
saw it: the historical manifestation of the inherent 
desire to attain the state of perfection in society - 
the progress of European 
political society towards 
perfection has been a 
development from small 
barbaric tribes... to 
civilization. 22 
and in the individual 
*0. man born to attain 
perfection because he 
is perfectible, 23 
20ynConsiderations philosophiques sur lee principes et 
leur applicationn,M4lar  es,CEuvres VII 1 p,42. 
21.Legielation primit ve, Puvrig-T757376. 
23.17ga analytinue cRuvres 1,p 0 704 
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In an argument which parallels one of his early proofs 
, of the existence of God -,that the idea of God necessarily 
presupposes the fact of God Bonald establishes his 
point: 
*** if perfection were 
not inherent in the nature 
of man, the concept of 
perfectibility would not 
exist in his ideas and 
would have no place in 
his language* 24 
So history becomes determdmant. It is the process by 
which potentiality becomes actuality, in proportion as 
man comes to understand the mysterious ways of PrOidence; 
The concept of perfectibility which is receiVing much 
attention, writes Bonald, 
constitutes the capacity to 
proceed from bad to good 
and from good to beet: 
that ie, to approach in 
application the best 
possible principle in 
theory. 	25 
Thus, he continues, the perfect society is that 
society whose laws conform to the principles of God 
(as revealed to Moses); and the perfect map - who can 
exist only in the perfect society . is he whose conduct 
is in accordance with these laws* Once a in, Bonsidss 
24. nonsideirations philosophiques pup les principes et 
leur app1ication 1,M6langes, CEuvres VII, p,37* 
2501bidt p.25# 
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theory of the ascendancy of society in the face of the 
individual is apparent; 
If we want - man to be 
good, we must first 
establish the good 
society, 	26 
he claims. While the perfect eociety, alias the ideal 
constitution, is attainable in spite of the individual, 
the perfect man is only feasible in the context of the 
consummated society. Although Bonald shares Condor9et's 
confidence in the "indefinite perfectibility" of the 
human race, their expectations are at variance: the 
author of th Bsouisse awaits this progress in man 
himself, while Bonald'anticipates it first in society. 
The progress (of humanity) 
is subject to the same 
general lams that can be 
observed in the development 
of the faculties of the 
individual, and it is indeed 
no more than the sum of that 
development realized in a 
large number of individuals 
joined together in society, 	28 
wrote Condorcet. It was statements such as this which 
led Bonald to range Condorcet amongst his eighteenth- 
century enemies - 
0 
26 "Du perfectionnement de 
P.510, 
27."Supplement",(EUvres IV 




those who see in society 
and in religion only man 
... 
 
his errors, his passions, 
his shortcomings . and then 
demand a reckoning with 
religion, 	29 
Neverthelese, by concurring with Condorcet that 
a stage, both th oretical and practicable, may be 
attained beyond, which any further improvement in the 
human condition is inconsequential, and that the 
happiness of mankind is fulfilled in proportion as 
history progresses towards its determined objective, 
Bonald is treading the forbidden ground of the 
Enlightenment. Admittedly, it is Christianity's 
own Supreme Being that Bonald invokes: 
. o . God in his wisdom has 
seen fit to reveal to men 
the final goal... By endowing 
them with the capacity for 
perfectibility, by commanding 
them even to perfection, he 
has taught them what it is 
and where it is to be found. 	30 
"What it is" is the theme of Bonald's entire writings: 
it is absolute monarchy, it is unity of power, it is 
inequality of rights, it is government based upon the 
Ten Commandments, it is Catholicism - but Catholicism 
so devoid of its former strength and character that it 
29.Princi e constitutif,CEuvres VIII, p.36. 
30,Mêiange, OEuvres VI ,15777- 
1450 
is almost unrecognizable; for, "where it is to be 
found" is not in the world-beyond-death, but in the 
very mortal world on earth. 
And once both society and man have attained this 
state of perfection, What is to be said of man (who is 
no longer "naturally wicked") and of society (which is 
no longer required to restrain its perfected subjects) 
. that they are unnatural and their constitution 
inapt? But Bonald does not clarify this ambiguity. 
This infinite, compulsive movement of man and 
society towards perfection placed Bonald Bonald the 
apostle of counter revolution - in a very real dilemma. 
How to surmount the obstacle presented by the French 
Revolution? Indeed, how to integrate the progress of 
destiny with the regress of man? To overcome this 
difficulty Bonald deviates from the Enlightenment's 
theory of progress; instead of pursuing the straight-
line concept expounded so forcefully by Condor9et, 
Bonald abandons it in favour of a cyclical pattern 
of development. 31Society, he writes, may pass beyond 
• 
31,Bonald'e theory of progress follows closely that of 
Vico, although Bored himself seems •to be unaware of 
the writings of tIlle other. See The New Science of 
Giambattista Vico,Book V;also M.H.Quinlan,The 
Historical Thought of the Vicomte de Bona1.37- 
TW,MTington,19 3 
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the age of maturity into a,decline or senility from 
which the only advance can be through complete 
rejuvenation, in which it may even be necessary to 
destroy in order to oreate.4 2 And this is what has 
happened to Prance since the seventeenth century: 
when the mature age of Louis XIV33declined into the 
weak reigns of his successors until the Revolution - 
society in its death-throes - disgorged the means of 
regeneration. 34 
Bonald develops this theme - begun, certainly, 
as a particular deviation to explain the Revolution 
without destroying his own teleology - in universal 
terms: 
Three ages, of power . 
personal, public and 
popular - incorporate 
all the casual elements 
of society; they explain 
the entire development of 
power, its birth, its life 
and its death,. the 
evolution of society. 	35 
32 Digislation primitiveI CEuvres 
33. 9u style et de la littdratureft,Millangps,COuvres VII 
P.206. 	 . 
34.Thid,p•234;and imitive,ccuirrea 10.272-3. 
35. "o la maniere 4Wett,r)lia16-7--ymN(16\ivres VII, 
pp.417,422. 
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The age of personal power is so designated because it 
is characterised by the leadership of the strong man 
who, inevitably, is present when circumstances demand, 
as in periods of disorder or revolutionr Thus 
Clovis raised on 
indestructible foundations 
the edifice of the 
Prench EMpire, 	37 
and Charlemagne emerged 
when the royal authority 
had been debilitated... 38 
PersOnal power becomes public power when a nobility 
emerges to implement the policies (by now laws) of 
their leader who by this time has adopted the title 
of king, thus establishing a line of hereditary 
succession to the throne and in the nobility* This 
is important, for the security of the age of public 
power depends upon this condition:- 
Power, once it was 
strengthened by public 
institutions and 
elevated beyond. the 
interference of the 
subjects, was more 
independent*** and 
more respected. 	39 
36.Principe constitutif,CEuvres VIII,pp.55-59. 
37,Thoorie du pouvoir,CORSTirni.p 225 _ 
38:Th1d,p4.226, 
39,17r angeel, Ceuvree VII I, PP. 418-419. 
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But when the king loses this respect and is reduced 
to nothing more than "the president of a deliberative 
40 assembly", then power has passed into the hands of 
the sovereign people; it has become popular. This is 
the full turn of the wheel, because popular rule means 
chaos; and out of the disorder which must ensue, a 
strong man is certain to appear to establish peace 
and order through his personal government. Thus the 
cycle renews itself. The analogy of Louis XVI . the 
Revolution . and Napoleon is obvious, but Donald does 
not leave it to conjecture: 
We have under our very 
eyes a memorable example 
of the formation of a 
society by the spontaneous 
ascendance of power. When 
Bonaparte appeared, Prance 
(was chaotic); and did he 
not proclaim himself First 
Consul, Consul for life, 
emperor"., and master...? 	41 
So far so good; but, continuing Donald's line of 
argument, Bonaparte 'a mastery of the situation and 
his establishment of personal power imply that the 
throne of Prance, in all legitimacy, must pass to his 
heirs just as surely as society must proceed to the 
stage of public power. And yet Bonald, both in his 
40.Thborie du pouvoir,CEuvres 
41.Frxne pe conotitutif, IEWies 
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life and in his writings, was adamant in his denial 
of Napoleon's claims. 
If . legitimacy (Louis XVIII) 
had not asserted itself, 
would not power have 	• passed down to the family 
of the victor (Napoleon)? 42 
wrote Donald in 1829, even then failing to see the 
significance (for his theory) of the fact that it 
did not do so. Elsewhere Donald describes Napoleon's 
failure as "fated43 even though his success should 
have been guaranteed by the cyclical (personal, public 
and popular power) development of society which is, 
Donald claims, 
capable of resolving 
great historical difficulties 
and explaining all political 
laws,.. 44 
Napoleon's failure is, in fact, "fated", because 
Donald's cycle of progress ends with the Revolution. 
History has no further need to renew, 
the cycle which is 
given it to observe, 45 
since the actual order, even as Donald writes, is 
finally approximating to the potential, ordained order, 
42.1bid. 




It mould appear that 
the French Revolution (has 
been) reserved for the final 
instruction of the universe.. 
now that we have witnessed... 
the (fall) of the most 
concentrated unity of power 
into the most abject demagogy, 
se. perfect theism... into 
infamous idolatry; now that 
we have witnessed". the 
return of authority... and 
of religion, all the social 
contingent:4es are comprehended, 
the social tour du monde has 
been completed; (France) has 
travelled to the two poles; 
no other lands remain to be 
discovered, and the time has 
came to offer to mankind the 
map of the morel universe, 
and the theory of society. 	46 
Despite his deviation from the Enlightenment's 
pattern of progress, Bonald never wavers in his 
optimistic vision of an earthly Utopia: 
•.. the idea of perfecting 
society has been, for a 
long time in civilized 
Europe, the most universal 
and dominant idea." 	47 
The prot6g6 of Bossuet wanted to keep his religion but 
embrace the En1ightenment too, right at their point of 
46.1.6 islation primitive,CEuvres 101).202-3. 




divergence. Not all of the philosophes' ideas, Bonald 
•was finding, to his d triment, could be dismissed 
without appeal; but here was one which, in the name 
of the Counter-Revolution, might have been. For when 
Bonald spoke in favour of the possibility of perfecting 
human society on earth, he was denying the very article 
which ve medieval Christianity its power . the 
promise of an after-'life where paradise would be 
regained. Catholicism, with good reason, had been ' 
fundamentally unworldly. The people of the eighteenth 
century, with good reason also, had become admirers of 
48 the world. They had ceased to think of the secret 
forces of nature as evil forces to be shunned and had 
come to think of them as beneficent forces to be 
understood and directed towards that final state which 
Condorcet described as 
•,. an Elysium created 
by reason... 	49 
The idea that this final and perfect state would 
eventuate on earth was one of the eighteenth century's 
most significant substitutions for Christianity: one 
of the most important events in the intellectual 
history of modern timeeriA fact, part of the great 
48.R.B.Palmer,Catholics and Unbelievers in i htsenth. 
,Century France New o .19 1 0.13. 
49.Esouisse0.202. 	. . 
50.Car1 Becker,The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth 
.Century Philosophers Wass.,1964)0.21. 
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liberal tradition - alien territory indeed in which 
to find an 'old medieval schoolmaster' like Bonald 
trespassing4 
So that, although Condor9et, in his long battle 
with an authoritarian church l 'a feudal aristocracy 
and an arbitrary government, rejected Leibnitz and 
his followers51(among whom Bonald was proud to be 
numbered), nevertheless, in his naive optimism in 
human perfectibility and its realization through the 
logic of historical progress, he found an inadvertent 
disciple in Bonald. When Bonald accepted the 
Enlightenment's postulate that the theory of progress 
necessarily implied the theory of human and social 
perfectibility, he was introducing gunpowder, treason 
and plot into th old Catholic otronghold. It meant 
quite simply that tradition and conservation were 
not enough; that change.' of a certain order, of 
course, but change nevertheless - could be condoned. 
And most important of all, it implied that the end 
of life was life itself, But Bonald did not perceive 
the consequences of his theories and, with a clear 
conscience, set out to restore' the Catholic battlements 
(which the philosophes' armies had demolished) with 
the philosophes' own bricks: truth, reason, and the 
universal education of enlightenment. 
* * * 
51. Esouisse, p.135. 
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(1) Truth 
It was Condorgetes avowed intention to show 
why, in spite of the 
transitory successes of 
• prejudice and the support 
that it receives from the 
corruption of governments 
• or peoples, truth alone 
will obtain a lasting 
victory, 	52 
Condorgetts parable of the human race, advancing with 
a firm and sure step along the path of truth, virtue 
and reason, 53foreshadows Bonald's moral: that where 
perfection is found, there also will be reason and 
virtue,54  while 
Truth, like men and like 
society, is a seed which 
grows in the succession 
of ages and of men, 
always ancient in its 
beginning, always new 
• in its sequential 
developments, 55 
Truth is eternal; it is revealed at a 'single moment 
in time. It is also, however, historical — seeking, 
in the ages of men, to fulfil itself, But, as Bonald 
and his successors found to their detriment, it was 
not always possible to harness such disparate forces. 
52,Ibid,p.10. 
53,nrao,201. 
54M—relation primitive,(Euvres 1,1).290 * 
55.1 do.) O. •• 
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Bonald expressed both the dilemma and his own attempt 
to reject Condorcet's historicism in favour of 
revelation when he wTote: 
It is not the progress 
of civilization which 
develops a knowledge 
of the truth; but the 
knowledge of the truth 
which hastens the progress 
of civilization. 	56 
Written or spoken, language, maintain Bonald, 
is a sift of Godr The consequence of this gift (which 
necessarily derives from the int rdependence between 
Thought and language) is that with the latter man 
received the former: he received thought - abstract 
thought which embodies all truths and which can be 
known only through lansuage. Among the revealed truths 
were those which are the basis and the condition of 
every society: moral truth, political truth and 
religious truth. Transmitted from generation to 
generation first by the spoken word, later by the 
scriptures which established them, these truths have 
become humanity's patrimony: man inherits them by 
entering into society, not - and this subsequently 
56.Ibid,p.334. 
57.117Zip p. 356« 
l55.' 
aroused the wrath of the Church58  . not because they 
are innate but because they are communicable. 
It is to the moral 
constitution of man 
that we must look for 
the foundations of his 
duties and the oriAins 
of his ideas of justice 
and virtue, 	59 
wrote Condor9et. But no, replies Bonald, it is not 
in his heart or in his conscience that man must seek 
moral law or religious inspiration. 
Man knows nothing of 
morality but what he has 
heard or seen; that is, 
what he has learnt through 
the spoken or written word. 60 
58.Bonald lived to see his prot4gd,Lamennaisoondemne6 
by Gregory XVI for his Indifferentism and,twenty-one 
years later,Pius IX condemned Bonetty for Tradition- 
alism.Bonald's eon indignantly repudiated the idea 
of his father's having founded a heresy (Victor de 
Bonald,"M.de Donald et is Traditionalismen,Le 
Correepondant XXXV,288).But this apparentli.-Fad 
little effect in convincing people of Louis de 
Donald's orthodoxy;see Charles de Remusat,"Du 
Traditionalisme",Revue des Deux-Mondes,IX,51;and 
George Boas, French Philosophies of the Romantic 
Period (Baltimore,1925)pp.79.80. 
59,Marise,p.64. 
60,Ao4islation primitive,CEuvres I,pp.356,361. 
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It is not sufficient for man to seek within himself 
the distinction between the Just and the unjust, the 
good and the bad, the existence of God, or the 
immortality of the soul; moreover it would be dangerous 
to abandon each to his own moods and inspirations. There 
is neither natural morality nor natural religion: 
The most natural religion, ' 
the knowledge of God.., 
must be taught or revealed; 
it is necessary to teach 
men the moral truths if 
one wishes that they know 
• 	 them, and speak to them 
the word of God in order 
that they have the thought' 
of God. 	61 
Thought is acquired by the child only through his 
communication with society (family, State and Church) 
which, ever since the original gift of language, has 
been the repository of all.the moral and religious 
truths. The necessity for tradition is no less 
imperative than the necessity for the first gift; the 
forme' consolidates the latter. Tradition becomes, in 
Boiald's Context, the continuous revelation across the 
centuries, 
, The theory of language gives thus to the moral, 
political and religious tradition a firm foundation, 
61.1bido p.172. 
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and it invests truth, in Bonald's mind, with a divine 
character which forbids as sacrilege any examination, 
any inquiry. Condor9et's reproach of the scholars of 
antiquity comes to mind: 
An "it is said that" or 
an "it is written that" 
at the beginning of a 
phrase seemed to them 
sufficient to shelter 
them from the reproach 
of puerile credulity. 62 
The man who questions himself concerning the value of 
the moral and religious truths which he finds established 
in society, in Bonald's reckoning, 
places himaelf by that 
alone in a state of revolt 
against society; he arrogates 
to himself, him a simple 
individual, the right of 
judging and reforming the 
world, and he aspires to 
dethrone universal reason 
in order to have his particular 
reason reign in its stead: 
this reason that he owes 
entirely to society since it 
has transmitted it to him in 
language, the means of all 
intellectual activity, 	63 
There is the evidence of tradition, which is the 




is the evidence of authority, whichAs the repository 
of this tradition; and the rest is silence. Universal 
agreement is Bonald's criterion of truth. 
A man who has ideas and 
sentiments which differ 
from those of other men 
is taken, with good 
reason, to be of bizarre 
mind..., and unsociable 
character..., a maniac 
or a fool. 	64 
an has no need to seek the truth, since he has it at 
his finger-tips: in society, in the body of communal 
beliefs admitted since time immemorial. The philosophes 
condemned these accepted beliefs Which Condorrt styled 
prejudices. Prejudices they may be, replies Bonald, 
errors or human inventions if they relate to local 
or particular opinions; but surely truths or "true 
prejudices", if they are opinions conceded by the 
entire human race. 
A universal prejudice in 
(writes Bonald) the belief 
in a universal truth, 
rather in the way a proberb 
Is the expression of a 
universal truth of conduct. 65 
Revelation then (revelation embodied, by the divine 
gift of language, in tradition), is the source from 
which, for Bonald, all moral and social truth deriveo. 
64.1bid0.65.. 
65.TM, p. 297. 
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To reject revelation is to admit that society is the 
work of man, that man could have created it and that 
man could of his own accord destroy it or reshape it; 
and this is to recognize the rights of the individual, 
• to assure the triumph of the spirit of individualism 
• and its artificial concepts. To acknowledge revelation, 
however, is to concede the necessity of obeying 
authority; and this is to assure the triumph of society 
over the individual, of the general will over the 
particular wills, of duties over rights, There, says 
Donald, resuming his thought on revelation, 
• - there is the proof of 
the existence of God, the 
motive for man's duties, 
the necessity for laws 
and for society; there is 
the reason for religious 
power, for civil power, 
for domestio power, in a 
word, the reason for the 
moral and social world, 
which the gift of language 
has rescued from the abyss 
of ignorance and the chaos 
• of error* 	66 
Not only does revelation embody all moral and 
social truths, continues Donald; it embraces as well 
all the philosophical and scientific truths; all the 
general, or necessary,trutheg in fact, all truths. If 
66,  Legislation 	OEuvres 41).183. 
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language were of human invention, argues Bonaldrthere 
would no longer be any mathematical truths, for it is 
only by language and by reasoning that the mind 
ascertains whether lines are absolutely straight, or 
ciroles absolutely round, because the senses recognize 
only relatively straight lines and relatively round 
circles; calculation and evaluation demand both 
language and reasoning, for the senses identify only 
units, There would no longer .even be historical truths, 
for without language man would apprehend only what he 
sees and feels. Absolute pyrrhonism Bonald would on 
no account condone, Truth is revelation incarnate, 
written not on the graven images of individual reason, 
but in the Book of Paith, 
(ii) Beason 
However, Condorcette pilgrim to the Heavenly City 
met, neither God nor Bonald, but 
Reason," braving the 
executioners and resisting 
the tempters, crushing under 
its all-powerful hand, first, 
religious hypocrisy which 
demands sincere adoration 
for its dogmas and, then, 
the political hypocrisy 
which abjectly pleads that 
67; Ibidt p.182. 
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it may be allowed to 
profit in peace from 
those errors in which, 
if we are to believe it, 
it is profitable not only 
for itself but for mankind 
that mankind should be 
sunk forever. 68 
In Condorpt's final stages of human progress, philosophy 
and the sciences shake off the yoke of authority. As 
disciple of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists, Condorcet 
was emphatic in his anti-clericalism and abhorrence of 
absolute monarchy, both of which he equated with the 
tyranny of unenlightenment. The author of the Esouiese  
saw in popular government and the annihilation of 
supernatural belief (particularly Bonald'e revered 
Catholicism) the perfection of society. 
The relentless war that 
philosophy bee declared 
upon the oppressors of 
humanity... will endure 
as long as there are 
priests and kings on 
earth, 	69 
warned Condor9et - which prompted Donald to comment 
Condorcet measures tbe 
progress of the human 
mind by the progress of 
atheism and materialism, 70 
although, of course, as Bonald is aware, Coneorcet's 
68. Esouisse, pp. 102-3. 
69•Quoted by Bonald, Obluvres IV,p.161. 
70. /bid, p. 162. 
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declared yardstick was the progress of reason, Honald'e, 
on the other hand, is faith; but it was the philosophes 
who had declared war, and they named their own weapons: 
' philosophy and reason. Bonald had no choice but to 
retaliate in kind. 
Christians (he cried), 
it is time to justify 
our faith; philosophers, 
it is time to vindicate 
your incredulity. 71 
For Ronald, the superiority of religion as compared with 
philosophy is obvious: it stems from the superiority of 
God as compared with man. Human passions are an obstacle 
in the way of both reason and virtue. Religion places 
the means of restraint beyond the passions of men . 
with God; but philosophy has no higher court of appeal. 
While philosophy discusses man only in terms of his 
strength or of his reason, at the same time showing him 
only the baseness of his nature, religion warns him of 
his extreme weakness, all the time presenting him with 
an ennobling view of his nature. Religion teaches him 
that he is made in the image of God, but that, without 
God, he can be nothing; philosophy, that he is no more 
than a brute but that, alone and unaided, he can be 
everything, Religion - social by nature - is appoeite 
to society; natural and necessary bond of human 
societies, of families and of States, it is the reason 
71: Th6orie du pouvoir,CEuvres 1110,404: 
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for every society. Philosophy, on the contrary, 
isolates man and serves only to develop and satisfy 
his individuality: 
Philosophy, which presupposes 
• the good man, shows only how 
• to tolerate him; religion, 
which teaches that man is 
basically evil, prescribes 
that he be loved* 72 
Religion strengthens the constitution of sooiety; 
philosophy weakens it: the former edifies, the latter 
destroys. A philosophic people would be a people of 
"seekers", and a people, under pain of survival, must 
know, not seek!73And Ronald turns to history for 
confirmation: the Jews and the Spartans are laudable; 
their strength was due to the absence of philosophy 
in their society. Whereas Germany, weakened by the 
philosophy of Frederick the Great, could not help but 
succumb to the radical ideas of Kant: It is not with 
impunity that the intellectual elite of a nation 
develops a curiosity for l'unintelligible" principles 
and professes complete disdain for the "popular 
philosophy of common semen: An for France, it is 
for Ronald the moot outstanding illustration of the 
effects that philosophy can have on the stability of 
society: philosophy has dethroned all positive ideas; 
philosophy has baniehed all respect for persons and 
72. 08i la philosophie 
'de la societtin,m61 
73 • Recherches,CEavres 
est utile pour le gouvernement 
es, Mavres 711 9 p* 502. 
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things which had for generations been objects of 
consideration; philosophy has undermined the 
foundations of social order — domestic, pplitical 
and religious; philosophy has defied nature. 
The work of philosophy thus appears to Bonald to 
be essentially destructive74  In its sole appeal to 
individual reason, in its spirit of free examination, 
it appears as nothing more than a dissolvent: 
dissolvent of ideas, of beliefs, of customs. By 
submitting to the open criticism of their personal 
reflection, moral and religious beliefs, political 
institutions, good, duty, family, and State, the 
philosophee of the eighteenth century have destroyed 
the social edifice. But accustomed to destroy, they 
have been powerless to reconstruct. Agreed upon the 
absolutely negative work of demolition, they could 
not agree upon the positive work of reconstruction. 
Bonald repeatedly laments the fact that philosophy 
is no longer what it once was: wisdom, the lave of 
wisdom, the science of things moral and abstract; 
that, for most, it is nothing more than the art of 
doing without religion. 75 
Philosophy, which to the 
pagans meant "love of 
wisdom", means for us 
simply "the quest for 
truth", 	76 
74.Th4orie du pouvoir,CEuvres III,p.396. 
75.Recherches,CEuvres V7B7 -317 
76.L64s1ation erimitive,CEuvres I,p.158. 
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he _writes. Donald would have the useless speculation 
upon facts and the laws of the physical universe revert 
to the study of moral man, especially social man, 
. Donald, in fact, would have the philosophy of Heaven 
return to earth. It is always with great disdain that 
he speaks of the natural sciences: 
The truth or falsity of 
opinions in physics does 
not determine whether 
society progresses 
forwards or backwards, 	77 
The physical sciences, according to Donald, cannot make 
man better, or even happier: fashioned for the sole 
satisfaction of the needs of the body, they should not 
engage the attention of the philosopher who, if he 
wishes to avoid falling into gross materialism, must 
concern himself with more elevated thoughts7 8  What is 
needed by mortal man, to Bonald's way of thinking, is 
a code of laws by which to live which are rather more 
than mortal. Thus the contemporary philosophies with 
their emphasis upon physical phenomena are, for Donald, 
inadequate. 
The enquiry of the 
philosophers of antiquity 
almost invariably had as 
Ito goal a code of ethics; 
the studies of the philosophers 
of the eighteenth century have 
been almost exclusively directed 
towards the physical sciences. 79 
77•Ibid,p.168. 
78.nSuppl6ment0,03uvres II414167, 
79. "The la philosophic) morale et politique du dix-huitiame 
sieolen tlaaanAes t (Euvres V110).65, 
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And Bonald writes disparagingly of his contemporaries: 
These men seek inspiration 
in the structure of the 
organs which they submit 
to their diseections; and 
they believe they have met 
the master because they 
have, in the waiting.room, 
interrogated the servants. 80 
Man and society * the principles of morality and political 
theory: these alone, to Donald, seem to be the true 
object of philosophy which is love of wisdom. It is 
not the la s of natural science, but the natural laws 
of God which will result in the progress which leads 
to ultimate perfection: 
Those who classify human 
knowledge in an inverse 
order, by giving precedence 
to the physical sciences.' 
see in ma only organs and 
sensations; in human relations 
only needs and pleasures; in 
society only quantity; and in 
the universe only matter' 	81 
In fact, Bonald blames the retardation of the social 
and moral sciences upon the inflated attention which 
the natural sciences had been receiving. It is certain, 
he writes, 
80,"R6floxions philosophiques stir la tolerance des 
opinions",  61anges,CEuvres VII,p.1410 
81* "Des scienceso des lettres et des arts",M61anges, 
atuvresVII,p.373" ........ 	. 
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• that the centuries in 
which these (physical) 
sciences become the 
exclusive study, will 
not be centuries of 
eloquence, poetry, 
• religion or morality. 	82 
How has it came about, he asks in the preface to 
the Thdorie du nouvoir, that the science which is of 
the greatest interest to man - the science of society - 
lags so far behind the other sciences of the universe? 83 
Man's happiness depends upon the knowledge of his goal, 
while the other sciences contribute nothing to his 
welfare and, instead, create further needs. So why 
is it that these truths - so important that they must 
be revealed - have been unappreciated for so many 
centuries? Why have they 
• remained until now 
obscured by a 
• multitude of errors? 	84 
There is no need, Donald considers, to seek an 
explanation beyond man himself. Man has been frightened, 
not by the truth itself - the "speculative truth" . 
but by the "practical consequences" - the obstacles it 
would place in the way of his designs and his ambitions. 
He is deterred by what he does not meet in the physical 
sciences: duties. To avoid submitting himself to the 
82.1bid0.374. 
83.703rie du ouvoir,Tuvres III,pp.11-12. 
84.1 id,p.12. 
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laws of God, man has rejected all belief in God. Thus, 
for Donald, what has retarded the progress of the moral 
and social sciences is the distaste for duties and the 
fear of the obligations which derive from them. 85 
But if philosophy consists thus primarily, if not 
exclusively, in the knowledge of the moral and social 
truths, it becomes important for Bonald, everywhere 
where these truths are known, to ascertain whether 
they h ve been observed in their original purity, or 
whether, after having been obscured or even effaced, 
they have finally been unearthed. Philosophy does not 
exist, - it could not have existed - among the Jews 
who, having received directly from God the true 
principles of moral conduct and social life and having 
preserved them faithfully, by the transmission of the 
divine word, did not have to seek in the "vain opinions" 
of men what they could find in their traditions and 
86 their books. Philosophy appeared (for example in the 
Orient and Greece) only among those peoples who, after 
having lost the memory of primitive traditions, after 
attempting to recreate them in the tentaCies - as 
bizarre as they were puerile - of their imagination, 
eventually sought in their own reason 
85.1bido pp.13-14. 
86.Talerches I CEUvres Vgp.7. 
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what they could no longer 
recognise in the beliefs 
of society. 	87 
Prom the time that, through Christ, God made known 
his word again to man, and placed him once again in 
possession of truths too long forgotten . from that 
time s for Donald, philosophy was rendered useless. In 
effect, man had no more to seek from the moment of 
truth when he knew, 
And that of those who are still seeking - those 
who, like Condorcet, are searching for that Elysium . 
created by Reason . what is at the base of their 
search? apke Donald. And reDlies: the pretension of 
opposing to the general reason of society their own 
individual reason, to the evidence of authority the 
authority of evidence, to divine reason human reason, 
finally . to religion, philosophy. 88 
In modern philosophy (two terms which, for Donald, 
refuse to be coupled; because, in the sphere of morality, 
he says, every doctrine which is not as ancient as man 
in an error99Bonald detects two schools: Ideology and 
Rationalism. 
Por Donald, Ideology relates to every system which 
derives from Condillact sensualism, materialism and, 
87•Ibid t p.9, 
88.7111a,p.38. 
89.Traslation primitive, ODavren /1p.163. 
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necessarily, the views of Condor9et. It is entirely 
in the analysis of the human mind, in the observation . 
of thought, in a sort of "dissection of the thought 
processes" that Condillac and the eighteenth-century 
philosophes Who sustain the sensualist doctrine, seek 
• the solution of the problem of the source of knowledge. 
Bonald. regards this procedure with hostility and 
scepticism. It is an impossibility, he declares: it 
is to expect the mind to comprehend itself. How, the 
human mind, writes Donald,90  is only an instrument which 
has' been given to man to enable him to understand those 
matters which are external to it, to expect it to 
comprehend itself is no less ridiculous than to argue 
that the eye can perceive itself without a mirror: a 
thamkless task and one which cannot possibly produce 
meaningful results. By interrogating himself, man 
makes of himself the Plaything of his own illusions, 
taking the echo of 
his own voice for 
the response of 
truth. 	91 
The Ideologues,- who persist in analysing their ideas 
in order to discover their ideas, who wish to know 
th ir minds instead of seeking to know with their 
minds, Bonald likens to the fools on Mount Athos who,. 
90.Recherches,CEUvres V143.41. 
91.Ibid, 
all their days, their eyes fixed upon their navels, 
: mistook for the light 
the vertigo that this 
posture induced in them. 92 
The mind is exhausted and dissipated by this sterile 
contemplation of itself, writes Bonald: 
Sad. pastime of a timid 
mind Which I would not 
dare call study and 
which. renders the mind 
inept and barren. 	93 
' The Ideologues, having reduced all philosophy to 
the analysis of the mind, the observation of the 
conscience, the contemplation ofself, and seeing only 
man and, in man, only his ideas and his sensations, 
must, to Bonaldls may of thinking, end in the most 
pointless and abject doctrine: materialism. 
By divesting man of 
everything save his 
sensations and his 
organs they have 
logically limited 
themselves to an 
anatomical study. 94 
By emphasising the individual's consideration of 
himself at the expense of forfeiting his awareness of 
his relationships with his fellow-cen, they have 
destroyed "the moral and social being" in him, and 
92.1bid0.42. 
93.71374 
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have led him finally, in morality to egoism, in politics 
to isolation. 
' A purely rational solution, however, could not 
. satisfy Ronald, in spite of the glowing tributes which 
he pays to the great rationalists. The cult of Reason 
has its dangers, as Bonald is aware, In the notion of. 
ideas inherent in the mind of each, Ronald detects the 
flaw of personal inspiration: the possibility of 
substituting for supernatural revelation, revelation 
which is entirely natural; for the word of God, the 
voice of conscience. 95 
It is not in philosophy (even in a philosophy 
liberally spiced with religion, like that of Malebranche 
or Leibnitz) but in religion itself, that the solution 
is to be found* Many have sought it, writes Ronald, 
but far away - 
in the inaccessible 
• 	 heights of pure 
intellect 	96 
when all the time it is close at hand* Religion 
placed it in the 
hands of the world 
and in the mouths 
of babes* 	97 





innate, beyond question; but they are inherent in 
society - not in man, 98 
In the final analysis, despite their differences, 
the Ideologues and the Rationalists have one common 
assumption . faith in individual reason - which is the 
core of all "modern philosophy", But, objects Bonald, 
the result of this assumption is a multiplicity and 
variety of incompatible systems. Each philosopher 
supersedes his predecessorsuntil he, in his turn, is 
• supplanted: Descartes after Bacon, Malebranche and 
Spinoza, and Leibnitz after Descartes, Kant after themr 
if philosophy is always awaiting a new reformer, hour 
can it ever be definitive? Philosophy, as Bonald saw 
it, spoke not with the mouth of God but with the tongues 
of men, and to Bonald the fact that their number was 
legion was in itself sufficient proof of philosophy's 
inherent weakness. Plato and Aristotle asked themselves: 
What is wisdom? What is knowledge? And after so many 
centuries of reflection, observation and experience, 
we who are so proud 
of the "progress of 
the human mind", we 
have not come any 
closer to answering 
their questions. 	100 
There are philosophers, but there is not one philosophy. 
98.Ibid $ 14172. 
99.nreffierches,CEUvres V,pp+36 37+ 
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And Bonald finds inexcusable evidence of this in the 
fact that the body charged with the direction and 
surveillance of public instruction, the University of 
Prance, in compiling the programmes and the methods 
of instruction, is content, for philosophy, to allocate 
indiscriminately to the masters the beet works of all 
the philosophical schools: the treatises of Bacon with 
those of Descartes, Locke with Nalebranche, Oondillac 
101 beside Leibnitz. This, to Bonaldes way of thinking, 
is a comment upon the fact that there is not, either 
in France or in Europe, 
any system of philosophy 
that is so universally 
accredited that it can be 
adopted to the exclusion 
of all others. 	102 
So « argues Bonald - all philosophical reasoning 
is transient and cannot claim immortality for its 
conclusions: Pythagoras and Tholes, Zeno' and Epicurus, 
Bacon and Descartes, are all in fundamental conf1ictl03 
The philosophes are transgressors in the human sin of 
fallibility: 
*.* limited in their, 
foresight and by the 
duration of their lives, 
they could not perceive 
the implications of 
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But Bonald? Bonald is absolved, for he writes, not 
the words of Bonald, but conclusively and unadorned, 
the words of God. Por the faithful, the argument is 
above reproach, but it was the infidels at whom Bonald's 
didactic mission was aimed. They had divested philosophy 
of its Christian accoutrements and left it to wander 
in disbelieving nakedness: 
The philosophy of the 
, moderns is an essentially 
atheistic philosophy; 
atheistic in principle 
for name, who deny all 
existence of a supreme 
Being; atheistic in 
consequence for others, 
who deny his works in 
society and his presence 
amongst men. 	105 
But the infidels had at leant succeeded in dictating 
the terms of debate. Bonald had became enmeshed in the 
web which the opposition had woven for him; in order to 
strengthen in their eyes his proposition: that philosophy 
and individualism are to anarchy as Catholicism is to 
perfect harmony, Bonald had resorted to philosophy's 
own weapon - reason. - Even Bonald's own declarations 
divulge his ironic dilemma. Bonald does not even begin, 
as he might have done, by invoking the authority of the 
Gospel; the Bible, in fact, serves Bonald merely an 
105 Ibida.66. 
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confirmation of the preinisees be has established by 
reasoning.. This fusion or, , more precisely, confusion 
of philosophy and religion is evident in the very 
106 name . "religious philosophy" — by which Donald 
designates his doctrine. As Nme de Stael wryly 
observed: 	, 
(Louis de Bonald) is 
the most philosophic 
of writers, with the 
minimum of philosophy. 107 
• (iii) Education 
To Condorcet, of all man's imprescriptable rights, 
education was perhaps the most fundamental. If 
happiness depended upon the progress of reason, perfection 
or universal enlightenment — demanded universal 
education. And, incongruous as it may seem, perfection 
and enlightenment' in Donald's plan also became 
synonymous with education. Once Donald had confessed 
that ideas are inherent in society and not in man; that, 
if man is to know the moral truths he must be taught 
them, then Donald, too, was committed to a programme 
of universal education, 	, 
All my writings will 
have been justified 
if I have proved the 
necessity for education, 108 
106,Princi e constitutif,CEuvres VIII,p.16.•
107,Observiions sliFTrouvrage de Mme la baronne de 
• Stabl",Mdlanees,C2uvres VII,p,620. 
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he wrote. And added by way of epigraph a quotation 
from Leibnitz: 
'I have always' thought 
that one could reform 
the human race, if one 
could reform the education 
of its youth. 	109 
Education is, in Bormld's view, the incumbent duty of 
the State. Man, naturally depraved, corrupts, or tends 
to corrupt, the government; it is necessary therefore 
to perfect man before permitting him to govern, And 
perfection presupposes education. 
TO Condorget's question: 
has not printing freed 
the eduction of the 
people from all political 	, 
and religious shackles? 	110 
BOnald replies adamantly in the negative. The 
Revolution, to Bonald's mindlllmade a great mistake, 
in the organization of education, of confusing the 
different societies to which man belongs; of not 
distinguishing between man in the family and man in 
the State, man in his private capacity and man in his 
public role; And the result, of this confusion was a 
system of education which, planned for all the world 
in general, was suited to no-one in particular. As for 
109.Ibid0.207. 
110,7Braisse,p.102. 
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the Emiles of this world Bonald considers that to 
follow the Enlightenment's educational methods is to 
produce naturalists at eight years and atheists at 
tWentyll2The question of what education a man should 
receive is answered by the . society for which he must 
be fitted, the milieu in which he will have to apply 
his knowledge and talents. If he is destined by birth 
or choice to fill a public profession, he must receive 
a public or social education. If he is destined to 
follow a private occupation (as in the case of the 
weaker sex) he should receive only a domestic or 
particular education. There is then, in Bonald's 
scheme, on the one hand social or public education 
which Man receives in and for the State, and on the 
other, domestic or particular education which man 
receives in and for the family. Religion being 
inseparable from both the family and the State, both 
systems must be religious. 
For all, domestic education precede social 
education: the former (which trains the child to accept 
his role in the family hierarchy) continues until his 
eleventh year; the latter (which trains him to live 
in harmony with his equals) continues until his 
eighteenth year. The first 113 the responsibility of 
112.4yis1ation primitive,(Euvres I,p.173. 
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the parents; but the last is a public trust. To rear 
social men - men who are to form society - is to rear 
society. And society is perpetual, universal and 
uniform; therefore what is required is a teaching order 
(ftcorpS") which is perpetual, universal and uniform. 
Ho secular body would fulfil these conditions, so that, 
1 concludes Ronald, 13  education must be entrusted to a 
religious body - an order; This will ensure - and 
Donald favours this - that from Brest to Strasbourg 
aria Dunkirk to Perpignan, instruction will be uniform. 
The only task of the Minister of Education will be to 
prevent innovation. The *memos of education may be 
high, Donald concedes, but they are necessary, which 
to Donald means they are practicable. As for subjects 
Bonald recommends, naturally (since they are the 
vehicle,of tradition) languages - that is, French and 
Latin - the latter since it is the language of the 
Christian' religion. Donald does not see the necessity 
for encumbering the memory with a multitude of facts - 
Botany, zoology, anatomy, 
mineralogy and chemistry 
are not absolute necessities . 114 
. which develop neither the mind nor the heart. 
Education is not designed to produce scholars but rather 
men capable of learning; for the final instruction, the 
113 COuvres /1,1).249. 
114‘ibido.260. 
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practical professional training, is received only 
within the profession itself* At eighteen, writes 
Bonal6115one knows nothing: but this is not ignorance; 
it is the beginning of knowing* 
• 	 With 's doctrine of progress and earthly 
perfectibility, attained through the medium of 
universal education which disseminates truth, and 
argued with all the devices of rationalism, Bonald bap 
succeeded in contradicting Condorcet on his own terms, 
only to reveal that feudalism and Catholicism were not 
always amenable to the Enlightenment's terms . even 
when those terms were redefined * It remained for 




VO/JTAIRE and HISTORY_ 
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In Voltaire, Bonald considerslan astonished and 
concerned world saw, for the first time, a writer 
break completely with, the principles which, since the 
beginning of time, had governed families and directed 
the evolution of States: 
Not deigning even to 
consult the nations or 
the centuries, but on 
the sole authority of 
his young reason, 
(Voltaire) blighted by 
• ridicule the most 
accredited beliefs of 
the most enlightened 
• people. 	2 
Voltaire to convinced that the first two estates of 
France the most sacred and the most eeneible orders, 
in Bonaldos opinion ,... are composed of nothing but 
slight, feeble, and credulous minds., 3 Such an attitude 
must, Bonald conjectures, be due to the impression 
which the disorders of the Regency made upon Voltaire's 




youth. Voltaire's entire life has been one long parody 
of respectability. 4 Ando Bonald continues, despite the 
fact that Voltaire has exercised such a prodigious 
influence over his contemporaries, all his works are 
rendered superficial by his obsessive hatred of 
Christianity: his manner of writing hietory is marred 
by a display of historical erudition which lacks depth, 
gravity, and authority. 5 /n Voltaire's hands, the history 
of religion becomes merely the history of a few popes; 
the history of nations is reduced to the history of a 
few leaders; and the history of society is only the 
history of a handful of people. In place of events, 
anecdotes; instead of reflections, epigrams: everywhere , 
chance, vice, and disorder which reflects Voltaire's 
commitment to the passions of men. This method, Bonald 
claims, gives to Voltaire's histories a querulous and 
disappointed air, unsuited to the dignity and impartiality 
of the discipline. Voltaire's history resembles more 
the necret Memoirs of a Malcontent" than the public 
annals of peoples and times. 6 Voltaire, Bonald concludes, 
must be held responsible for the misfortunes of Europe 
and of France. But his flippant raillery will not 
survive; his glory will fade: born with his century, 






hand, was determined to produce a history of peoples 
and times which would live forever. And o , in the 
prologue to the Lftiplation primitive, Donald declares 
his intention to present for modern history what 
Bossuet had offered for ancient history - the general, 
historical pattern of causation behind world events: 
the explanation of the "secret liaison" between the 
past, the present and the Future as society struggles 
to realize itself. 8 It is society . not man - thraagh 
which Donald's history operates 
To allay the detrimental effects of the history 
which the Enlightenment produced, the very pivotal 
point of argument must be radically changed, Donald 
condiders. Voltaire and his disciples observed only 
individuals when really, it is society which should 
be observed, They saw only the elements of the social 
organism, instead of the organism itself. They 
proceeded from individuals to society rather than 
from society to individuals. 9 
In religion, they saw only individuals, and worse, 
equal individuals: by renouncing the body of priests 
specially consecrated and distinct from the faithful; 
the sacrifice, and religious observance, they arrtved 
at a religion which is wholly individual - deism, 
8,1,6 islation primitive, CEuvres  
IL Du perfectionnemen de l'homme 0 cMelanges,CEuvrez VII, 
pp.516-517. 
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and deism is only nascent atheism disguised. In the 
family, they saw Only individuals, equal individuals, 
each entitled to his particular will and rights: by 
denying a general power, a fixed authority, and true 
conjugal union, they arrived at divorce. In the State, 
they saw only individuals, all equal and having the 
same rights: instead of holding to unity and fixity 
of power, and social distinctions, they arrived at 
theories of the rights of man, of a social contract, 
and the sovereignty of the people. But Bonald sets 
out to offer the complete antithesis of this, In the 
State, in the family, and in religion, he considers 
Only society. The individual exists only by virtue 
of society: it is society which makes him and perfects 
him; it is society which nOonstitutes" him, that is, 
which gives him his constitution, his proper state. 
And society forms him only for herselfl° The personality 
of the individual is submerged in the social group to 
which he belongs and from which he muet no longer . 
indeed, can no longer . be detached; for man, Bona1d 
is adamant, cannot struggle against eocietyll 
Speaking of marriage, Bonald says that, once united, 
the parties lose their individuality, and no longer 
10. Thdorie du pouvoir, CEuvres III, p.10. 
11:"Du perfeetionnement7riThommen,pelanges, CEu.vres 
p.518. 
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possess particular wills: 
In marriage there are 
no longer individuals. 12 
It is equally true, in Bonald's opinion, in religious 
society and political society; in one as in the other, 
the individual is integrated and therefore disappears. 
Thus it is against the natural order of things to 
consider man apart from, and above, society. 
To consider the individual above society is to 
exaggerate his worth, to deem him naturally good, and 
to free him from all restraint other than his own 
conscience. And this is to misconstrue the nature of 
man; man is, if not fundamentally bad, at least weak, 
subject to his passions, sometimes even perverted and 
corrupt. To consider the individual above society is 
to attribute to him inherent and natural rights, to 
make of these rights - natural to man but foreign to 
'society - a solemn declaration, and by this "foolish 
chatter"13dissuade the individual from respect for 
his duties, inflate his pride and goad him into revolt 
against society. To consider the individual above 
society is to see society as the work of individuale, 
and to recognize their right to pass judgment upon 
it, to reform it. 
12.14 slati n irimltive,Oeuvres I,p,396. 
13. 	pouvoi,C&uvros  
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Individualism is the cause of all revolutions: 
the religious revolution of the sixteenth century no 
less than the political revolution of the eighteenth 
century. 
The Revolution began with 
the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man. It will end 
only with the Declaration 
of the Rights of God. 	14 
Por nature sooner or later exacts her revenge and 
returns society to its natural state . by a series of 
upheavals designed, it seems to Donald, to expel the 
injurious principle introduced by human intervention. 
A revolution, says Donald, 
is only the effort that 
, nature makes to pass from 
a provisional state . a 
state contrary to nature . 
• to a fixed, and therefore 
natural, state; thereby 
bringing men into line 
• with nature. 	15 
When the individual bows before society; when he 
resumes his true place in the social groups (State, 
family and religion) to which he belongs by birth; 
When man ceases to oppose nature; when, in fact, 
mankind sacrifices for ever this individualism which 
is, the error of the Reformation, and of the eighteenth 
• 14#L6 islation rimitive, Cal-n.....lrres It pi 250: 15.*iDu traitóde Wee halie 4,Ceuvres'II,p.429. 
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century - then the lams, temporarily deflected by 
human perversity, will return to their natural course,: 
between the past and the present, the traditions 
momentarily interrupted will be renewed, and the social 
edifice will be restored on its anoient foundations. 
Bonald's answer to the complex problem inherent 
in the work of the historian - how far man makes history 
or history makes the man- is thus a simple one: God 
made man and God's law is history. The individual's 
role in history is a passive one, one which cannot be 
said even to exist except as part of society's role. 
But if Bonald is the great exponent of the primacy of 
the corporate society, he is no lees the spokesman for 
the consequences of Original Sin. Royer.Collard felt 
the fundamental weakness in this point of view. 
According to the theocrats, he wrote, 
there was a lack of 
foresight on the great 
day of Creation in 
allowing man to escape, 
free and intelligent, 
into the Universe... 
A higher wisdom seeks 
to restrain this 
imprudent liberty. 	16 
There is, in Bonald's argument, a duality: on the one 
hand the individual is represented merely as a negative 
16.P.Asde Barante l Vie politisue de RoyerCollard (Paris, 
1857) 0 1I0.291;Charlotte Muret,Prench Royalist 
Doctrines since the Revolution (Neu York-,1933),p052. 
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quantity in the historical process; on the other be 
is considered to have a detrimental effect upon it. 
The ambiguity, and Bonald'a solution, are evident in 
his treatment of Voltaire. Par from denying Voltaire's 
influence and achievements, Donald emphasizes the impact 
of his genius. Donald, for example, refers to Voltaire's 
"extraordinary" talent and the great influence which 
he exercised over his contemporaries. A writer of 
Voltaire's calibre can, Donald deems, 
not only exert a great 
intellectual influence, 
but can become, in some 
respects, a veritable 
power in society. 
Voltaire was fortunate 
in possessing all the 
hallmarks of succeee. 	17 
And yet, Donald maintains, all history is subject to 
divine determinism; 
In society when an 
important question is 
raised or a new principle 
introduced, one can be 
sure that there le a 
profound and natural 
reason for it, not so 
much in the state of 
• 	 mind as in the general 
state of affairs, and 
that it is a necessity 
of society rather than a 
system devised by man. 	18 
17."Deb Ocrits de Voltaire",Melaws,CBuvres VI/,p.7. 
18. Opinion Bur is projet de Ioi relatif aux Journaux", 
Oeuvres VI.p.363. . 
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Simultaneously, Voltaire is cast as the villain of the 
piece, the producer of the Revolution, and the Divine 
Understudy. As far as Donald is concerned, this 
tableau explains the Revolution; but it does not explain 
Voltaire. Hardly in a position to reject Voltaire's 
influence without jeopardising bin own didactic purpose 
concerning the end and means of history, Donald 
vacillates between the ,impotence of the individual and 
his detrimental propensity. In Carlyle-like dimeneions, 
Voltaire is depicted as the 'dons ex machina' of the 
Revolution: 
• In that century which, 
in Prance, opened with a 
revolution in customs and 
ended with a revolution in 
laws, Voltaire, who lived 
• through both, was instrumental 
in prolonging the one and 
preparing for the oth r. 	19 
The concept of Voltaire as the instigator of the 
Revolution has introduced a new and radical element 
into Donald's anti-individualist argument. The 
implication is that here is one individual at least 
(and there had been others, like Luther and Bonaparte) - 
who is capable of directing the course of history in 
un-Godly channels. Caught between the two seemingly 
incompatible metaphors of the gloved hand of the Lord 
19."Des dcrits de Volta 0 Melanges,CruvresVII,p.22. 
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and Voltaire as France's version of the Trojan horse, 
Donald resolves the contradiction by subordinating 
the ephemeral nature of the individual to the immortal 
nature of God: 
Voltaire is responsible 
for the misfortunes of 
France (but) his glory 
will fade; born with his 
century, he will vanish 
with it likewise, 	20 
For Donald, the sway of necessity in human affairs 
is absolute, The dilemma is obvious: everything that 
is necessary must be equated with that which is divine, 
unless the argument is to defeat itself. Further, 
since all causation must be attributed to the prime 
cause — God . absolutely everything that is, is both 
necessary and divine. Wh nce follows Donald's 
oltimistic historical doctrine; there is no roam for 
pessimism since all historical events must be attributed 
to God's universal plan for the indefinite perfectibility 
of mankind. As to chance Donald concurs with 
Leibnitz . 
chance is only ignorance 
of the natural lams. 	21 
20 Ibid,p.23.0ne critic has perceived in this train of 
thought a certain relativism in Donald's historical 
view.(Beerd.H.Quinlan f heilistoca1T ri e 
Vicomte de Bonald),Thie shbuid riot be taken as an 
inconsistency, however. Whatever relativistic moments 
Donald may have serve only to emphasize his absolutist 
dogma t at least after 1801,when Donald broke with the 
orthodox conception of static revelation in favour 
of a more malleable one. 
21 Lezislation primitive, CEuvres I,p.293. 
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Bot that this argument is unique to the orthodox 
believers. Voltaire himself wrote: 
Chance is a word void of 
sense; nothing can exist 
without a cause. The world 
is arranged according to 
mathematical laws; therefore 
it is arranged by an 
intelligence. 	22 
And it was Voltaire who remarked that what is not in 
nature is never true . which elicited Grimmte rejoinder: 
But what is nature? Is 
it not everything that 
is? And does not what 
exists exist of necessity? 
Bow can sairthing be 
contrary to nature? 	23 
The answer was, of course, clearer to Christians than 
to Unbelievers who had rejected the notion of Original 
Sin. And Bonald circumvents the difficulties of 
"whatever is, is right" with the argument: whatever 
endures, must be rights 
The best guarantee of the truth, the infallible 
and objective criterions is, in Sonnies eyes, success. 
Utility and truth, in fact, tend to be confused by 
Bonald. Citing the maxim current in the eighteenth 
century, but too often employed, in Bonald's views in 
the service of error - "all truth are useful to men" . 
teen h- 
22.Dictionnaire 	philosoyhisue,Vola0.234. 
23.17.11.Palmer,Chris tans and Unbelievers in 
Century France ew or 	P. O. 
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be declares it to be valid, because 
everything that is 
useful to man is 
a truth 4 	24 
Success and strength are indications of truth far more 
valid than logical argument. Bonald sees in the strength 
and survival of the Christian nations the most shining 
evidence of the worth of their legislation and of the 
truth of the principles upon which this legislation 
is based, And, he demands of those who, like Voltaire, 
would ridicule the miraculous and the supernatural: 
Compared with the 
social proofs of the 
truth of the sacred 
books, what are the 
lucubrations of critics 
regarding their factual 
authenticity? 25 
In success Bonald discerns the stamp of divinity: what 
succeeds is true and comes from God, 
Show me (he adds) 
societies as strong 
in all ways as the 
Judaic and Christian 
societies, and I will 
believe in the divinity 
Of their legislation. 	26 
Above rational demonstration Bonald places social 
24,  Th6orie du pouvoir, (Murree III, pp, 15-16. 
25. Leetslation primitive, CEuvres p. 258, 
264:rbidt PP, 25d-259. 
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demonstration the proof of social utility. Donald 
invokes this utility in favour of the existence of 
God, the immortality of the soul, and the highest 
philosophic and moral truths. He invokes it to explain, 
in peremptory fashion, the pattern of divin causation 
and human endeavour. The necessity or the Impossibility 
of events depends upon their congruence or incongruence 
with the natural order of society. The true, the real 
even, are thus subordinated to the necessary, the 
usefUl, In another century, it might have teen termed, 
pra atism. 
Having contested the eighteenth-century's 
confidence in the individual's capacity to make or 
to deny history - with, strangely enough, the example 
of Voltaire himself - Donald proceeded to establish 
his own philosophy of history. There are, Donald 
considers, two principal methods of writing history. 
Either it can be written in all its details: this is 
the method of Rollin, Crevier and Le Beau; or it can 
be written in such a way that the details are reduced 
to a minimum in order to emphasize the general facts, 
that is, 
the causes behind events, 
their synthesis and 
their results. ,27 
27. 9)0 la maniere d'ecrire l'histoire" MOlanges,CEUvres VII, 
p.402, 
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This is the method of Dossuet and Fleury. And this 
is the method particularly valuable for statesmen, 
Donald considers, for it demands the exercise of 
judl, ent and reflection. It is Donald's choice. He 
inclines towards a philosophy of history in which facts 
and names have no place: Donald believes that 
it is possible to 
write the history of 
a society without 
naming any of the 
kingn who have 
governed it. 	28 
Philosophy of history, Donald emphasizes, must 
on no account be confused with philosophic history as 
. the eighteenth. century saW it. In this century of 
philosophy, says Donald, all knowledge must be 
philosophic, or it does not merit the title of 
knowledge. History is no exception: were it exact 
in the recital of facts, methodic in their use, 
coneidered in its reflections, and yet not philosophic, 
the eighteenth century would see in it 
only a boring and 
useless gazette. 	29 
Philosophy being the search for causes and their 
relation to effects, it would be logical to assume 
that the most philosophic history would be 
28•Ibid,p.415. 
29 Mat p. 406. 
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that which presents a 
general survey of the 
facts, uncovers their 
causes, indicates their 
relationships, and derives 
from this knowledge 
general reflections on 
the religious and political 
order of society. 	30 
But no. Instead, philosophic history, to this century, 
has consisted of exceptions to the rules, of particular 
and isolated facts, of anecdotes; everything has been 
particular and even persobal; the only general theme 
has been 
a spirit of hatred 
and censure of modern 
• 	 religion and political 
theory. 	31 
Preference is always given to ancient governments 
rather than to modern governments, and to paganism 
rather than to Christianity. Popes and kings are 
invariably presented as the enemies of progress, and 
artists, industrialists and merchants as the pioneers 
of civilization. All of which is certainly not Bonald s 
idea of "truly philosophic history". Bonald takes as 
his model Bossuet's Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle. 




of capturing the spirit 
and the totality, of 
bringing the whole to 
a-general point of view, 	32 
could be successfully applied to the political history' 
of societies. It is necessary to lay aside particular 
facts and particular men, even those who hold important 
positions, in order to view the entirety or the gum 
of facts and men: from this general perspective 
principles will emerge which will have the double 
advantage of dispensing with the necessity for knowing 
factual detail and of supplying 
rules which are applicable 
to all historical 
circumstances and to 
the conduct of governments. 	33 
Then history, in Donald's opinion, will be truly 
philosophic: less charged with details, it will be 
more fecund in observations and results. 
And Donald believes that in his truly philosophic 
history he has produced a comprehensive denial of the 
history which the Enlightenment had yielded. In reply 
to Voltaire's Eseai sur l'Histoire G‘nerale, Donald 
cites his exemplar, Bossuet: 
One can make of the history 
of all peoples nothing but 
a collection . or a confusion - 




one only narrates facts); 
yet from the history of a 
single people, or even from 
the development of a single 
fact, one can create a 
general or even universal 
history; and that is what 
Bossuet has done by equating 
the history of the human 
race with that of the People 
of God, and subordinating 
all great historic events 
to the sole fact of the 
establishment of Christianity. 	34 
Then, and only then, is history capable of fulfilling 
its most elevated purpose - instructing both men and 
kings. And yet Bonald's insistence upon truly 
philosophic history: history which places emphasis on 
cause and effect, and which has as its end oomprehension 
rather than narration, in which facts are si ificant 
only insofar as they contribute to an understanding of 
the pattern of general dev lopment, calls to mind 
Voltaire's famous advice to the historian: 
If you have nothing to 
tell us but that (on the 
banks of the Oxus or 
Jarartes) one barbarian 
has been succeeded by 
another barbarian, in 
what respect do you 
benefit, the public? 	35 
34."Des Ocrits de VoltaireP,M6lan es,CBuvree 
351,21agamal.rouloc0 4.2....e.222,vo •IVIP•70d, 
1914 
Indeed, it mould not be an unfair question to 
ask at this juncture whether it is really Boseuet's 
methods that Donald admires - so much as Boseuetts 
conclusions? More than fifty years before Donald first 
took up his pen, Voltaire had written: 
Woe to details, They are 
a vermin that destroys 
great works... 	36 
public faults, 
prevarications, and 
injustices... They cannot 
be too much exposed; they 
are beacons which warn 
these always...existing 
bodies againet splitting 
again on similar rocks, 37 
But Donald refuses to acknowledge that, in this respect, 
Voltaire's philosophy of history is in accord with his 
own, No sooner has be attacked Voltaire: 
The most important piece 
of historical writing 
among the works of 
Mo de Voltaire is his 
Essai sur l'Histoire 
Generale... (but) he 
should bear in mind that 
it is not possible to make 
a general history simply 
by accumulating facts; one 
must draw generalizations 
from them.., 	38 
36,Lettre 4 J.B.Duboio,3 Oct.1738,(Euvres(1677-85)XXXV, 
p.30;A.Cobban,In Search of Humanit 0.109. 
37.Dictionnaire 	V,1447. 
38 AG 	de o a re 0161ange,CEuvresVII,p 16, 
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than he contradicts himself by admitting that Voltaire 
does, after all, depict a trend: 
the general theme 
of Voltaire's Essai is 
that religion has Eeen 
the cause of all the evils 
and disorders of the 
universe„,. 	39 
In fact, the Essai is Net as didactic as Donald's 
ThOorie du pouvoir, and was conceived as a refutation 
of Bossnetts Histoire Universelle. 
Bonald, it is clear, is criticizing Voltaire's 
methods on the basis of his conclusions. Voltaire's 
historical pattern, writes Donald, 
is sad and false; it 
denies God and destroys 
the basis of society. 
Evil, however wide-spread 
it may be, is only a flaw, 
an exception, and cannot 
be the subject of a 
general history. Thus 
Voltaire's so-called 
"general" Essal is really 
particulaieria-partial. 	40 
In Donald's list of historians who, in their capacity 
as advisers to the throne, have imparted 
those ideas by which 
those who.govern may know 
whence they came and whither 
they are going, 	41 
39.Ibid. 
40.1160,pp.16-17. 
41. 'De 	maniere d'ecrire l'hietoire",1161anpes,CEuvres VII, 
p.422. 
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Bossuet and Fleury, as upholders of French royal 
absolutism, are prominent. On the other hand, Machiavelli 
and Voltaire are conspicuous by their absence. It must 
be concluded that, in Donald's opinion, what the 
historian told the prince was rather more important 
than the manner of the telling. 
The study of history is, Donald claims, more 
instructive in its lessons than the study of philosophy. 
And he opposes it to the hypotheses and systems of man: 
It is not the systems 
of philosophers which 
should be consulted, 
but the testimony of 
history. 	42 
In fact, Donald places history above all reasoning, all 
theories and all philosophy. If, he writes, 
I were to establish a 
political theory on 
general or abstract 
propositions, and 
substantiate it in 
history, it mould not 
be sufficient, in 
contesting it, to oppose 
the propositions by 
propositions, or the 
reasoning by reasoning. 
It would be necessary to 
oppose the facts by facto, 
and history by history. 	43 
42.Thdorie du pouvoir, Oeuvres III,p.20. 
43,Thid,p.2 
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Donald's espousal of the authority of history has 
twentieth-century overtones; and yet to the question 
posed by Voltaire in the Dictionnaire philosonhieue: 
Should the duty of an 
historian prevail over 
the higher and more 
imperative duty of 
a man? 	44 
Bonald replies adamantly in the negative, im belonged . 
along with his adversary - to the moralist school of 
eighteenth-century historical thinkers who continued 
to regard history as philosophy teaching by examples. 
This attitude is the key to the historical writings of 
almost an entire century, during which history became 
but another weapon in the unholy war. Despite Bacon 
and Descartes, Bolingbroke's definition was still the 
operative one. The aim. of these philosopher-historians 
was none other than to reconcile experience with truth . 
revealed or otherwise. Thus, to Gaillard's expressed 
wish that the historian could look upon history with 
an impassive countenance, unimpaired by religious and 
political pre-conceptione, Benald replies: 
This "apathie sublime", 
very different from . 
impartiality, which is 
the first duty of the 
historian, indicates , 
only an extreme indifference 
44.V01.1V0.65. 
202. 
for all opinions true 
or false, or else an 
abysmal ignorance of the 
truth, and can only prolong 
the errors of society. 
A writer must have, in the 
realms of morals and 
politics, decided opinions 
because he must look upon 
himself as a preceptor 
of men, 	45 
It should never be forgotten that Bonald's first 
work, the Thdorie du Pouvoir, appeared in 1796. Written 
in exile in Heidelberg by an émigré noble at the height 
of the Terror, it would have been extraordinary had it 
not reflected the particular animosity engendered by 
the author's involvement in the particular circumstances 
Of the Revolution. It is hardly too much to say that, 
had the Revolution not occurred, Bonald would not have 
been motivated to write his Theorie du pouvoir at all; 
an hypothesis, it is true, but the fact remains that 
Bonald, while claiming for his work the immortality 
duo to the universal and the abiding, never really 
escaped from his particular obsession — the French 
Revolution, His failure to transcend the Revolutionary 
experience is as much a comment as a criticism; but 
its existence belies Bonald's claim that he studied 
46 history for its own sake. Rather, Bonald searched 
45.M6 an a o CELIvres VII,p.424. 
46.. or e du pouvoir,Ceuvres III,p 21. 
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history for the sake of the CounterRevolution. His 
unhistorical approach is made exploit in the first 
book of the_Lesialation primitive. The third chapter 
is entitled "Concerning Truth and Reason" - a title 
carefully 6hosen to demonstrate the fallacy of the 
author of the book, "Concerning Reason and Truth" . 
a defective title, 
because truth precedes 
reason in order to 
shape it. 	47 
The Cartesian scientific method, therefore, which begins 
in doubt, applicable as it is to the physical sciences, 
cannot be extended to the moral sciences where to begin 
in doubt is to end in doubt: 
One cannot reject, under 
pretext of error, all 
moral belief without 
destroying at the same 
time in man and in 
society the motive or 
the practice of moral 
actions... (which cannot 
but lead to) the bottomless 
abyss of absolute pyrrhonism. 	48 
Bonald and Voltaire were, both of them, propagandists 
and moralists - preceptors of men; whose methods, in 
the heat of controversy, became more polemical as they 
became less historical. Both assert that the historian 
should strive for impartiality, but both, when it 
47 Oeuvres 414298,note. 
48.1S171,17,167. 
204. 
comes to the point of actually defining history, reveal 
the degree of their involvement in the wider eighteenth-
century controversy. What, asks Voltaire, would 
constitute useful history? And replies: 
That which should teach 
• us our duties and our 
• rights without appearing 
to teach them. 	49 
And so they started out, both armies flying the flag 
of impartiality, on their crusades for morality. 
History, then, is Bonald's court of appeal. It is 
in history that he seeks the confirmation and application 
of his doctrine: the fundamental, natural laws of the 
constitution, government, and administration of societies. 
Beginning, certainly, in the manner of his century, with 
an abstract exposition of principles, his work nevertheless 
receives animation from his highly subjective, colourful 
IWO of history. In particular, it is in French history 
that he seeks validation for the principles of natural 
law which he has advanced: to the collective, natural, 
oocial unit - the nation - when he requires substantiation 
for his own principles, and to the single, perverted, 
anarchic unit . the individual - when he requires 
falsification of others'. To conclude this study of 
Bonaldts doctrine, perhaps it would be iopropriate to 
review BonalWs own essays as an historian, to compile 
49' Dictionnaire philosophioue, Vol. IV, p. 57. 
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Bonald's own (albeit at times hypothetical) history 
of France, which should shed much li t both on his 
methods and on his principles* 
The state of Europe at the turn of, the nineteenth 
5 century, writes Bonald, 0  can only be understood by 
turning back one hundred and fifty years to the Treaty 
of Westphalia . bearing in' mind, of course, the natural 
and necessary laws of history* 
,Every social group, he recapitulatesPat least 
every social group whose constitution is based upon 
the natural order of things, passes, like man, from a 
state of infancy and growth to a state of virility and 
preservation* This natural tendency to develop 
necessarily produces antagonism between nations and, 
in their conflicts, those which have been established 
by man disappear, while those which have been constituted 
by nature that ie, those whiCh obey the natural laws 
of history . survive and increase until they attain in 
territory and population sufficient intrinsic strength 
to sustain in themselves the principl of their 
preservation* There is for each nation a boundary 
fixed by nature: limits (for example, seas, rivers, 
mountains, and even langdagesPthat the ambition of 
men can certainly euxmount, but beyond which permanent 
5O 'Du Traite de Westphalie et de celui de Campo-Formioa 
qMEtt2 11. 
514101.4 /44411-412* 52 Ibid:p.412. 
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claims can never be made. Once a nation arrives at 
these limits, it becomes fixed; henceforth it ceases 
to be a danger to other nations. It will never again 
attack, because it has nothing more to acquire and 
unless (as in Poland) it harbours a destructive principle 
within its constitution, it will never again have the 
fear of being deetroyed by conquest. 
It is by virtue of these natural principles that 
the Spanish nation is composed of the aggregation of 
many kingdoms, Great Britain of the conjunction Of 
three countries and Prance of the reunion of many 
feudal domains; it is by virtue of these principles 
that Germany and Italy strive to unify their estranged 
nations and (Bonald has no compunotion in prophesying) 53 
that Portugal must one day be reabsorbed into Spain 
and that Holland, dissevered from Gaul and Germany, 
must sooner or later be shared between them. 
Of all the societies of Barope none was given 
greater power of expansion than Prance because, says 
54 Bonald, none had laws more natural, traditions more 
enduring, or geographical boundaries more determined. 
France will not - indeed, must not • desist until she 
has attained these natural limits: the Alps, the Ocean, 




Bonald declares, is "France's natural boundary" to the 
55 north. But the Treaty of Westphalia, sullied already-, 
in Donald's eyes, by the terms which gave official 
recognition to democratic and protestant States, has, 
moreover, prevented Prance in her natural efforts to 
expand by guaranteeing the integrity of German territory 
and ceding Germany Belgium, which by nature belongs to 
France. By disregarding the natural destiny of Prance, 
the Treaty of Westphalia haa t Donald maintains, thrown 
Europe into a elate of "general ravolution4 6 And in 
this temporary aberration - the mistake of the peace. 
makers of 1648 . Europe had to aspire to raise herself 
to the fixed, natural and definitive state. It was 
left to the Treaty of Campo-Formio 57to establish this 
or at least to prepare the way, by giving to the States 
their constitution and their natural boundaries, or 
rather, putting them in a position to attain them one 
day. Since the cession of Belgium, Austria has not 
seemed to be opposed to the expansion of France to the 
Rhine. A rapprochement has thus became possible between 
the two great monarchic and Catholic powers of Europe, 
which, their interests no longer opposed, can find only 
a reason for greater understanding in the identity of 
their political and religious constitutions. - A similar 
559 Ibid, p.416. 
56e:1 E1134, 429. 
57.Itdd,p.430. 
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rapprochement, based upon a similar affinity of 
constitutions, must eventually be established with 
Spain and : with Italy. And then there Will be . 
Bonaldes dream . the union of the fear powers of the 
South as opposed to the four powers of the Borth . • 
England, Sweden, Prueeia and Russia. This confrontation 
of forces seems to Bonald to be in perfect harmony with 
the plan of the Creator, who decreed 
that the North should 
have the population and 
the workshops of the 	. 
world and the South the 
ascendancy of culture 
and civilization... 	58 
This confrontation will pat an end to the retrograde , 
work of the Treaty of Westphalia: the democratic States 
will disappear, the aristocratic States will be weakened, 
and monarchy will reassert its natural supremacy. 
Ultimately the natural, divine, historical laws of 
Louis de Bonald will result in complete affinity 
between political and religious societies, . in the 
return of Europe to religious unity. 59 
The illusions of Bonald concerning this harmony 
and the "definitive" state of Europe were soon rudely 
ehattere4 however, and by France herself; Napoleon's 
imperial Prance belied Bonald's principle that a nation 
58,1bid t p.435. 
5907E1g0N4364 
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which has attained or is within sight of attaining its 
natural boundaries, loses all motive for aggression. 
Nevertheless, Bonald clings to it tenaciously and, in 
an article written on the eve of the Treaty of Tilsit
he presents the hegemony that the war will assure France 
as the result of nature itself, which feels repugnance 
to all system of harmony or balance of power. 
This system, this power-balance which has been 
receiving much attention, Bonald regards as an invention 
of the eighteenth century philosophes. They saw 
everywhere, he writes, harmony and equilibriums in the 
universe, harmony and equilibrium between inconsistent 
beings and elements; in the political sphere, between 
antagonistic powers; in man himself, between 
contradictory passions: all of which is contrary to 
nature. Nature establishes everywhere superior powers, 
and constitutes man, the State, the political world, and 
universe, not by the balancing of opposed forces but, 
to the contrary, by a Unique direction of common forcesll 
man, by subordinating his passions to the power of his 
reason; the State, by subordinating all men to the power 
of one man; the political world, by subordinating all 
peoples to the power of one people; the universe finally 
60. 011$6quilibre de Europe" ;also "De liUnitti Religieuse 
en Burope",Mdlan-es,CEuvres VII. 
61De l'Unitog Eeligieuoe en Burope",Mdlanges,CEdvres VII. _ p.168, 
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by subordinating all beings to the power of one being — 
the Supreme Being, There is, true harmony: in 
subordination, A balance of powers is a complete 
and dangerous fallacy. 
It is thus in the name of his fundamental principle 
of the unity of power that Bonald =bate the idea of 
62 a political balance in Europe, The contemporary 
interpretation, as Donald understands it, comprehends, 
a state of affairs produced when ono nation or alliance, 
balanced by another nation or alliance with equal means 
and resources, are at peace on account of the equality 
of forces which could mutually destroy one another, 
This is, Bonald considers, the application to political 
theory of an idea borrowed from mechanics; the desire 
to make of society a machine strikes Bonald as typical 
of the - century whiCh had reduced man to a robot. The 
eighteenth century had seen in society only physical 
forces, and had overlooked the most potent forces of 
all; whose influence may be traced in every civilization: 
the moral force of character, of genius, and of wisdom
Upon such purely physical data as population 
figures, finances, and soil surveys, there does not 
and there cannot.. exist two n tions which are perfectly 




this equilibrium were possible, it still does not 
take into account the superiority that a man of genius 
or an outstanding general - an Alexander, a Hannibal, 
a Caesar, or a Richelieu - bestows; or, to take a 
more recent example: (the most brilliant, says Donald, 
which the history of societies could cite) the man who 
at this moment governs Prance and leads her to European 
64 domination* There is there a moral force which cannot 
be estimated by any preoonceived system of checks and 
balances, because it does not lend itself to calculation. 
Uoreover, these outstanding men have appeared but rarely, 
sometimes in one nation, sometimes in another, and less 
• to maintain the status quo than to reestablish power. 
Thus, concludes Donald, equilibrium has no part 
in the natural system for the government of societies * 
And he turns once again to the history of France to 
support his thesis* Destined to inherit the heritage 
of Rome and to exercise in the Christian world, by the 
ascendancy of its enlightenment and civilization, the 
supremacy that the ancient capital had secured by force 
of arms in the pagan world, Prance has been halted in 
her progress towards her natural political and religious 
destiny only by the checks which, in the course of the 
centuries, have been placed upon her power: sometimes 
64*Ibido4200-01, 
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internally, sometimes externally. With Charlemagne, 
France, so to speak, mounted the throne of Europe, 
but she was soon dethroned (without losing, it is true, 
ho adds, any of her dignity), With Louis XIV France 
was reinstated, in spite of the league of States to 
balance her power, but with Louis XV the downfall 
began. Externally France was gradually thrust into 
the background by the emergence of so many independent 
powers which offset French power and; fallen from her 
domination, she had no alternative but to accept this 
balance. Internally, by the excessive laxity of the 
government; by the abrupt change of fortune the 
result of the daring enterprise of a "foreign 
adventurer" . espedially by the spread of the philosophic 
spirit which undermines all religious, political and 
military institutions, power became weakened, degraded, 
and destroyed by the pressure of the forces which 
sought to limit it by checks and balances. Once divided, 
its days were numbered, until finally the factions 
within and the nations without induced the Bavolution. 
But nature, stronger than factiOns and nations . 
nature which wills that there be one power in Prance 
and that Prance be the power of Europe, as Europe is 
the power of the world . nature will render abortive 
the opposed designs of all factions and all nations: 
with irresistible force, she will reestablish in Prance 
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unity and independence of power and at the same time 
' give Prance preponderance and pre-eminence to which 
the fixed character of her language, her political and 
religious constitutions, and - her territory, entitles 
her, 65 
But if the illueions of Bonald, in 1801, 
concerning the peace and stability of EUrope bad been 
short-lived, his hopes in 1807, that Napoleon would 
assure for ever the pre-eminence of Prance, were even 
more quickly dadhed. After the auccesees Which exceeded 
even Bonald's expectations; after the apogee beyond all 
aspirations, came the reverses and the fall; after the 
European empire, came the dismemberment, France was 
returned to less than her natural limits, to less, 
oven, than the frontiers of the ancient monarchy, 
At the very moment that this dismemberment of 
France was being prepared by the victorious powers, 
Bonald took up his pen to reclaim Prance's natural 
rights. Not so much in the interest of France herself 
as that of Europe and world peace, the Allies should 
allow Prance her natural nothern boundary - the Rhine. 
And it was in the name of God's principles that 
Bonald formulated this petitiofi6which, had it ever 
65 Ibid, pp.196-197 
66 nelexions cur interet general on Eurepenof 
neonsidOratione cur les principaux dvenements de la 
revolution francalsen,MelanRes,CEuvres VII, 
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reached the Oongxess of Vienna, would certainly have 
struck the delegates as either temerarious or hilarious. 
Referring again to the Treaty of Westphalia, 
Ronald compares the war which that Treaty had concluded 
with that which had ended at Metternich's round table, 
expressing the hope that the terms drawn up by the 
latter will be more enduring than those of the former. 
The Thirty Years War was, Ronald considers, a war of 
religion kindled by the Reformation; the war which 
began with the Revolution has been a war of irreligion, 
provoked by the Hoe-called philosophicodoetrines, 
which are after all, in Bonald's view, merely the final 
consequence of the Reformation. The Treaty of 
Westphalia was nothing more than a masterpiece of 
diplomacy: 
• that art which serves 
mery often only to 
betray others, and even 
sometimes to deceive 
itself. 	67 
The Treaty of Vienna will be Ronald does not doubt, 
a masterpiece of politics: 
that science which 
establishes among nations 
the most natural 
relationships and, therefore, 




Europe needs order, and order mete, in the great 
European family, upon two bases; religion and monarchy. 
With the Treaty of Westphalia, the spirit of the 
Reformation grew into a popular system - in politics 
and in religion. With the Congress of Vienna, the 
monarchic system must - and will - be restored. 
The coalition of the powers against the vire 
Ronald views as the concerted effort of Europe to 
return France to her natural, monarchic constitution. 
•It is a shining attestation to the social and political 
importance of Prance; an avowal of her preponderance. 
•In Pranceve darkeet hours Bonald finds consolation 
and optimism in her ancient brilliance: It is France, 
•Ronald proclaims, which, through the centuries, hes 
preserved the political and religious truths. Europe 
Will be the first to Duffer, if she deprives France of 
the means of fulfilling her destiny. It to therefore 
in the political and religious interests of the Allies 
not to diminish France's power or territory. If Prance 
loses her natural boundaries, she will not rest until 
she has recovered them; France will thus be a permanent 
aggressor in Europe until she is restored to the Rhine. 
On the other hand, once her natural goal has been 
attained, France will cease to be a danger because, 
having nothing more to acquire, she will cease to be 
23.6. 
acquisitive, Instead she will be an example to the 
rest of the world - a unique example of a society 
which, having nothing to fear and nothing to lose, 
can direct all its efforts towards perfecting its 
customs, its laws, its administration, and its 
constitution . the example of a society fixed„ , 
completed and perfect. France will be an 
inspiration to Europe; the arbiter and oracle 
of nations. 
And so, in defeat, Bonald finds victory, 
Ironically, the theory of Preach supremacy reached 
its perfection at the very moment that the actuality 
had ebbed to the level of Waterloo, The audacity of 
Bonald's demands can only be explained by his 
invincible faith in the absolute truth of his 
principles: 
I am not saying: 
'Here is my scheme' 
for I do not have 
a scheme, But I am 
saying: Mere is the 
scheme of nature'. 	69 
Porhaps it is only just to allow Voltaire the last 
word: 
69.Theorle du pouvoir,CEuvres III,p.115. 
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How can we avoid bending 
in prostration before 
an old-clothes-man, 
who proves to us that 
his history has been 
written by God himself? 	70 




After nearly forty years devoted to the task of 
imparting to a hostile generation an insight into 
God's constitution for his kingdom on earth, Bonald 
died, ten years after the dethronement of his Boutbon 
ideas, still convinced that the Holy War had been — 
or was about to be — won. Catholicism must, and 
waald, triumph over atheism because the will of God 
must necessarily transcend the fiendish plots of 
sceptical individuals, caught always between an 
inconsequence and a blasphemy. And, more than 
anything else, it was in the universality and 
uniformity of Catholicism that Bonald found its 
strength. Whether Bonald is refuting Roussoaule 
notion of the general will, or attempting to imitate 
Vontesquieu's comparative sociology; whether he is 
contradicting Condoroet's concepts of truth and 
education, or analyzing Voltaire's philosophy of 
history . one common factor has emerged, and that 
is Bonaldss "obsession for unite, uniformite, and 
union": horizontally, his collectivist vision of 
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corporate societies.; vertically, his sense of the 
continuous and abiding in the "secret liaisonn 
between the past, the present and the future, The 
future always retains something of the past since 
there are, in time, at least two factors which are 
changeless: God and man. What is required, therefore, 
is not innovation but renovation, !loyalty is 
pernicious: it is an unnatural offence tainst society. 
Luther sought out novelty and society has paid the 
penalty — with the French Revolution, Shrinking from 
the temporal into the eternal, Bonald sought refuge 
from the mutable in the unchanging. The diminution 
of universality or eternity seemed to Bonald an 
admission of defeat. 
The thesis that, in Rousseau's fundamental precept 
of the inalienable character of sovereignty lies the 
origins of totalitarian democracy, is a recent one. 1 
• But the possibilities of what Professor Cobban 
describes as - nthe transmutation of democratic gold 
into totalitarian drosen 2were not lost on Rousseau's 
contemporaries particularly, of course, his 
opponents. It was becaase he perceived thin element 
of tyranny in the French Revolution that Edmund Burke 
1.J.R.Talmon,The °plains of Totalita;.ian Demooracg 
(London,1952). 
2, In Search of Rtmanity,,p.194. 
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opposed it so bitterly. And Lenormant olaimed3that, 
from 1769 on, the aristocrats in the National Assembly 
had consistently, cited Rousseau's testimony in favour 
of a monarchic state. Bonald was apparently not aware 
of this trend; daring the term of the National Assembly 
when aristocratic plaints were still beard, Bonald 
had not broken with the Revolution and its principles. 
But when, in exile, Donald began to analyze the ideas , 
underlying the Revolution, he discovered, as they 
had - men like DtAntraigues, Malouet, and Dergasse 
that many aspects of Rousseau's political theory 
could be adapted with ease to the counter-revolutionary 
cause, The first victim was, of course, the general 
will. On the basie, of Rousseau's testimony • that 
sovereignty could not be represented Donald was 
able to argue quite consistently that the people 
could not, therefore, be sovereign. For the people, 
Donald substituted society, and for society, the State, 
personified in the king. The king thus became the 
expression of the general will, which bears no 
relation to a counting of heads. Stripped of its 
individualist connotations, Rousseau's 'general wino 
became the basis of Donald's absolutism; just as 
Rousseau's theory of the unity of purpose and action 
3',Lenormant, ',Roue Beau, Aristocrat° "(1790 ) lu 24; 
Joan McDonald,Rousse.l. and the French Revolution 
1762-1791 (Lon on, 	• 
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was translated into Donald's monarchic "will-love
force" hierarchy. And, too; the concept of innate 
ideas . which, Donald argued with justification, 
Rousseau and the delete had borrowed from Christianity 
was only too easily repossessed and counterparried. 
Although Rousseau, in Donald's opinion, confused the 
natural with the native state, he nevertheless 
postulated . what became the core of Donald's work 
and the key to the Revolution - the idea that the . 
natural state is the perfect state; and its converse: 
that the imperfect state is =unnatural state which 
cannot last because nature . "iuvineible nature" . 
abhors aberrations. Just as Donald saw in Rousseau's 
concept of the general will the justification for his 
corporate society, so in Rousseau's natural law he 
found further validation for his Catholicism; and 
"natural" Donald equated with "divine". 
Of all the products of the Enlightenment, 
Montsequieu's Esnrit des lois lent itself most readily 
to Donald's corporate view of society and Donald was 
not slow to take advantage of Montesquieuls definition 
of the role and function of the social "corps", 
particularly the nobility. The nobility, both agreed, 
is an intermediary and hereditary body designed, not 
to estrange the king from his subjects, but to draw 
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them closer together. But while, to Montesquieu, 
the nobility is only a'monarchical phenomenon, to 
Donald it is a social necessity . the very embodiment 
of liberty and equality: equality, that is, of 
opportunity to ascend to the noble ranks, and liberty 
- the right to do so. Not only is society composed 
of "corps" •. but society itself is a "corps". 
Undoubtedly Bonald's view of the organic nature of 
nations owes much to the Esprit des lois. Despite 
the fact that for Montesquieu the climate is the 
decisive factor in moulding the national temperament, 
and for Donald it is the institutions and traditions, 
the format is common to both. But Montesquiea's most 
original and valuable contribution to the Enlightenment 
. one which even the Enlightenment for the most part 
was dubious to accept - was his empirical and comparative 
sociology, It is interesting, therefore, to find 
Donald attempting to follow Montesquieuls lead in this 
respect. For Bonald, in his analysis of the history 
. customs, origins and traditions - of the Germans, 
the Gauls, the Romans and others, truly believed that 
he had began with the "reality of history". Always, 
however, his sociological analysis lapses from 
relativism into absolutism. Where Montesquiea was 
the theorist of the contingent and the probable, Donald 
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aspired to political eternity: what Paguet described 
as Donald's flelizir de vie socials perpetuellen. 4 
The same collectivist motif is discernible in 
Donald's refutation of Condorcet's principles of 
enlightenment. Condor9et's fundamental error, as ' 
Donald saw it, was to envisage universal enlightenment 
in individualist terms. To seek universal truths in 
individual minds seemed to Donald to be a blatant 
contradiction. Synthesis, he believed, must replace 
multiplicity and adopting Condorget's own watchwords 
. reason, truth, and education - Donald set about 
redefining them; in order to produce a picture of 
enlightenment which was truly universal, Donald 
determined to denude it of all its individualist 
connotations. Like Henry Adam, Donald sought some 
great generalization which would finish the clamour 
to be educated. Beason became, in Donald's scheme, 
universal reason - which is revealed faith. Truth 
became universal truth which is embodied in revelation. 
And education became universal education which is 
moral and religious instruction based upon revelation. 
Enlightenment therefore became, in Donald's hands, 
the universal acceptance of revelation which meant, 
ultimately, the Catholic church. The Ten Commandments 
4. E. Paguot t  op. at,. p • 8 2• 
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. which represent the promulgation of the truth, •
the establishment of human reason, and the 'basis of 
society and education - represent, then, perfection. 
Condorcet's darkest hours were, for Ronald, the dawn. 
Nevertheless, the doctrine of earthly social 
Utopianism introduced a new dimension to Catholicism 
which, added to the belief that this mortal perfection 
is the final goal of human progress, brought Ronald 
very close to the Enlightenment indeed. Ronald, it 
is true, abandons Condorcet's straight-line theory 
of progress in favour of a cyclical pattern more 
accommodating to his counter revolution; and his 
belief that society must be perfected first . that 
the perfect man is feaeible only in the context of 
the perfect society . owes more to Rousseau than to 
Condor?et. Nevertheless, there is, in Ronald's 
assumption that the doctrine of progress presupposed 
the doctrine of perfectibility, no mean debt to 
Condor9et's "disguised sophism". 
Bonald's attitude towards history reaffirms his 
conception of the totality of society . whether it , 
be religious, domestic, or political • in the face 
of the nonentity of the individual. There le, in, 
Bonald's view of history, something of T o S.Eliot's 
"vast and impersonal forces". In the "philosophic 
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history" of the Enlightenment' Bonald detects what be 
considers to be the flaw of all eighteenth-century 
scholarship: its individualism. Not only do Voltaire 
and his contemporaries over.estimate the role of the 
individual in the tide of human affairs, but they also 
regard history as a science, analogous in its methods 
to the physical sciences, History, Bonald concurs, 
is a science, but it is a moral science; therefore 
the philosophic method (where to begin in doubt is to 
end in doubt) is inapplicable to history, where 
objectivity . far from being hapathie sublime" . 
involves commitment. ,Fearful of the Scylla of 
indifference, Bonald steered instead straight for the 
Charybdis off indoctrination. Of all the philoeophes 
Bonald might have chosen to attack on the score of 
indifference, it is ironic that he should have chosen 
Voltaire. For Voltaire at least in his advice to 
historians . probably came closer than any other to 
Bonald's idea of "truly philosophic hietoryo: that 
which should point morals and establish generalizations. 
It is even possible that Voltaire's Philosophy of 
History (although Bo:mid does not mention it) provided 
Bonald with the alternative to the eighteenth-century's 
philosophic history. While their historical conclusions 
were diametrically opposed, certainly their opinions 
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concerning the ways and means of arriving at those 
conclusions have points of similarity: not the least 
of which was their moralizing pragmatism. Raving 
smuggled into history their moral objectives, it was 
only too easy to extract them again as expedient 
lessons. In the great eighteenth-century controversy, 
it was history's reputation rather than the serious 
practice of the craft which profited. Bonald's own 
essays as an historian reveal his naive craving for 
unity and symmetry . at any cost. His history of 
prance moves more in the realms of hypothetical fancy 
than actuality: it is not so much a study of the past 
as a vision of the future, 
Rousseau, Montesquieu, Condor9et and Voltaire 
Bonald's chosen adversarie0 - brought to his works 
their own pre-conceptions: natural law, reason, 
perfectibility, and history, If Carl Becker's 
contention - that, in the eighteenth century, these 
were the words without which no enlightened person 
could reach a restful conclusion - is in anywise 
accurate, Bonald might even be termed enlightened, 
were it not for the fact that he continually sought 
to equate the terms he had borrowed with the terms he' 
knew: God, religion, grace, and sin. Bonald had been 
forced to meet the Enlightenment on its own level of 
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apprehension: to offer a rational apology for the terms 
of his faith, even if this at times resulted in what 
one critic described as a strange Christianity in which 
religion is justified only as a panacea for lawlessness, 
and a still stranger philosophy in which rational 
argument is invoked to reject reason itself. 5 
It would be fallacious, therefore, to dismiss 
Ronald simply as the postscript of the Middle Ages . 
the prophet of an outworn gospel whose very watchwords 
have been almost forgotten. On the contrary, although 
Bonald's gospel may have been outworn, his watchwords 
were the watchwords of the Enlightenment. Indeed, 
perhaps the most interesting observation to emerge 
from the thesis - which is less a comment upon Ronald 
than upon the Enlightenment itself . is the facility 
with which the old wine could be stored in the new 
vessels. 
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